Opinion
Case No. 94-CV-74711-DT
July 12, 2001
OPINION ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Marvin White filed this pro se action against Defendant Commissioner of Social Security. Plaintiff is a diagnosed schizophrenic who is currently receiving benefits from the Social Security Administration as the disabled child of John Bullock. However, Plaintiff claims that Collie White is his biological father and sought a determination that he is eligible for benefits on the account of Collie White. On January 22, 2001, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. This Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Virginia Morgan for a Report and Recommendation ("RR") on March 17, 2001.
Magistrate Judge Morgan was able to educe the following background information from the exhibits submitted by the parties. Plaintiff's mother, Ella Mae White, was married to Collie White at the time of Plaintiff's birth. However, Ella Mae White named John Bullock as Plaintiff's father when plaintiff first applied for a Social Security card, and John Bullock has admitted paternity of Plaintiff. Years ago, Plaintiff applied for and was granted Social Security disability benefits as the disabled child of John Bullock.
As the RR noted, Plaintiff has filed a plethora of documents in this case. Most of them are not relevant to the issue before the Court and many of them are illegible.
In February of 1994, Plaintiff filed an application requesting benefits on the account of Collie White, admitting that he was already receiving benefits on the record of John Bullock, and admitting that he had not lived with Collie White since 1958. The agency denied the claim, as dependancy requirements were not met for a step-child relationship.
In October of 1994, Plaintiff sought review of his application by filing a pro se action in U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. However, as Plaintiff was living in Michigan, the case was transferred to this district. Plaintiff's counsel agreed to dismiss the case without prejudice since Plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies, and the case was dismissed without prejudice on April 21, 1995.
In October of 1995, the Appeals Council granted Plaintiff's request for review of the decision denying him benefits on the account of Collie White, vacated the decision and remanded the case for determination of whether Plaintiff was the "child" of Collie White. In June of 1997, a decision was issued by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") finding Plaintiff to be the child of Collie White. However, after consideration of a protest and other evidence, the Appeals Council reopened the case. The Appeals Council considered the testimony of involved persons that John Bullock is Plaintiff's biological father, Bullock's admission of paternity, the absence of any claim by Collie White that he is Plaintiff's father, and the fact that Plaintiff's mother named John Bullock as Plaintiff's father on his application for a Social Security card. The Appeals Council, finding clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff is not the child of Collie White, reversed the decision of the ALJ on March 16, 1998. The Appeals Council found that Plaintiff could continue to collect benefits on the account of John Bullock, and also noted that Plaintiff would receive more benefits if collecting benefits as John Bullock's child rather than Collie White's child.
In April of 1998, Plaintiff filed a new application for benefits, raising the same issue. The application was dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's dismissal, and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for reopening of the case.
On March 10, 2000, Plaintiff moved to reinstate this case, and on May 24, 2000, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to reopen.
On January 22, 2001, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. Defendants assert that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed: 1) because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the merits of the Appeals Council's March 16, 1998 decision because Plaintiff failed to timely seek review of that decision, 2) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Court has no jurisdiction to review the Appeals Council decisions denying Plaintiff's requests for review of the dismissal order and denying a motion to reopen, and 3) because dismissal of this action would be in the best interest of Plaintiff.
On May 10, 2001, Magistrate Judge Morgan filed a RR recommending that Defendant's motion to dismiss be granted. Magistrate Judge Morgan was not convinced that the case should be dismissed due to Plaintiff's alleged failure to timely seek review of the March 16, 1998 decision. However, upon reviewing the March 16, 1998 decision, she found that there was substantial evidence to support that decision. She also found that this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the Appeals Council's determination not to reopen the case. See Cottrell v. Secretary of HHS, 987 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1993) (absent any colorable constitutional claim, federal court has no jurisdiction to review Appeals Council's decision not to reopen case.) The RR also noted that dismissal is in the best interest of Plaintiff, as Plaintiff will receive greater benefits as the disabled child of John Bullock than he would as the disabled child of Collie White.
As explained in the RR:
Plaintiff would only be able to receive child's insurance benefits on one account. 20 C.F.R. § 404.353(b). The "family maximum" provisions of 20 C.F.R. § 404.403, 404 limit the total amount of benefits that can be paid to all beneficiaries on the wage earner's account. Because plaintiff's mother is collecting benefits as of October, 1995, and Mr. White is collecting, plaintiff's benefits would be less than he is currently receiving from Mr. Bullock's account.
(RR at 7).
The RR notified the parties that they may object to and seek review of the RR, but are required to act within (10) ten days of service of a copy, as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and E.D. MICH. LR 72.1(d)(2). Plaintiff filed objections to the RR on May 14, 2001, and on May 29, 2001. The Court is unable to decipher the content of the objections filed on May 14, 2001, as they are handwritten and are illegible. Although the typed objections filed on May 29, 2001, are legible, the Court is unable to understand the substance of Plaintiff's objections, or how they relate to the issues in this case. Objections made to the RR must be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those issues that are "dispositive and contentious." Howard v. Secretary of Health Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). As the Court is unable to discern the issues that are dispositive and contentious from Plaintiff's objections, the Court rejects those objections.
Plaintiff also filed other illegible, handwritten documents on June 25, 2001, and July 3, 2001. The Court is unable to determine if these document contains "objections." However, even if the documents do contain objections, the Court is unable to understand the substance of such objections, and these objections were not timely filed.
The content of Plaintiff's May 29, 2001 objections is as follows:
Plaintiff contends that he has been underpaid throughout this case, beginning with sometime in November, 1977.
Plaintiff is entitled to these benefits with a lump sum payment.
Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that six (6) checks were sent to his home while he was hospitalized, where he was found not guilty by reason of insanity, May 31, 1977. There were several issues during the Plaintiff's hospitalization that were misleading and bordered deceit and outright lies. A State employee, Curtis Irish, acting as a social security agent, at the Forensic Service Department, Dr. William Yonne, and social worker, Nicholas Holt, made the report to start the Plaintiff's supplemental income which amounted to hospital fraud. You are not allowed while hospitalized. Therefore, the Plaintiff is merely asking to be reimbursed.
(5/29/01 Objections at 1).
Having reviewed the pleadings, and the RR, this Court concurs with the recommendations of Magistrate Judge Morgan. Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, and for the reasons set forth by Magistrate Judge Morgan in the RR, the Court shall grant Defendant's motion to dismiss.
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion Order shall issue forthwith.