Opinion
2:22-cv-00109-JAK (MAA)
08-25-2022
CHRISTOPHER WHITE, Plaintiff, v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY et al., Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
MARIA A. AUDERO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS
On January 5, 2022, Plaintiff Christopher White (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint alleging violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). (Compl., ECF No. 1.) That same day, Plaintiff also filed a Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2), which the Court granted on January 12, 2022 (ECF No. 5). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court screened and dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend on March 3, 2022. (ECF No. 8.)
On May 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (FAC, ECF No. 11.) On May 31, 2022, the Court screened and dismissed the FAC with leave to amend (“Order”). (Order, ECF No. 13.) The Court ordered Plaintiff to file a response to the Order, no later than June 27, 2022, electing to proceed with one of the following options: (1) file a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”); (2) proceed with the FAC; or (3) voluntary dismissal. (Id. at 11-13.) The Court cautioned Plaintiff that “failure to respond to this Order may result in a recommendation that this lawsuit be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute and/or failure to comply with a court order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See C.D. Cal. L.R. 41-1.” (Id. at 13.)
On July 18, 2022, in the absence of a filed SAC or other response to the Order, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause, ordering Plaintiff to show cause by August 17, 2022 why the Court should not recommend that the case be dismissed for want of prosecution (“OSC”). (OSC, ECF No. 14.) The Court stated that if Plaintiff filed a SAC, notice to proceed with the FAC, or notice of dismissal on or before such date, the OSC would be discharged, and no additional action need be taken. (Id.) The Court again advised Plaintiff that “failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation that the lawsuit be dismissed for failure to prosecute and/or comply with court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 41-1.” (Id.)
To date, Plaintiff has failed to file a SAC or otherwise comply with the Order, and has failed to respond to the OSC. Indeed, Plaintiff has not communicated with the Court since May 11, 2022.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
District courts may dismiss cases sua sponte for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with a court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962) (holding that the court has “inherent power” to dismiss cases sua sponte for lack of prosecution). Unless the Court states otherwise, a dismissal under Rule 41(b) operates as an adjudication on the merits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). “Dismissal is a harsh penalty and is to be imposed only in extreme circumstances.” In re: Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. USPS, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)).
“A Rule 41(b) dismissal ‘must be supported by a showing of unreasonable delay.'” Omstead v. Dell, 594 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). In addition, the court must weigh the following factors in determining whether a Rule 41(b) dismissal is warranted: “(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants/respondents; (4) the availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit will “affirm a dismissal where at least four factors support dismissal, or where at least three factors strongly support dismissal.” Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 788 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)). Finally, “in order to warrant a sanction of dismissal, the party's violations of the court's orders must be due to wilfulness or bad faith.” Id.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Public's Interest in Expeditious Resolution and the Court's Need to Manage Its Docket
The first and second factors (the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation and the Court's need to manage its docket) weigh in favor of dismissal. “Orderly and expeditious resolution of disputes is of great importance to the rule of law.” In re: Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1227. “The public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642 (quoting Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990). In addition, district courts “have an inherent power to control their dockets,” In re: Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986)), and “are best suited to determine when delay in a particular case interferes with docket management and the public interest.” Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990 (quoting Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1984)).
The first two factors are usually reviewed together “to determine if there is an unreasonable delay.” In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff has failed to file a SAC or otherwise comply with the Order, has failed to respond to the OSC, and has not participated in this lawsuit since May 11, 2022. The Court concludes that Plaintiff's inaction and lack of communication with the Court constitute willful unreasonable delay. See, e.g., Thomas v. Maricopa Cnty. Jail, 265 F. App'x. 606, 607 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing pro se prisoner lawsuit for failure to respond to a court order for almost three months). Plaintiff's noncompliance also interferes with the public's interest in the expeditious resolution of this litigation and hinders the Court's ability to manage its docket. See In re: Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1227 (“[The Ninth Circuit] defer[s] to the district court's judgment about when a delay becomes unreasonable ‘because it is in the best position to determine what period of delay can be endured before its docket becomes unmanageable.”) (quoting In re Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1451)). The first and second factors favor dismissal.
B. Risk of Prejudice to Defendants
The third factor (risk of prejudice to the defendants) also weighs in favor of dismissal. “A defendant suffers prejudice if the plaintiff's actions impair the defendant's ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” In re: Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Adriana Int'l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990)). “The law also presumes prejudice from unreasonable delay.” Id. The risk of prejudice to a defendant is related to a plaintiff's reason for failure to prosecute an action. Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642 . “Whether prejudice is sufficient to support an order of dismissal is in part judged with reference to the strength of the plaintiff's excuse for the default.” Malone, 833 F.2d at 131.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to file a SAC or otherwise comply with the Order, and has failed to respond to the OSC. Indeed, Plaintiff has not communicated with the Court since May 11, 2022. As “a presumption of prejudice arises from the plaintiff's unexplained failure to prosecute,” the third factor favors dismissal. See Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 400 (9th Cir. 1998).
C. Availability of Less Drastic Alternatives
The fourth factor (the availability of less drastic alternatives) also supports dismissal. “The district court need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424.
The Court considered and implemented less drastic alternatives prior to dismissal. The Court twice warned Plaintiff that failure to respond to the Court's orders would result in a recommendation that the action be dismissed for failure to prosecute and/or failure to comply with Court orders pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See In re: Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1229 (“Warning that failure to obey a court order will result in dismissal can itself meet the ‘consideration of alternatives' requirement.”). The Court also extended Plaintiff's deadline to file a SAC or otherwise respond to the Order from June 22, 2022 to August 17, 2022. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the district court's allowance of an additional thirty days for plaintiff to file an amended complaint was an attempt at a less drastic sanction). The fourth factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
D. Public Policy Favoring Disposition on the Merits
As to the fifth factor, “[p]ublic policy favors disposition of cases on the merits.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643. However, “a case that is stalled or unreasonably delayed by a party's failure to comply with deadlines . . . cannot move toward resolution on the merits.” In re: Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1228. Thus, “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case towards disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The case has been stalled by Plaintiff's failure to file a SAC or otherwise comply with the Order, and failure to respond to the OSC. Still, the public policy favoring the resolution of disputes on the merits is strong and, under the circumstances, outweighs Plaintiff's noncompliance and inaction.
E. Dismissal Without Prejudice
In summary, Plaintiff's failure to file a SAC or otherwise comply with the Order, failure to respond to the OSC, and failure to otherwise participate in this lawsuit since May 11, 2022, constitute willful unreasonable delay. Four of the Rule 41(b) dismissal factors weigh in favor of dismissal, whereas only one factor weighs against dismissal. “While the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits weighs against [dismissal], that single factor is not enough to preclude imposition of this sanction when the other four factors weigh in its favor.” RioProps., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1022 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court concludes that dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute and to comply with Court orders is warranted, but, consistent with Rule 41(b) and this Court's exercise of its discretion, the dismissal is without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that this lawsuit is DISMISSED without prejudice. No further filings shall be accepted under this case number.
JOHN A. KRONSTADT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE