Opinion
No. 1-16-1282
06-14-2017
MICHAEL WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE - FIREARMS SERVICE BUREAU, HIRAM GRAU, Director, Illinois State Police, and CONCEALED CARRY LICENSING REVIEW BOARD, Defendants-Appellees.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 14 CH 17205 The Honorable Anna Helen Demacopoulos, Judge Presiding. JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Lavin and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The Board did not err in denying White's application for a concealed carry license. ¶ 2 Plaintiff, Michael White, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County affirming the decision of the Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board (Board) to deny him a license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act (Act) (430 ILCS 66/1 et seq. (West 2014). The Illinois Department of State Police (State Police) received objections to White's application for a concealed carry license and submitted the matter to the Board, which affirmed the objections and denied White's application, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that he poses a danger to himself or others, or poses a threat to public safety. On administrative review, the circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. ¶ 3 For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶ 4 BACKGROUND
¶ 5 On May 1, 2014, White applied to the Illinois Department of State Police (State Police) for a concealed carry license. In a letter dated June 13, 2014, the State Police informed White that it had received an objection to his eligibility from a law enforcement agency and submitted the matter to the Board, which would issue a decision within 30 days of receipt of the objection. ¶ 6 Thereafter, in a letter dated September 9, 2014, the Board informed White that it needed additional information from him in order to reach an informed decision concerning his application based on the following objection:
"Based on your history & conduct reported by both the Chicago Police Department and the Cook County Sheriff's Office, the Board has preliminarily voted to sustain the objection to your receipt of a Concealed Carry License (CCL). Chicago PD lists you as a member of the Latin Souls Street Gang and Cook County reports you were arrested on 04/07/1995 for Battery with a knife, on 01/01/2012 for Unlawful Use of a weapon and reckless discharge and on 01/09/1996 for possession of a firearm in a vehicle. You now have 10 days from the date of this notice to submit any additional evidence for the Board to consider before the Board's vote is finalized and your application for a CCL is denied."¶ 7 In compliance with the Board's request, White uploaded the requested information "via the CCL website" and submitted the following comments:
"To whom it may concern,
¶ 8 In October 2014, the State Police informed White that his CCL application had been denied because the Board reviewed the evidence received and "determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the above referenced Applicant is a danger to him/herself, is a danger to others, or poses a threat to public safety." ¶ 9 On October 23, 2014, White filed a pro se complaint for administrative review. In March 2015, private counsel was granted leave to file an appearance on behalf of White and to file an amended complaint. However, in April 2015, the circuit court entered an agreed order remanding the matter to the Board for reconsideration of White's CCL application because the Illinois Administrative Code had been recently amended to include new rules regarding the Board's review of law enforcement agency objections. ¶ 10 Upon remand, the Board notified White in a letter dated May 7, 2015, that it needed additional information from him in order to reach an informed decision concerning his application based on the following objection submitted pursuant to section 15(a) of the Act (430 ILCS 66/15(a) (West 2014)):
I am not and never have been a member of any street gang.
I am not, never was and never will be affiliated with the Latin Souls street gang. I think because of the area I was arrested in, I was presumed to be a Latin Soul.
On the charge of 04/07/1995 (battery with a knife) I never battered anyone and the arresting officer declined to press charges and that case was dismissed.
On the charge of 01/09/1996 This must be a case of mistaken identity because I was never arrested or charged with any crime on that day or year. I can not [sic] attach anything to disprove this charge because I was never arrested on this date or year.
On 08/10/1998 I was arrested for (unlawful carry/possess firearm) this was a simple possession charge not in a commission of any crime. This charge was reduced to a misdemeanor on 08/10/2001 I have attached a PDF of the court records as proof.
On the charge of 01/01/2012 (UUW and reckless discharge) I was found not guilty of all charges and I have also attached a copy of the court records to prove this.
Just to recap I have met all the criteria to obtain a F.O.I.D. card
I currently posses [sic] one and have had no arrests since receiving the card. I've read all the requirements to obtain a CCL and meet them ALL. Therefore I don't understand why I can legally own a firearm but I have to go through all these hoops to carry one."
"The Chicago Police Department submitted an objection stating: Superintendent Garry [sic] F. McCarthy/Chicago Police Department object to the issuance of a concealed carry license to the applicant Michael White based upon a reasonable suspicion that the applicant is a danger to himself or others or a threat to public safety. The criminal activities of street gangs pose a substantial threat to the safety and quality of life of the residents of Chicago. In support of the objection, be advised that Chicago Police Department reports reflect the following: The applicant is listed in the CPD Gang Member Data Base [sic] as a member of The Latin Souls Street Gang.
The Cook County Sheriff's Office submitted an objection stating: There is a reasonable suspicion that White is a danger to others and a threat to public safety. A search of CLEAR revealed that White was arrested for BATTERY/UUW KNIFE on
4/7/1995, UUW WEAPON FELON AND RECKLESS DISCHARGE on 1/1/2012 & POSSESSION FIREARM VEHICLE on 1/9/1996. A CLEAR search also revealed White as a Latin Soul Gang Member."¶ 11 On July 30, 2015, White uploaded the requested information, including a response to the aforementioned objection. In his response, White argued that "with only one arrest within 7 years of his application, [he] could not be deemed 'a danger to himself or herself or others, or a threat to public safety' under the criteria of CCA Section 15," that consideration of hearsay evidence regarding his gang membership would violate his right to due process of the law, that a CCL applicant "is a danger to himself or herself or others, or a threat to public safety" is unconstitutionally vague, and that the preponderance of the evidence standard provided by statute was unconstitutional. ¶ 12 In his supporting affidavit, White acknowledged that he was arrested on more than one occasion as "a younger man," but noted that only one of those arrests resulted in a conviction in 1994 for possession of cannabis. He also acknowledged being arrested in 1998 for having a loaded firearm in his vehicle, which he characterized as a mistake, and pleading guilty to unlawful use of a weapon. White stated that he had no "run-ins" with law enforcement for over a decade, other than "an allegation of 'disorderly conduct' in 2000" and a traffic offense in 2001. He further acknowledged being arrested on January 1, 2012, after someone fired shots into the air at a New Year's celebration, but explained that he was tried and found not guilty of firing those shots. ¶ 13 In August 2015, the State Police informed White that his CCL application had been denied because the Board reviewed the evidence received and determined, by a preponderance of the evidence that he "is a danger to him/herself, is a danger to others, or poses a threat to public safety." ¶ 14 On September 24, 2015, White filed an amended complaint for administrative review. In his amended complaint, White alleged five counts, namely that (1) the Board's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) the Board incorrectly applied section 15(b) of the Act (430 ILCS 66/15(b) (West 2014)); (3) the Act is unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to him; (4) he was denied due process of the law when the Board expanded the scope of disqualifying conduct under the Act by considering arrests that occurred 19 and 20 years before the date of his CCL application; and (5) the implementation of the Act and the preponderance of the evidence standard violate his second amendment rights. ¶ 15 On April 8, 2016, following a hearing on White's amended complaint, the circuit court entered an order affirming the Board's decision and finding as to counts one and two of his amended complaint, that he did not meet his burden of showing that the Board's decision was clearly erroneous; as to count three, that he did not meet his burden of showing the Act is unconstitutionally vague; as to count IV, that he did not meet his burden of showing a violation of due process; and as to count five, that he did not meet his burden of showing a second amendment violation. ¶ 16 White timely appealed. ¶ 17 In this court, White's statement of issues presented for review lists seven contentions, namely that (1) the Board's finding that he is a danger to himself or others, or poses a threat to public safety was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) the Board misapplied the Act when it considered his arrests more than 10 years ago; (3) he was denied due process of the law when the Board considered double hearsay evidence that he was a former gang member; (4) he was denied due process of the law when the Board expanded the scope of disqualifying conduct under the Act; (5) the Act is unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to him; (6) the procedure used to determine if an applicant poses a danger to himself or others, or a threat to public safety violates the right to keep and bear arms as guaranteed by the second amendment of the United States Constitution; and (7) the preponderance of the evidence standard for evaluating objections to the issuance of a concealed carry license violates the right to keep and bear arms. ¶ 18 However, these contentions do not correspond precisely with the four points White raises in the argument section of his appellate brief, i.e., that (1) the Board's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) the Board misapplied the Act; (3) the Act is void for vagueness in violation of due process because it fails to define or provide guidance to determine when an applicant is a threat or danger; and (4) the Act violates his right to keep and bear arms as secured by the second amendment. We will consider only those contentions that are supported by substantive argument. Fryzel v. Miller, 2014 IL App (1st) 120597, ¶ 45; O'Gorman v. F.H. Paschen, S.N. Nielsen, Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 133472, ¶ 90; Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016).
Although the transcript is dated April 7, 2015, the attached stipulation refers to the "hearing held in this case on April 8, 2016," a clerk's status order, dated March 1, 2016, indicates that the matter was set for hearing at 10:30 a.m. on April 8, 2016, and the Cook County clerk of the circuit court's online docket indicates that the case was disposed on "04/08/2016." --------
¶ 19 ANALYSIS
¶ 20 White first contends that the Board's finding that he is a danger to himself or others, or poses a threat to public safety was against the manifest weight of the evidence where he had only one arrest within the statutory seven year period before his CCL application was filed and he denied, under oath, the unsubstantiated double hearsay that he was a gang member. ¶ 21 Section 87(b) of the Firearm Concealed Carry Act (430 ILCS 66/87(b) (West 2014)) subjects all final administrative decisions of the Department of State Police (Department) or the Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board (Board) to judicial review under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2014)). On administrative review, we review the final decision of the Department or Board, not that of the circuit court. Petrovic v. Department of Employment Security, 2016 IL 118562, ¶ 22. The scope of judicial review of an administrative agency decision extends to all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record before the court. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2014). However, the applicable standard of review depends upon whether the question presented is one of fact, law, or a mix of both. AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 390 (2001). ¶ 22 We review an administrative agency's conclusion on a question of law de novo, its factual findings to determine whether they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, and its conclusion on a mixed question of law and fact for clear error. Moore v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 133148, ¶ 23; Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc. v. Rockford School District No. 205, 216 Ill. 2d 455, 471-72 (2005). Here, whether White "poses a danger to himself or herself or others, or is a threat to public safety" (430 ILCS 66/20(g) (West 2014)) presents a mixed question of law and fact notwithstanding White's contrary assertion. See, e.g., Moore, 2016 IL App (1st) 133148, ¶ 24 (same). ¶ 23 A mixed question of law and fact involves "an examination of the legal effect of a given set of facts." City of Belvedere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998), quoted in AFM Messenger Service, Inc., 198 Ill. 2d at 391. In other words, a mixed question exists where "the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard or whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated." Perez v. Illinois Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board, 2016 IL App (1st) 152087, ¶ 16 (citing AFM Messenger Service, Inc., 198 Ill. 2d at 391). A mixed question is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review, which is "significantly deferential" to an agency's experience and expertise in construing and applying the statutes that it administers. Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc., 216 Ill. 2d at 472. Under the clearly erroneous standard, we will reverse an agency's conclusions only if, upon review of the entire record, we are left with "the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." AFM Messenger Service, Inc., 198 Ill. 2d at 393. ¶ 24 White argues that "the entirety of relevant, objectively verifiable information before the Board" when it decided he poses a danger to himself or others, or poses a threat to public safety, was that he was arrested in January 2012 on charges of unlawful use of a weapon and reckless discharge of a weapon, then tried and found not guilty. White challenges the Board's finding that he "is a danger to himself or to others or a threat to public safety" (emphasis in original), reasoning that "[e]vents that occurred nearly 20 years ago are, by definition, not evidence of current condition." He points out that an arrest is not evidence of guilt and that he was entitled to the presumption of innocence, citing People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472 (1984), and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). He complains that the Board was only presented with a form arrest report and his criminal history, arguing that the Board did not have a statement, police report, or other information pertaining to the "only current arrest" that could have provided factual support for the Board's determination that he was a "danger" or a "threat" at the time he filed his CCL application. He also complains that the Board had nothing more than the "CPD's and Sheriff's unsupported assertions" regarding his gang membership or affiliation, arguing that such is not sufficient to overcome his sworn affidavit to the contrary. We disagree. ¶ 25 White's argument against the Board's consideration or reliance upon "events" that occurred almost 20 years ago erroneously merges sections 15(a) and 15(b) of the Act. Pursuant to section 15(a) (430 ILCS 66/15(a) (West 2014)), any law enforcement agency may submit an objection to a license applicant based upon a "reasonable suspicion" that the applicant is a danger to himself or others, or a threat to public safety, and must include "any information relevant to the objection." Alternatively, section 15(b) of the Act (430 ILCS 66/15(b) (West 2014)) requires the Department to object and submit the applicant's arrest record "to the extent the Board is allowed to receive that information under State and federal law, the application materials, and any additional information submitted by a law enforcement agency to the Board," when the applicant has at least five arrests, regardless of reason, or at least three arrests for gang-related offenses, that have been entered into the Criminal History Records Information System, within seven years prior to the application date. ¶ 26 Here, the Board's May 7, 2015 letter to White cited section 15(a) as the sole basis for the objection, not section 15(b). Moreover, section 35 of the Act (430 ILCS 66/35(2) (West 2014)) directs the State Police to use, inter alia, "all available state and local criminal history record information files," in conducting the mandatory background check of CCL applicants. Jankovich v. Illinois Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board, 2017 IL App (1st) 160706, ¶ 44; Perez, 2016 IL App (1st) 152087, ¶ 24. The plain language of the Act allows the Board to consider White's entire criminal history and the objection to his CCL application based on a reasonable suspicion under section 15(a), which shows the legislative intent not to limit considerations for a CCL application to convictions. Perez, 2016 IL App (1st) 152087, ¶ 21. Thus, White's argument against the Board's consideration of events that occurred almost 20 years ago is unavailing. ¶ 27 We are also unpersuaded by White's assertion that he is entitled to a presumption of innocence as to the January 2012 charges because Zehr and Supreme Court Rule 431 apply to criminal proceedings, which is not the case here. People v. Garstecki, 382 Ill. App. 3d 802, 806 (2008); People v. McLaurin, 2015 IL App (1st) 131362, ¶ 59. Further, that White was found not guilty for the January 2012 charges " 'does not demonstrate [his] innocence.' " Perez, 2016 IL App (1st) 152087, ¶ 18 (quoting People ex rel. City of Chicago v. Le Mirage, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 093547-B, ¶ 134). Rather, it demonstrates only that the State was unable to prove White guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of those charges. Id. Under these circumstances and where White responded to the objection to his CCL application, explaining the evidence against him, we attach no significance to the absence of a corresponding police report to provide factual support for the Board's determination that he was a "danger" or posed a "threat." ¶ 28 We also reject White's argument that the evidence about his gang membership or affiliation was inadmissible hearsay. This very contention has been rejected in two recent decisions of this court, and we discern no reason to depart from the analysis and result therein. Perez, 2016 IL App (1st) 152087, ¶ 24 ("The language of the Act establishes the intent to permit the admission of hearsay evidence before the Board for considering a concealed carry license application."); Jankovich, 2017 IL App (1st) 160706, ¶¶ 55-56 (adhering to Perez). ¶ 29 Based upon our review of the Act and the facts presented, e.g., White's criminal record, the objection based on it and his response, we cannot conclude the Board's determination that White is a danger to himself or others, or poses a threat to public safety was clearly erroneous; we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Perez, 2016 IL App (1st) 152087, ¶ 22. As a practical matter, we appreciate the potential for unintended consequences such as the Board's consideration of false arrests or unsubstantiated accusations, but observe that where, as here, the language of the Act is plain, " 'the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.' " United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)). ¶ 30 White next contends that the Board misapplied the Act. According to White, a conflict exists between section 25 of the Act (430 ILCS 66/25 (West 2014)), which provides six qualifications for a concealed carry license, and section 10(a) of the Act (430 ILCS 66/10(a) (West 2014)), which provides for the issuance of a license when four conditions have been met. He complains of the subjective nature of the fourth condition in section 10(a), which he refers to as the "Threat and Danger Clause," and he proposes to reconcile the perceived conflict by defining the "Threat and Danger Clause" in terms of section 15(b) of the Act (430 ILCS 66/15(b) (West 2014)). The essence of White's argument is that the Act "nowhere provides a definition or guidance as to how the Board will determine if an applicant poses a threat or a danger." According to White, "reading the relevant and related statutory provisions together, the objective criteria under which the Threat and Danger Clause should be read [to] set the objectively relevant time period to access [sic] whether an applicant is a threat or a danger as seven years prior to the application; and, the objectively relevant conduct is the applicant's arrest record in this time period." (Emphasis in original.) ¶ 31 Having previously determined that the plain language of the Act permits the Board to consider White's entire criminal history and the objection to his CCL application based on a reasonable suspicion under section 15(a), we necessarily reject White's contention that the Board misapplied the Act. Put another way, we are unpersuaded by White's argument that the seven year period before his CCL application was filed, as set forth in section 15(b), comprises the "objectively relevant time period" for assessing whether an applicant is presently a threat or danger. Furthermore, as previously discussed, the law enforcement agency objection to his CCL application was made pursuant to section 15(a) and not 15(b). ¶ 32 Likewise, we reject White's ancillary assertion that the Board violated the Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/1-1 et seq. (West 2014)) by making no findings of fact and only conclusions of law. An administrative agency need not make a specific finding on every fact or claim; rather, it is sufficient that the findings are specific enough to allow an intelligent review of its decision. Ress v. Office of State Comptroller, 329 Ill. App. 3d 136, 140 (2002). ¶ 33 White next contends that the Act is void for vagueness in violation of due process because it fails to define or provide guidance to determine when an applicant is a threat or danger. He argues that certain sections of the Act, "which rely on the undefined subjective standard of posing 'a danger to himself, herself or others, or a threat to public safety,' are, on their face and as applied to [him], unconstitutionally vague." ¶ 34 Statutes are presumed constitutional, and the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of showing that the statute is unconstitutional. Id. at ¶ 63. In our de novo review, we have a duty to construe any statute in a manner that upholds its constitutionality. Id. "A statute violates due process on the basis of vagueness only if its terms are so ill-defined that the ultimate decision as to its meaning rests on the opinions and whims of the trier of fact rather than any objective criteria or facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Howard, 2017 IL 120443, ¶ 25. "The constitutional principle of due process of law requires that a statute 'give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.' " Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 442 (1998) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)). The statute must also provide "reasonable standards to law enforcement to ensure against authorizing or even encouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Wilson v. County of Cook, 2012 IL 112026, ¶ 21. ¶ 35 Although White argues that the Act is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him, it is well-established that vagueness challenges to statutes that do not implicate the first amendment must be examined in light of the facts at bar. Id. "In order to succeed on a vagueness challenge to a statute that does not involve a first amendment right, a party must establish that the statute is vague as applied to the conduct for which the party is being prosecuted." People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 291 (2003). Conversely, "[w]hen the statute is examined in the light of the facts of the case and the statute clearly applies to the party's conduct, then a challenge to the statute's constitutionality based on vagueness will be unsuccessful." Id. at 291-92. "A mere hypothetical involving a disputed meaning of some terms of a statute does not make the statute unconstitutionally vague." People v. Einoder, 209 Ill. 2d 443, 451 (2004). For that reason, we merely note without discussion, White's hypotheses that an applicant cannot know from reading the Act whether one arrest, a particular type of arrest, or the age of an arrest will result in a determination that the applicant is a threat or danger. ¶ 36 However, regarding White's perceived failure of the Act to answer whether he would ever subsequently qualify for a CCL, or is forever barred, we are mindful that " '[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.' " Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110, quoted in Granite City Division of National Steel Company v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 155 Ill. 2d 149, 164 (1993). To the extent that White argues he cannot predict what circumstances will result in a determination of dangerousness, we find that any reasonable definition of "danger" or "threat" includes the conduct he was alleged to have committed, and which the Board found sufficient to deem him as such. Jankovich, 2017 IL App (1st) 160706, ¶¶ 91-94. Put another way, "even if the outermost boundaries of words like 'danger' and 'threat to public safety' were theoretically imprecise, what should have been perfectly clear to a reasonable person in plaintiff's shoes is that the allegations concerning his past conduct could comfortably fall within the heart of those definitions." Id. at ¶ 93. ¶ 37 As for White's argument that the Act fails to define or provide guidance to determine when an applicant is a threat or danger, we again note that less precision in statutory language is constitutionally required when penalties are civil as opposed to criminal. Wilson, 2012 IL 112026, ¶ 23. The Act's dangerousness standard (see Jankovich, 2017 IL App (1st) 160706, ¶¶ 61-62 (referring to standard "that the applicant poses a danger to himself or herself or others, or is a threat to public safety" as the dangerousness standard)) is not vague simply because it is subject to some interpretation and discretion as to its parameters. See Morgan v. Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, 374 Ill. App. 3d 275, 293 (2007) ("The fact that the scope of the term 'imminent danger' is subject to some interpretation and discretion does not mean that the Director was left with no cognizable standard."). In other words, although the Act provides the Board some discretion in determining the scope or parameters of an applicant's dangerousness, that latitude does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague. Id.; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114. Ultimately, examining the Act "in light of the particular facts of the case" (internal quotations omitted) (Jankovich, 2017 IL App (1st) 160706, ¶ 90), we conclude that the dangerousness standard is not "so ill-defined that the ultimate decision as to its meaning rests on the opinions and whims of the trier of fact rather than any objective criteria or facts." Id. ¶ 38 Aside, White also complains he was denied due process because of the Board's "unbounded power" to call a hearing, "which itself is limited to 'circumstances that cannot be resolved to the [Board's] satisfaction through written communication with the parties." A similar contention was rejected in Perez, 2016 IL App (1st) 152087, ¶¶ 26-28, wherein the court noted that an administrative proceeding need not involve a hearing in order to comport with due process, that plaintiff did not request a hearing after receiving notice of objections to his CCL application, and he consented to the administrative procedure of written communications. We discern no reason to depart from the analysis and conclusion in Perez. ¶ 39 White next contends that the Act violates his right to keep and bear arms as secured by the second amendment. However, we find that White has forfeited this argument by failing to raise it before the Board. Crowley v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 2014 IL App (1st) 130727, ¶ 35. White did not present, before the Board, any constitutional arguments regarding the Act in relation to his second amendment right to keep and bear arms. Although he raised such an argument for the first time on administrative review in the circuit court, that is insufficient (Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 213 (2008)), particularly where our review is limited to the final decision of the Board, not that of the circuit court (Petrovic, 2016 IL 118562, ¶ 22). "Any issue that is not raised before the administrative agency, even constitutional issues that the agency lacks the authority to decide, will be forfeited by the party failing to raise the issue." Crowley, 2014 IL App (1st) 130727, ¶ 35.
¶ 40 CONCLUSION
¶ 41 For the reasons stated, we affirm the Board's denial of White's CCL application. ¶ 42 Affirmed.