Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:18-1043-RMG-BM
04-10-2020
Alfred T. White, Plaintiff, v. Jonathan Chase Iseman, Brandon T. Braxton and Clarendon County Sheriff's Office, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This action was originally filed by the Plaintiff in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, Third Judicial Circuit. Plaintiff's claims arise out of his vehicle stop by the Defendant Iseman (a Clarendon County Sheriff's Deputy) on October 13, 2016. This action was removed to this United States District Court by the Defendants on the ground that Plaintiff has asserted a federal claim in his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Defendants have now filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., seeking a dismissal of all of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff has filed a response memorandum in opposition to the Defendants' motion, to which the Defendants have filed a reply. This motion is now before the Court for disposition.
This case was automatically referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(f), D.S.C. As the Defendants' motion is dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the Court.
Allegations of the Complaint
Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that on or about October 13, 2016, he was driving on Interstate 95 in Clarendon County, South Carolina when he noticed that a Sheriff's Department patrol car was traveling along side of him in the left lane. Plaintiff alleges that the patrol officer looked into Plaintiff's vehicle and made eye contact with the Plaintiff, following which he decreased his speed, activated his blue lights, and pulled behind Plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff alleges he pulled over to the safety lane of the Interstate. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant Iseman then approached Plaintiff's vehicle on the passenger side, and requested Plaintiff's drivers license and registration information, which Plaintiff provided. Isemen then requested that Plaintiff meet him at the front of his patrol vehicle, and again Plaintiff complied.
Plaintiff alleges that Iseman explained to Plaintiff that he had conducted a traffic stop on the Plaintiff for exceeding the speed limit by four (4) miles per hour and for driving too close to the white fog line. Plaintiff alleges that Iseman then proceeded to interrogate the Plaintiff, asking him if he had any guns or drugs in the vehicle, to which Plaintiff replied that he did not. Plaintiff alleges that he remained respectful during this entire interrogation, answered all of Iseman's questions, and informed him that he did not possess any illegal substance. Plaintiff alleges that after he had answered all of Iseman's questions, Iseman then asked for consent to search his vehicle, which Plaintiff denied. Plaintiff alleges that Iseman then continued to detain him while he requested assistance. Eventually, the Defendant Braxton (another Sheriff's Deputy) arrived with a K-9. Braxton deplored his K-9 around Plaintiff's vehicle and then indicated that the K-9 had displayed a positive alert. Plaintiff alleges that Iseman and Braxton then proceeded to search his entire vehicle, during which they located Plaintiff's cash savings of $30,000.00. The Defendants did not locate any weapons or any illegal substances inside Plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff further alleges that when the Defendants located Plaintiff's cash, Iseman pointed his weapon at the Plaintiff and yelled "get on the ground, get on the ground, hand behind your back". Plaintiff alleges that both Iseman and Braxton moved towards him with their weapons drawn pointing directly at the Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that he complied with the officers' demands, quickly got face down on the pavement, and asked "what did I do", to which Iseman replied "don't be stupid". Braxton then handcuffed the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges that after Braxton and Iseman had located his savings, he was threatened with arrest by the Defendants if he did not disown the funds. Plaintiff was told that he could either be arrested or disown the funds and "walk away clear". Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants then forced him to drive to the Clarendon County Sheriff's Office, where Iseman and Braxton escorted him through a back door and placed him in an interrogation room. Plaintiff alleges that Iseman and Braxton then coerced him, by threat of arrest, into signing a Department of Homeland Security Abandonment Form, relinquishing his rights of ownership to his $30,000.00 cash savings.
In his Complaint, Plaitniff alleges a state law claim against the Defendants for false imprisonment (First Cause of Action), a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Second Cause of Action), a claim for conversion (Third Cause of Action), a claim for negligence/gross negligence/recklessness (Fourth Cause of Action), a claim for negligent supervision/training (Fifth Cause of Action) and a claim for intentional violation of Plaintiff's civil rights by excessive force and unreasonable search and seizure (Sixth Cause of Action). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. See generally, Plaintiff's Complaint.
This claim contains a typographical error listing it as a Third Cause of Action, but it is in fact Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action.
This claim is incorrectly listed as Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action.
This Cause of Action is incorrectly listed as Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action.
Discussion
Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. The moving party has the burden of proving that judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party makes this showing, however, to avoid summary judgment the opposing party must respond to the motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff's Federal Claim
Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action (mislabeled his Fifth Cause of Action) is the only federal claim asserted in this lawsuit, the other five claims being state law claims. In his Sixth Cause of Action, Plaintiff asserts a claim for excessive force and unreasonable search and seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Court Docket No. 1, p. 2; Court Docket No. 1-1, ¶ ¶ 51-54. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). As sheriff's deputies, the Defendants Iseman and Braxton are subject to suit for damages under § 1983 in their individual capacities. Plaintiff also alleges that the actions of Iseman and Braxton "were a course of ordinary dealings with the public and known by the Defendant Clarendon County Sheriff's Office" prior to October 13, 2016, and that the Defendant Clarendon County Sheriff's Office is vicariously liable for Iseman's and Braxton's actions "pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior for the conduct of its employers or agents, Iseman and Braxton . . . .". Complaint, ¶ ¶ 53-54.
Turning to consideration of the evidence relevant to Plaintiff's federal claim, both parties have submitted as their Exhibit 1 a copy of the Sheriff's Department Incident Report detailing the events surrounding Plaintiff's traffic stop. The Incident Report sets forth that Iseman observed Plaintiff's vehicle traveling 74 mph in a 70 mph zone as well as traveling near the fog line, following which he conducted a traffic stop. The Incident Report further reports that as the Plaintiff was gathering his vehicle paperwork and license, Iseman observed numerous cell phones (4) throughout the vehicle, that there was an open bible laying in the front passenger seat of the vehicle, that there was a book bag and a dog crate in the rear seat of the vehicle, and that there was a bag of dog food on the rear vehicle floor. The Incident Report indicates that once at the front of the patrol vehicle, Iseman explained to the Plaintiff the reason for the stop, including that South Carolina was an "absolute speed state", and that Plaintiff was traveling above the posted speed limit. Iseman also explained how Plaintiff's driving near the fog lane could indicate that the driver was possibly impaired or fatigued. During the conversation, Plaintiff stated that he had been in Virginia for about two weeks visiting family and was heading home to Florida, where he resided. Plaintiff advised that he was going to Florida to "pack his stuff" and was then going to move to Virginia. However, Iseman observed that the vehicle (which was a rental) had been rented in Maryland, not Virginia, and further had been rented by a third party (not the Plaintiff) for a period of seven days. Plaintiff then told Iseman that his cousin had rented the vehicle for him and that he was going to return the vehicle back to Maryland.
The Incident Report indicates that when Iseman asked Plaintiff about any prior arrests, that Plaintiff "hesitated" and then stated that he had been arrested for drugs in the past. According to the Incident Report, Iseman could see that Plaintiff was beginning to become increasingly nervous. Iseman then asked Plaintiff if everything in the vehicle belonged to him, and Plaintiff replied that it did. He specifically asked about whether there were any guns or drugs in the vehicle, to which Plaintiff responded that there were none, but the Incident Report indicates that when Iseman asked about large amounts of money, Plaintiff "looked away and changed his response". When Iseman then followed up with a question about amounts of money over ten thousand dollars, Plaintiff "again looked away and changed his response". The Incident Report indicates that at that point, based on Iseman's training and experience, he believed criminal activity to be afoot based on the fact that Plaintiff was traveling from one source area to another source area along Interstate 95, which is a main drug trafficking corridor along the east coast, that the vehicle was a third party rental rented from a state other than where Plaintiff stated he was coming from, and that Plaintiff was making an extremely long trip with a very short turn around time to travel back. According to the Incident Report, Iseman also knew through his training and experience that persons involved in drug smuggling will often have more than one cell phone to make detection and wiretaps by law enforcement more difficult, that such persons often prominently display religious material in an attempt to make law enforcement believe they are not involved in an illegal activity, and that these facts combined with the nervous behavior displayed by the Plaintiff and his admission of past arrests for drugs resulted in Iseman asking for consent to search the vehicle. According to the Incident Report, although Plaintiff denied consent to search the vehicle, Braxton had arrived on the scene by that time and advised Iseman, after his K-9 had run around the vehicle, that a positive alert had been given.
The Incident Report indicates that Iseman then began to search the vehicle, during which he had observed that the trunk of the vehicle was full of shoes and boxes along with several luggage bags full of clothes, which Iseman found to be strange given that Plaintiff was taking all those items back to Florida even though the reason for his trip (as stated to the officers) was to pack his belongings to go back to Virginia. The Incident Report further indicates that during the vehicle search, Iseman opened the dog food bag and reached into the dog food, where he located a duct taped package consistent with drugs or money. Plaintiff was detained at that time, and (according to the Incident Report) the deputies learned that the package contained cash money that was wrapped in a grocery bag and then duct taped, packaging consistent with drug proceeds. When asked about the money, Plaintiff initially stated that it was his money that he had saved doing landscaping. The Incident Report indicates that the money was placed in Iseman's patrol vehicle, and that Plaintiff then followed the officers to the Sheriff's Office. Once at the Sheriff's Office, Plaintiff signed a Department of Homeland Security Abandonment Form stating that he disowned the money. Plaintiff was then given a copy of the form along with a written warning for the traffic violation and released.
The Incident Report next indicates that the money was then photographed along with the dog food bag, and that when Braxton then deployed his K-9 in the room containing the money, the K-9 provided a positive alert on the money. The money was counted and found to total $30,000.00, all in twenty dollar bills. The money, packaging, dog food bag, and a phone in the car that Plaintiff also disclaimed were all logged into evidence. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Defendant's Exhibit 1.
Unlawful Search and Seizure. "When a police officer stops an automobile and detains the occupants briefly, the stop amounts to a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment". United States v. DiGiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 506 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810 (1996)), abrogated on other grounds, Rodriguez v. Unite States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015); see also United States v White, 707 Fed.Appx. 766, 2017 WL 4149530 at * 1 (4th Cir. Sept. 19, 2017). Therefore, Plaintiff's allegation that he was unlawfully detained and "seized" by the Defendant states a claim under the Fourth Amendment. Robinson v. Brown, No. 15-387, 2016 WL 4975021 at * 3 (D.S.C. Sept. 19, 2016) [Noting that an individual is "seized" under the Fourth Amendment when there is a termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied]; United States v. Melo, No. 89-5554, 1989 WL 117839 at *1 (4th Cir. 1989) [Fourth Amendment protection is triggered when a person is seized by law enforcement officers]. However, the Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment seizure claim fails because Iseman had probable cause to pull over and detain the Plaintiff.
"As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred". Whren, 517 U.S. at 810; see also Artiga Carrero v. Farrelly, No. 16-3939, 2017 WL 4167398, at * 8 (D.Md. Sept. 19, 2017). "Probable cause exists if, given the totality of the circumstances, the officer 'had reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense'". United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2012), citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); see also Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir. 1998). Defendants argue, and the undersigned agrees, that Officer Iseman had sufficiently reasonable information to give him probable cause to make the traffic stop, because he personally observed the Plaintiff committing a crime; i.e., exceeding the speed limit. Plaintiff has presented no evidence to dispute that he was exceeding the speed limit, and indeed his own Exhibit 1 indicates that he was. See also, Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 47 [Admitting that he was exceeding the speed limit]. Therefore, there was nothing unlawful about Plaintiff's initial "seizure" by Iseman. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 ["As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that at traffic violation has occurred"].
Even so, "[a]n automobile stop is . . . subject [to] the constitutional imperative that it not be 'unreasonable' under the circumstance". Whren, 517 U.S. at 810; see also Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) [The Fourth Amendment commands that seizures be reasonable]. The question thus becomes whether Iseman's continued interaction with the Plaintiff, after the initial stop, at some point transformed from a permissible traffic stop into an illegal seizure. Cf. State v. Adams, 659 S.E. 2d 272, 273 (S.C.Ct.App. 2008) [Even where an officer has probable cause to initiate a traffic stop and may lawfully detain the driver for purposes relating to that traffic stop, "any further detention for questioning is beyond the scope of the [ ] stop and therefore [becomes] illegal unless the officer has a reasonable suspicion of a serious crime"]. After careful review of the evidence submitted, the undersigned does not find that a constitutionally unreasonable amount of time passed between the initial stop and the officer's reasonable suspicion of a serious crime (thereby justifying Plaintiff's continued detention) such as to present a genuine issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Cf. United States v. Grayon, No. 17-1185, 2019 WL 1427461, at * 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2019) [Noting that the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to conduct an investigation unrelated to the reasons for the traffic stop as long as the officer is diligently pursuing the purpose of the traffic stop and the investigation does not prolong the roadside detention for the traffic infraction], citing United States v. Hill, 852 F.3d 377, 384 (4th Cir. 2017) ["An officer may engage in ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop, such as inspecting a driver's identification and license to operate a vehicle, verifying the registration of a vehicle and existing insurance coverage, and determining whether the driver is subject to outstanding warrants"].
Both parties have submitted as an exhibit the dash cam video of Plaintiff's traffic stop, which indicates that Plaintiff was pulled over at 4:33 p.m. Iseman then asked for Plaintiff's license and registration, determined that the car was a rental, and asked questions concerning Plaintiff's stated reason for travel. The video further reflects that when questioned whether there were any drugs or weapons in the car, Plaintiff answered no, but when asked about whether there were sums of cash in the vehicle, Plaintiff demurred or changed the subject. The dash cam video also shows that during this questioning, Officer Braxton had arrived on the scene by 4:39 p.m., only six minutes into the traffic stop. Based on the information obtained and the officers' impressions as are set forth in the Incident Report (which Plaintiff himself has submitted as an exhibit), to include determining that Plaintiff was not the person who had rented the automobile and that the vehicle had been rented in a different state from where Plaintiff told the officer he was traveling from, the presence of a number of cell phones in the automobile, and Plaintiff's admission of a past drug violation, the obvious display of an open bible on Plaintiff's car seat, Plaintiff's evasiveness in answering Iseman's questions concerning cash in the vehicle, Iseman asked for consent to search the car at a little past 4:39 p.m. (six minutes into the traffic stop), to which Plaintiff stated no. Even so, by that time Braxton was on the scene, and the dog conducted a sniff search around the vehicle at 4:40 p.m., only seven minutes into the traffic stop. See United States v. Bernard, 927 F.3d 799, 805 (4th Cir. 2019) ["A police officer can extend the duration of a routine traffic stop . . . if there is reasonable suspicion that an illegal activity is occurring"]. The K-9 had a positive alert on the vehicle by no later than 4:41 p.m., only eight minutes into the traffic stop.
Based on the facts set forth in the Incident Report and as observed on the dash cam video, the limited extension of time of the traffic stop (totaling at most only 1 to 2 minutes) for the purpose of the dog sniff search was objectively reasonable under the facts and circumstances of this case. Bernard, 927 F.3d at 805 [Reasonable suspicion is present where the officer demonstrates a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing", which is evaluated by looking at the "totality of the circumstances"], quoting United States v. Vaughan, 700 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 2012). Therefore, the evidence simply does not present a genuine issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff had been unlawfully "seized" at that point for purposes of a Fourth Amendment claim. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008) ["A police officer may detain a driver beyond the scope of a routine traffic stop if he possesses a justification for doing so other than the initial traffic violation, such as a reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is afoot]; Illinois v Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) [A canine sniff is constitutionally acceptable if performed within "the time reasonably required" to issue a traffic citation.]; Grayon, 2019 WL 1427461, at * 5 ["A deminimus delay does not violate the Fourth Amendment"].
As for Plaintiff's illegal search claim, once the K-9 had alerted on the automobile indicating the presence of unlawful contraband, Iseman and Braxton had probable cause to search the vehicle. Branch, 537 F.3d at 340 n. 2 ["[I]t is well settled that a "positive alert" from a drug detection dog, in and of itself, provides probable cause to search a vehicle."]; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) [Search lawful where it "was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances"]. In any event, under the applicable law at the time this incident occurred, Plaintiff does not even have standing to challenge the search under the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 1994), the Fourth Circuit held that a driver of a rental car who is not an authorized driver on the rental agreement does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car. Id., at 119-120. Although, in Byrd v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1518 (2018), the Supreme Court announced a new rule abrogating Wellons and held that a driver in lawful possession of a rental car, even when the person is not an authorized driver on the rental agreement, has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car, that decision was two years after the traffic stop in this case. See also Grayon, 2019 WL 1427461, at * 6-7. Therefore, even if that had been the basis for the search in this case (which it was not), Plaintiff would not have a claim because the officers would have been acting with an objectively reasonable good faith belief that their conduct was lawful. Id., at * 7; Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) [Official entitled to qualified immunity from suit "insofar as [their] conduct [does] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known"], quoting Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818 (1982). Therefore, Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim is also subject to dismissal.
Excessive Force Claim. Plaintiff also asserts an excessive force claim against Iseman and Braxton based on their pointing their weapons at him and forcibly handcuffing him. The Fourth Amendment governs claims of excessive force during the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of a person. Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1161 (4th Cir. 1997), citing Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989); see also Hayes v. Knight, No. 13-816, 2015 WL 225753, at * 9 (D.S.C. Jan. 16, 2015).
