Opinion
ACTION NO. 2:19cv210
2020-07-20
Lynda D. WILCOX, Plaintiff, v. TRANSMODAL SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant.
Lynda D. Wilcox, Pro Se. Julie Rouleau, Transmodal Solutions, LLC, 3 Commercial Place, 7th Floor, Norfolk, Virginia 23510, James Brieger, Transmodal Solutions, LLC, 25405 162nd Place SE, Covington, Washington 98042, for Defendant.
Lynda D. Wilcox, Pro Se.
Julie Rouleau, Transmodal Solutions, LLC, 3 Commercial Place, 7th Floor, Norfolk, Virginia 23510, James Brieger, Transmodal Solutions, LLC, 25405 162nd Place SE, Covington, Washington 98042, for Defendant.
OPINION
Rebecca Beach Smith, Senior United States District Judge
Plaintiff Lynda D. Wilcox ("Plaintiff"), appearing pro se, filed suit against her former employer, Defendant Transmodal Solutions, LLC ("Defendant"), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). Compl., ECF No. 5. This matter is before the court on Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment. Mot. Default J., ECF No. 13.
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 13, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED as to Defendant's liability on Plaintiff's claims of racial discrimination, racial harassment, and retaliation. Plaintiff's motion is DENIED as to damages at this time. The court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file a supplemental Motion for Default Judgment as to damages, pursuant to the instructions set forth herein, within twenty-one days from the date of entry of this Opinion.
I. Background
A. Plaintiff's Complaint
On May 8, 2019, the court issued an Order that granted pro se Plaintiff authorization to proceed in forma pauperis, and directed the Clerk to file Plaintiff's Complaint. Order at 1-2, ECF No. 4. In her Complaint, Plaintiff, an African American, alleges that she began working for Defendant as a Customer Service Representative in Norfolk, Virginia, on October 5, 2015. Compl. at 5, ECF No. 5. Plaintiff alleges that "in April/May 2017," she was directed to complete the work assignments of a Caucasian co-worker. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff alleges that she was "provided ... with a breakdown of the [co-worker's] workload," and believed that the co-worker had "adequate time to complete her work assignments" without assistance from Plaintiff. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that she complained about the "disparity of the work" to representatives of Defendant's management; however, Plaintiff's workload was not adjusted. Id. at 6. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that she was advised that she was "trust[ed] ... [to] handle the multiple roles [she] was assigned." Id.
Plaintiff further alleges that she "was the only Black manager onsite who was required to have a Bachelor's Degree to hold a management position." Id. Plaintiff alleges that her "Caucasian counterparts did not have a degree," but nevertheless "received different pay and job opportunities and favoritism because of their race." Id. Plaintiff alleges that although she was "required to clock in and out," the Caucasian managers were not required to do so. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that her "Caucasian counterparts" were "allowed to work minimal hours," take "long extended lunches," "have extended vacation time," and "perform less managerial duties." Id.
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Amanda Hill, a Caucasian Operations Manager, "encourage[d] [Plaintiff] to reprimand black subordinates," and treated Plaintiff poorly if Plaintiff "made an attempt to reprimand a white employee." Id. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that she was "disrespected," "ridiculed," and given additional "daily managerial duties" when she attempted to reprimand white employees. Id.
Plaintiff further alleges that the situation "intensified" between July and November 2017, and that Ms. Hill "would make demeaning comments about people of color, such as calling them ‘bitches’ [and] ‘[f]at black heffas.’ " Id. Plaintiff alleges that "offensive comments," "jokes, slurs, name calling, cursing, threats, intimidation, insults [,] and put downs" were made "to every individual on the team excluding Caucasian workers." Id. Plaintiff alleges that she reported the "harassment and discriminatory practices" to James Brieger, Defendant's Chief Executive Officer, and was subsequently "excluded from manager meetings." Id.
In November 2017, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination against Defendant with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id. After filing the Charge of Discrimination, Plaintiff alleges that she was "retaliated against in different terms and conditions of employment," and "denied paid time off." Id. Plaintiff further alleges that Ms. Hill continued to harass Plaintiff, and Mr. Brieger "ignored [Plaintiff's] complaints against [Ms. Hill]." Id.
In December 2017, Plaintiff filed a second Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, in which she alleged that she had been subjected to retaliation after filing her initial Charge of Discrimination. EEOC Charge, ECF No. 5-1 at 5.
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of her work environment, she was diagnosed with anxiety and depression. Compl. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that her physician prescribed medication for Plaintiff, and recommended that Plaintiff take time off of work, limit her weekly work schedule, and "see a counselor once a month." Id. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Brieger "openly discussed" Plaintiff's health conditions, despite Plaintiff's request for confidentiality. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that she submitted a request for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), based on her physician's recommendations, and that Mr. Brieger attempted to "see how he could get [Plaintiff's] FMLA revoked." Id.
Plaintiff alleges that "Mr. Brieger refused to hear any additional complaints or investigate any issues [that] [Plaintiff] brought to his attention about Ms. Hill." Id. at 7. On July 1, 2018, Plaintiff submitted a resignation letter to Ms. Hill, in which Plaintiff stated that she "tolerated a toxic work environment for as long as [she] was able to endure." Resignation Letter, ECF No. 5-1 at 14; see Compl. at 8 (alleging that Plaintiff was "constructive[ly] discharge[d]" from her employment with Defendant).
On December 12, 2018, the EEOC issued a Determination as to both of Plaintiff's Charges of Discrimination. Determination, ECF No. 5-1 at 3. In its Determination, the EEOC (i) noted that Defendant declined to respond to either of Plaintiff's Charges of Discrimination; and (ii) found reasonable cause to believe that Defendant subjected Plaintiff to racial discrimination, racial harassment, and retaliation. Id. The EEOC attempted to settle Plaintiff's matters via conciliation; however, after conciliation attempts failed, the EEOC issued a "Notice of Right to Sue (Conciliation Failure)" ("Right to Sue Letter") on February 5, 2019. Right Sue Letter, ECF No. 5-1 at 1. Plaintiff initiated this action, in which she asserts claims of racial discrimination, racial harassment, and retaliation, on April 23, 2019, within ninety days of the receipt of her Right to Sue Letter. IFP Appl., ECF No. 1. As relief, Plaintiff seeks $63,000 in monetary damages. Compl. at 8.
In a February 7, 2019 email from an EEOC investigator to Plaintiff, the EEOC investigator stated that Defendant "ignored [the EEOC] completely from the beginning." Feb. 7, 2019 Email, ECF No. 5-1 at 9.
B. Service of Process
Because the court granted pro se Plaintiff authorization to proceed in forma pauperis in this action, the court coordinated the service of process on Defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (explaining that "[t]he officers of the court shall issue and serve all process" when a plaintiff is granted in forma pauperis status). In an Order dated May 8, 2019, the court directed the Clerk to send Defendant a copy of Plaintiff's Complaint and a Waiver of Service form. Order at 2, ECF No. 4. The court stated:
If Defendant fails to waive service, the Clerk is DIRECTED to: (i) issue [a] summons; (ii) prepare a packet containing a summons, a copy of the Complaint, and this Order for Defendant; and (iii) deliver the packet to the United States Marshal, who is DIRECTED to serve the packet upon Defendant.
Id.
Defendant failed to waive service. Therefore, the Clerk, as directed, issued a summons, prepared a service packet, and delivered the service packet to the United States Marshal. Summons, ECF No. 6. On July 18, 2019, a United States Marshal personally served Julie Rouleau, an Operations Manager for Defendant. Executed Summons at 1, ECF No. 7. As explained in the summons, Defendant was required to file a responsive pleading to Plaintiff's Complaint within twenty-one days from the date of service of the summons. Id. at 2. More than twenty-one days passed, and Defendant did not file a responsive pleading.
Defendant's website identifies Ms. Rouleau as one of two management employees based in Defendant's Norfolk, Virginia office. See Management, Transmodal Solutions, https://www.transmodalsolutions.com/management (last visited July 9, 2020).
On August 29, 2019, the court issued an Order, in which it: (i) summarized the service of–and lack of response from–Defendant; and (ii) explained that personal service on Ms. Rouleau complied with the service requirements of Rule 4 (h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Order at 1-3, ECF No. 8. However, the court, out of an abundance of caution, directed the Clerk to attempt service on Defendant via alternate means. The court stated:
The court explained that, pursuant to Federal Rule 4(h), a company may be served "by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer [or] a managing or general agent" of the company. Order at 2, ECF No. 8 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h) ).
Additionally, the court stated that "although Defendant conducts business in Virginia, it appears that Defendant is not registered with the Virginia State Corporation Commission, and has not identified a registered agent in Virginia to accept service on behalf of the company." Id. (citing Commonwealth of Virginia State Corporation Commission, https://www.scc.Virginia.gov/clk/bussrch.aspx (last visited July 9, 2020)).
Defendant is a Washington limited liability company, and according to the website for the Washington Corporations and Charities Filing System, the address for Defendant's registered agent in Washington is 25405 162nd Place SE, Covington, Washington 98042-0000. The website only identifies the name of Defendant's registered agent as "Transmodal Solutions, LLC;" however, it identifies James Brieger as Defendant's "governor."
The court explained that a "governor" is defined by the Revised Code of Washington as, among other things:
(e) A manager of a manager-managed limited liability company;
(f) A member of a member-managed limited liability company; ... or
(h) Any other person under whose authority the powers of an entity are exercised and under whose direction the activities and affairs of the entity are managed pursuant to the organic law and organic rules of the entity.
Order at 3 n.3 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 23.95.105(12) (2019)).
The court directed the Clerk to: (i) issue another summons for Defendant, directed to the attention of James Brieger at Transmodal Solutions, LLC, 25405 162nd Place SE, Covington, Washington 98042-0000; (ii) prepare a packet containing a summons, a copy of the Complaint, and this Order; and (iii) deliver the packet to the United States Marshal for service. Id. at 3-4. To increase the likelihood of a response, the court also directed the Clerk to send a copy of the August 29, 2019 Order to Ms. Rouleau. Id. at 4. The court specifically advised Defendant that "failure to respond to this action may result in the entry of default and default judgment pursuant to Federal Rule 55." Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), (b) ).
On September 3, 2019, a United States Marshal mailed a service packet to Defendant, as instructed, via certified mail with return receipt requested. Returned Summons, ECF No. 10; see Order at 4, ECF No. 11 (summarizing the mailing details). According to online records, there was "[n]o [a]uthorized [r]ecipient [a] vailable" to accept delivery of the certified mail at the registered agent's location on September 6, 2019. Order at 4 (citations omitted). Although the United States Postal Service left a notice at the location, it did not appear that Defendant's registered agent attempted to pick up the service packet. Id. Defendant did not file a responsive pleading in this action.
C. Default Issues
In an Order dated October 16, 2019, the court explained that "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise," Federal Rule 55(a) provides that "the clerk must enter the party's default." Id. at 5 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) ). The court further explained that "although Defendant's Operations Manager, Ms. Rouleau, was personally served with process by a United States Marshal on July 18, 2019, and service was also attempted on Defendant's registered agent in Washington (of which Ms. Rouleau was made aware), Defendant has not responded to Plaintiff's Complaint." Id.
The court determined that "Defendant's conduct evidence[d] a failure to ‘otherwise defend’ this action." Id. at 6 (quoting Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Haslup, No. 2:10cv191, 2012 WL 12953465, at *6 n.6, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197369, at *18 n.6 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 12, 2012) for the proposition that "a court can enter default under Rule 55(a) sua sponte against a litigant who has failed to answer the complaint or otherwise defend a pending action"). As a result, the court directed the Clerk to enter Defendant's default pursuant to Federal Rule 55(a). Id.; see Entry Default, ECF No. 12.
Additionally, the court explained:
Once default is entered, "the next step is entry of a ‘default judgment’ resulting from such ‘default.’ " Vick v. Wong, 263 F.R.D. 325, 328 (E.D. Va. 2009) ; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (a), (b). "A default judgment is ‘a final disposition of the case and an appealable order that has the same effect as a judgment rendered after a trial on the merits.’ " J & J Sports Prods. v. After Six Prods., No. 3:13cv591 [2014 WL 644400, at *2], 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21435, at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 19, 2014) (internal citations omitted).
Order at 6. The court further explained that, pursuant to Federal Rule 55(b), if a plaintiff's claims are not for "a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation," the plaintiff "must apply to the court for a default judgment." Id. at 6-7 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) ). Because Plaintiff's claims in this action are not for "a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation," the court advised Plaintiff that "she may file a Motion for Default Judgment against Defendant pursuant to Federal Rule 55(b)(2)." Id. at 7 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) ).
D. Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment on October 24, 2019. Mot. Default J., ECF No. 13. Upon review, it did not appear that Plaintiff sent a copy of the Motion for Default Judgment to Defendant. Order at 6, ECF No. 15. As such, in an Order dated April 24, 2020, the court stated: "Prior to ruling on the merits of Plaintiff's motion, the court will coordinate the service of Plaintiff's motion on Defendant, and provide Defendant with an opportunity to respond." Id. The court further stated:
[T]he Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 13, and a copy of this Order, to Defendant via: (i) Julie Rouleau at Transmodal Solutions, LLC, 3 Commercial Place, 7th Floor, Norfolk, Virginia 23510; and (ii) James Brieger at Transmodal Solutions, LLC, 25405 162nd Place SE, Covington, Washington 98042. Defendant is ORDERED to file any intended opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment within twenty-one days from the date of entry of this Order.
Id. at 6-7. Defendant did not respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment.
II. Analysis
A. Federal Rule 55
As explained above, Federal Rule 55 provides that entry of default is appropriate "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Such is the case here and, as noted above, the Clerk has entered default against Defendant. Entry Default, ECF No. 12.
After default has been entered against a party, a plaintiff may move for default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). In considering whether to enter default judgment, a court recognizes that, by its default, a defendant has conceded the factual allegations in the complaint. See Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 780 (4th Cir. 2001). However, default does not constitute an admission of the plaintiff's conclusions of law, and is not to be "treated as an absolute confession by the defendant of ... liability and of the plaintiff's right to recover." Id. (quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) ). Instead, the court must "determine whether the well-pleaded allegations in [the movant's] complaint support the relief sought in [the] action." Id. "In performing that task, the [c]ourt will examine the essential elements of [the] [p]laintiff's claims and determine whether [the] [p]laintiff has pled facts sufficient to satisfy those elements." Portfolio Recovery Assocs. v. Portfolio Recovery Group, LLC, No. 2:12cv649, 2013 WL 5723869, at *2, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150998, at *6 (E.D. Va. Oct. 18, 2013) ; see GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 612 n.3 (E.D. Va. 2003).
In her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims under Title VII for racial discrimination, racial harassment, and retaliation. Compl. at 1-7, ECF No. 5. The court will analyze the sufficiency of the factual allegations asserted by Plaintiff to support each claim.
B. Racial Discrimination
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1). To state a prima facie claim of race discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show (i) membership in a protected class; (ii) satisfactory job performance; (iii) an adverse employment action; and (iv) more favorable treatment of someone outside the protected class with comparable qualifications. Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). Under Title VII, an adverse employment action "is a discriminatory act that ‘adversely affects the terms, conditions, or benefits of the plaintiff's employment.’ " Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 2004) ).
As summarized above, Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that (i) she is a member of a protected class (i.e., African American); (ii) she was "trust[ed] ... [to] handle the multiple roles [she] was assigned" at work, including the additional responsibilities of her Caucasian co-worker, thus suggesting that Plaintiff's job performance was satisfactory; (iii) she was subjected to additional work assignments, unequal job opportunities, unequal terms and conditions of employment, and harassment that ultimately forced Plaintiff to submit her resignation; and (iv) Plaintiff's Caucasian counterparts received more favorable treatment from Defendant. Compl. at 5-7; Resignation Letter, ECF No. 5-1 at 14.
