Opinion
July Term, 1811.
From Gates.
The saving in the statute of limitations, as to persons "beyond seas." does not extend to persons resident in other States of the Union.
THE defendants gave a letter to Copeland and Freeman, directed and to be delivered to the plaintiff, and therein requested the plaintiff to furnish Copeland and Freeman with goods to the amount of $2,000, and promised to be securities for the payment of that sum. The goods were accordingly furnished by the plaintiff, and after more than three (24) years had elapsed from the delivery of the goods this action was brought, to which the defendants pleaded, "that they had not assumed within three years," and rested their defense upon the statute of limitations. The plaintiff, at the time he delivered the goods, and continually afterwards up to the time of bringing this suit, resided at Suffolk, in the State of Virginia. There was a verdict for the defendants, and the plaintiff having obtained a rule for a new trial, it is submitted to the Supreme Court to decide, Whether the saving in the statute of limitations, 1715, ch. 27, sec. 9, as to persons beyond seas, extends to a person resident in the State of Virginia.
Although more than three years have elapsed since the plaintiff's cause of action accrued, it is contended that as he was a resident of the State of Virginia, his case is embraced by Laws 1715, ch. 27, sec. 9, which gives a further time to plaintiffs "beyond seas," etc., to bring their actions, provided they do so within a certain time after their return from beyond seas. The plaintiff is certainly not within the words of the proviso, and it does not appear to the Court that he falls within the true meaning and spirit of it. Great is the intercourse between the citizens of this State and the citizens of other States, particularly adjoining States; and if suits were permitted to be brought on that account against our own citizens, at any distance of time, by citizens of other States, the mischief would be great. Let the rule for a new trial be discharged.
Cited: S. v. Harris, 71 N.C. 176.
(25)