Summary
noting that "[t]he word land legally includeth all castles, houses and other buildings, so as passing the land or ground, the structure or building thereupon passeth therewith" and holding that where a "stable was fixed to the land, [it] was in law a part of it"
Summary of this case from Binkley v. BinkleyOpinion
(December Term, 1832.)
An unsealed memorandum given by the owner of land, stating that A. is the owner of a house upon the premises, and authorizing its removal, is a mere license to enter, and is revoked by a subsequent conveyance to B.
TRESPASS quare clausum fregit, and upon not guilty pleaded, on the trial before Daniel, J., at WARREN, on the last spring circuit, the case was that one Robert Ransom, in the year 1826, bought the premises in dispute of one Robert R. Johnson, from whom he received an absolute deed, and to whom he gave the following memorandum, which was without a seal: "I, Robert Ransom, agree that the stable next, etc., which belongs to Robert Johnson, may be removed at any time he pleases, which stable was reserved by said Johnson in his sale, etc." The plaintiff claimed under an absolute deed from R. