Opinion
22-1328
10-20-2022
CALVIN L. WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES E. ALBERTELLI, PA, d/b/a ALAW; SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING, LLC, Defendants-Appellees.
D.C. No. 1:21-CV-03390-PAB-KLM (D. Colo.)
Before PHILLIPS, CARSON, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Calvin L. White appealed an order entered by the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado transferring the underlying case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The case was transferred from the District of Colorado, and litigation proceedings have resumed in the Northern District of Georgia.[*]Mr. White appealed the transfer order to this court. After the appeal was opened, the court issued an order to show cause to Mr. White to demonstrate how this court has jurisdiction to consider his appeal of a nonfinal order. See 10th Cir. R. 27.3(B). He filed a memorandum brief in response. Upon consideration of the record of the proceedings below, Mr. White's response, and the applicable law, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
This court's ordinary jurisdiction is to review final decisions of the district courts within this circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. An order transferring a case from one federal district court to another without ending the litigation entirely is by its nature not a "final decision" of a district court. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. McGlamery, 74 F.3d 218, 221 (10th Cir. 1996). A transfer merely ends one court's involvement with a case and allows another court to continue the proceedings through their conclusion, which is what happened here. The District of Colorado ended its involvement when it transferred the case to the Northern District of Georgia. The Northern District of Georgia has placed the case on its docket, and discovery will likely begin soon. In other words, the litigation is ongoing, and nothing about the case is currently final.
Mr. White would need to show an exception to the final judgment rule to appeal now. But this court decided more than 25 years ago that transfer orders do not qualify for an exception to the final judgment rule under the collateral order doctrine. Id. ("The courts have almost universally agreed that transfer orders fall outside the scope of the collateral order exception. See In Re Dalton, 733 F.2d 710, 715 (10th Cir. 1984)."); see Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). A transfer order is not "effectively unreviewable" because a party opposing transfer can renew their challenge to the transfer with the transferee court or challenge the transfer after entry of final judgment in the appropriate appellate court. See McGlamery, 74 F.3d at 222 (quoting Firestone Tire &Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981) effectively unreviewable on appeal after final judgment only 'where review would render impossible any review whatsoever'")). Mr. W the contrary in his memorandum brief do not persuade us otherwise
In sum, because we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal dismissed. D&H Marketers, Inc. v. Freedom Oil &Gas, Inc., 744 Cir. 1984) ("Jurisdiction to consider an appeal is not discretionary.
[*] The court takes judicial notice of ongoing proceedings in another federal court. See Estate of Lockett by and through Lockett v. Fallin, 841 F.3d 1098, 1111 (10th Cir. 2016).