The court finds that (i) Plaintiff's factual allegations are sufficient to satisfy the elements of a racial discrimination claim; and (ii) Plaintiff is therefore entitled to the entry of default judgment against Defendant as to this claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment is GRANTED as to Defendant's liability on Plaintiff's racial discrimination claim.
C. Racial Harassment
To establish a prima facie case of harassment under Title VII, a plaintiff must show: (i) unwelcome conduct; (ii) based on a protected characteristic; (iii) which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment; and (iv) which is imputable to the defendant. Perkins v. Int'l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 196, 207-08 (4th Cir. 2019) ; Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 221 (4th Cir. 2016) ; Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 745-46 (4th Cir. 2006) ; Monk v. Potter, 723 F. Supp. 2d 860, 880 (E.D. Va. 2010).
To reach the level of severity or pervasiveness necessary for a prima facie case of harassment, a plaintiff must show that "the environment was pervaded with discriminatory conduct ‘aimed to humiliate, ridicule, or intimidate,’ thereby creating an abusive atmosphere." EEOC v. Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167, 175 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007) ). In determining whether the harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive, courts will consider "(1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) its severity; (3) whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Jones v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712-13 (E.D. Va. 2004). Notably, this element "has both subjective and objective components." Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d at 175. A plaintiff must establish that he or she "did perceive, and a reasonable person would perceive, the environment to be abusive or hostile." Id.
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that Ms. Hill "would make demeaning comments about people of color, such as calling them ‘bitches’ [and] ‘[f] at black heffas.’ " Compl. at 6. Plaintiff further alleges that "offensive comments," "jokes, slurs, name calling, cursing, threats, intimidation, insults[,] and put downs" were made "to every individual on the team excluding Caucasian workers." Id. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that she was "disrespected," "ridiculed," and given additional "daily managerial duties" when she attempted to reprimand white employees. Id.
The court finds that (i) Plaintiff's factual allegations are sufficient to satisfy the elements of a racial harassment claim; and (ii) Plaintiff is therefore entitled to the entry of default judgment against Defendant as to this claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment is GRANTED as to Defendant's liability on Plaintiff's racial harassment claim.
D. Retaliation
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee "because he [or she] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he [or she] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: (i) the plaintiff engaged in protected activity; (ii) the plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action by the employer; and (iii) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 432 (4th Cir. 2006) ; King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 150-51 (4th Cir. 2003).
In analyzing the requirement of an adverse employment action in a Title VII retaliation claim, the United States Supreme Court has explained that it "is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment." Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). Instead, a plaintiff may satisfy the adverse employment action requirement by showing "materially adverse" action that "well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’ " Id. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ); see Edwards v. Murphy-Brown, L.L.C., 802 F. Supp. 2d 670, 677 (E.D. Va. 2011).
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that (i) she engaged in protected activity by reporting "harassment and discriminatory practices" to Mr. Brieger, and by filing Charges of Discrimination with the EEOC; (ii) after reporting her concerns to Mr. Brieger, Plaintiff was "excluded from manager meetings;" and (iii) after filing her Charges of Discrimination, Plaintiff was "retaliated against in different terms and conditions of employment," Plaintiff was "denied paid time off," Plaintiff's health conditions were "openly discussed" despite Plaintiff's request for confidentiality, Mr. Brieger attempted to revoke Plaintiff's FMLA leave, and Mr. Brieger ignored Plaintiff's subsequent complaints against Ms. Hill. Compl. at 6-7.
The court finds that (i) Plaintiff's factual allegations are sufficient to satisfy the elements of a retaliation claim; and (ii) Plaintiff is therefore entitled to the entry of default judgment against Defendant as to this claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment is GRANTED as to Defendant's liability on Plaintiff's retaliation claim.
E. Damages
Because the court hereby grants Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment as to Defendant's liability on each of Plaintiff's claims, the court must also determine the appropriate relief to award Plaintiff in this case. In her Complaint, and in her Motion for Default Judgment, Plaintiff asks the court to award her $63,000 in monetary damages. Compl. at 8, ECF No. 5; Mot. Default J. at 1, ECF No. 13.
As Federal Rule 54 (c) explains, "[a] default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
"Although well-pled factual allegations are accepted as true for default judgment purposes, a party who defaults does not admit the allegations in the complaint as to the amount of damages." Int'l Union v. Se. Protective Servs., No. 2:14cv162, 2015 WL 1916857, at *2, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54813, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 27, 2015) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (b) (6) ). Therefore, when a court determines that liability has been established in a default judgment setting, the court cannot accept damage-related allegations as true, and must "make an independent determination regarding damages." PharMerica East, LLC v. Healthlink of Va. Shores, LLC, No. 2:19cv456, 2020 WL 877983, at *3, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30348, at *6 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2020). In doing so, the court "may rely on affidavits or documentary evidence in the record." Id.
Here, Plaintiff categorizes her request for $63,000 in monetary damages as follows: (i) $10,000 in back pay; (ii) $50,000 in compensatory damages; and (iii) $3,000 in attorney's fees and costs. Mot. Default J. at 1. To support her request for back pay, Plaintiff alleges that she "took a new job earning $10,000 less per year" after she was "constructive[ly] discharge[d]" by Defendant. Id. With respect to her request for compensatory damages, Plaintiff states that "[p]ursuant to Title VII[,] an employee who is subjected to discrimination by an employer with 15 to 50 employees ... can be awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages." Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that she has paid $3,000 in attorney's fees and costs in this action. Id.
Although Plaintiff is appearing pro se in this action, Plaintiff was represented by an attorney prior to her initiation of this lawsuit. Letter, ECF No. 5-1 at 12.
The court finds that Plaintiff did not provide affidavits, documents, receipts, invoices, or other evidence that adequately support her request for monetary damages. As noted above, the court cannot accept damage-related allegations as true in a default judgment setting, and must "make an independent determination regarding damages." PharMerica East, LLC, 2020 WL 877983, at *3, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30348, at *6. Under these circumstances, the court finds that Plaintiff has not submitted sufficient evidence to support her request for monetary damages. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment is DENIED as to damages at this time. However, the court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file a supplemental Motion for Default Judgment as to damages within twenty-one days from the date of entry of this Opinion. Plaintiff is ADVISED that her supplemental motion must provide evidence–by way of affidavits (from Plaintiff or other individuals with personal knowledge regarding Plaintiff's damages), documents, receipts, invoices, or other evidence–to support each category of damages requested by Plaintiff. Plaintiff is ORDERED to send a copy of any supplemental motion to Defendant via: (i) Julie Rouleau at Transmodal Solutions, LLC, 3 Commercial Place, 7th Floor, Norfolk, Virginia 23510; and (ii) James Brieger at Transmodal Solutions, LLC, 25405 162nd Place SE, Covington, Washington 98042. Plaintiff is ADVISED that this action may be dismissed if she chooses not to file a supplemental motion.
The court notes that Plaintiff attached FMLA documents to her Complaint, which were completed by Plaintiff's physician, that indicate that Plaintiff suffered from "anxiety and depression;" however, the documents do not provide any further details regarding Plaintiff's condition. FMLA Docs., ECF No. 5-1 at 19. Plaintiff also attached a letter that Plaintiff's former attorney sent to Defendant on April 5, 2019, for settlement purposes, in which the attorney referenced Plaintiff's $10,000 per year loss of earnings and $2,000 (not $3,000) in attorney's fees; however, these statements are not supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Letter, ECF No. 5-1 at 13.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 13, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED as to Defendant's liability on Plaintiff's claims of racial discrimination, racial harassment, and retaliation. Plaintiff's motion is DENIED as to damages at this time. The court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file a supplemental Motion for Default Judgment as to damages, pursuant to the instructions set forth herein, within twenty-one days from the date of entry of this Opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.