Fourth Amendment claims of excessive use of force during an arrest or seizure are considered under an "objective reasonableness" standard. Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011); Culosi v. Bullock, 596 F.3d 195, 201 (4th Cir. 2010); Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir. 2008); Estate of Jones v. City of Martinsburg, West Virginia, 726 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 2018); Smith v. Kendall, No. 09-6452, 2010 WL 764051 (4th Cir. Mar. 8, 2010). This test requires "balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985); Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d 412, 415 (4th Cir. 2007); White v. Town of Chapel Hill, 899 F.Supp. 1428, 1435 (M.D.N.C. 1995), aff'd, 70 F.3d 1264 (4th Cir. 1995); Sweatt v. State of Maryland, No. 89-3231, 1989 WL 126582 at **1 (4th Cir. 1989). What is objectively reasonable depends on what conditions exist at the time the alleged excessive force is used, recognizing that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396; Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 476-477 (4th Cir. 2005); see Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1991).
When considering a police officer's actions under this "objective reasonableness" standard, the Court must consider the circumstances of the particular case, including the potential severity of the crime committed and whether the subject posed an immediate threat to the safety of the police officers or others. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see Foote v. Dunagan, 33 F.3d 445, 447-448 (4th Cir. 1994); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 869 (4th Cir. 1988); Waller v. City of Danville, 212 Fed. Appx. 162, 169 (4th Cir. 2006). The Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's excessive force claim because the amount of "force" used against the Plaintiff was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and the undersigned is again constrained to agree. See Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc), citing Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470, 476 (4th Cir. 2006).
Defendants note that such clams are based on a standard of "objective reasonableness"; i.e., whether the amount of force used by an officer was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them. Graham, 490 U.S. 396-397; Wilson v. Flynn, 429 F.3d 465, 468 (4th Cir. 2005) [reasonableness of amount of force used must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene]; Young v. Prince George's County, Md., 355 F.3d 751, 757 (4th Cir. 2004) [Court should "view the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene"], quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Here, the evidence (including Plaintiff's own evidence) shows that during the search of his vehicle Plaintiff was standing at the back of his vehicle. He had never himself been searched, such that neither Iseman nor Braxton knew if Plaintiff was armed. Then, during the search of Plaintiff's vehicle, the officers uncovered a "brick" of an undetermined substance (later determined to be cash, but which also could have been drugs or other contraband), wrapped and packaged in a manner consistent with drug smuggling and hidden in the bag of dog food. See Defendants' Exhibits (Court Docket No. 31-4, pp. 9, 13-14. The discovery of this "brick" dramatically changed the nature of this traffic stop, providing a clear indication to the Sheriff's Deputies that illegal conduct had been uncovered, in all likelihood drug smuggling. The officers at that point (having now a reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff was a drug dealer transporting contraband), and not knowing what Plaintiff's reaction would be (particularly if he was armed) upon realizing that the officers had discovered the brick hidden in the dog food bag, drew their weapons, ordered Plaintiff on the ground, and handcuffed him in order to ensure their own safety, before proceeding further. There was nothing objectively unreasonable about their actions under the circumstances. See Braxton Deposition, pp. 47-51 [Explaining why securing a driver under such circumstances is warranted and necessary]; see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 [Discussing factors to consider in assessing a police officer's actions under the "objective reasonableness" standard]; cf. Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2150, 2158 (2001) ["If an officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believes that a suspect [could pose a danger to himself or others], the officer would be justified in using more force than was in fact needed"], overruled on other grounds by, Parson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); Thornton v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395, 1400 (11th Cir. 1998) [Findings officers may be justified in using force where suspects were reasonably believed to have been committing a serious crime, or that they could pose a threat].
Moreover, the only "force" used in this case was the pointing of the firearm, and then placing handcuffs on the Plaintiff. He was not struck, beaten, or injured in any way; rather, the only "force" that was used were minimal actions sufficient to ensure that Plaintiff would not be a threat to the officers after evidence of potential drug trafficking had been discovered, following which no further force was used. Again, this evidence is not sufficient to set forth a genuine issue of fact that the Defendants used "excessive" force against the Plaintiff under the circumstances. Wilson v. Flynn, 429 F.3d at 468 [reasonableness of amount of force used must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene]; Young v. Prince George's County, Md., 355 F.3d at 757 [Court should "view the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene"], quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Plaintiff's argument that he has a valid claim because he was "at all times relevant to this action and to all party's knowledge an unarmed citizen, not in possession of any illegal substances and not resisting or fighting the officers' questions and demands" (Plaintiff's Response Brief, p. 6) is patently without merit, because there was no way for the officers to know at that time whether Plaintiff was or was not armed, while (contrary to Plaintiff's argument) they had just discovered evidence indicating that Plaintiff was most likely in the possession of illegal substances and had lied to Officer Iseman during his earlier questioning of the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's excessive force claim.
Plaintiff's State Law Claim
In addition to his one federal cause of action, Plaintiff asserts five state law causes of action in his Complaint. If the Court adopts the recommendation contained herein with respect to Plaintiff's sole federal cause of action, the only claims remaining in this case will be these state law claims, and under such circumstances, this Court should not retain jurisdiction over these state law causes of action but should instead remand them back to state court for disposition. See Clark v. Brown, 861 F.2d 66, 68 (4th Cir. 1988)[Directing dismissal of state law claims on remand following dismissal of Plaintiff's federal § 1983 claim]; Mills v. Leath, 709 F.Supp. 671, 675-676 (D.S.C. 1988) [Noting that federal courts should generally decline to exercise pendant jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissal of federal claims in a lawsuit].
In Carnegie-Mellon v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988), the Supreme Court held that "in the usual case in which all federal - law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendant jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims". Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350, n. 7. The "factors" the Court was referring to in Carnegie-Mellon are judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Here, comity obviously favors a remand, as a remand of these remaining state law causes of action will allow the more appropriate court to rule on these exclusively state law issues. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 726 (1966) ["Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well"]. There are also no issues of judicial economy, convenience or fairness weighing against remand, as discovery has been completed and the summary judgment motion relating to these state law claims has been briefed and is ready for decision by the state court on remand. Not only is the state court the more appropriate court to now rule on these remaining state law claims, but if summary judgment were to be denied on any of these claims (a decision which should be made by the state court), it would be much more appropriate for the state courts to then try these state law claims. Finally, in considering whether remand is appropriate, District Courts in the Fourth Circuit have also taken into consideration whether the complaint was originally filed in federal court. Spears v. Water & Sewage Auth. of Cabarrus Cty., No. 15-859, 2017 WL 2275011, at * 9 (M.D.N.C. May 24, 2017). Of course, here the case was not originally filed in federal court - rather, it was removed to this Court by the Defendants from the Plaintiff's preferred state court jurisdiction. Hence, the Carnegie-Mellon factors support remand in this case.
The Fourth Circuit has made clear that in circumstances as are present in this case, it should be left to the state courts to resolve these uniquely state law issues. Safar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d 241, 251 (4th Cir. 2017) [Noting the unique nature of state tort laws, and holding that "we think the definition of legal duties under the law of tort is best left with the state courts to resolve"]. As was noted by the Fourth Circuit in Safar, "the better course in this particular instance is to allow Plaintiff [ ] the opportunity to press [his] state court claims in state court". Safar, 859 F.3d at 251 [Reversing the District Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's state law claims, and remanding with instructions to dismiss Plaintiff state law claims without prejudice to Plaintiff's right to advance [his] case in state court]. Therefore, if the Court adopts the recommendation herein for dismissal of Plaintiff's sole federal claim, his five (5) remaining state law causes of action should be remanded back to state court for disposition. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 ["Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well"]; Mills, 709 F.Supp. at 675-676 [Noting that federal courts should generally decline to exercise pendant jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissal of federal claims in a lawsuit]; Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350, n. 7 ["[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims."].
The Safar case was originally filed in Federal Court, not state court, therefore the order for the District Court would be a dismissal without prejudice rather than remand in that case.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted with respect to Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action asserting a federal claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that that claim be dismissed. With respect to Plaintiff's five remaining state law claims, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to those causes of action should be denied, without prejudice, with those claims being remanded back to state court for disposition. Cf. Clark, 861 F.2d at 68 [Directing dismissal of state law claims on remand following dismissal of Plaintiff's federal § 1983 claim].
The parties are referred to the Notice Page attached hereto.
/s/_________
Bristow Marchant
United States Magistrate Judge April 10, 2020
Charleston, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).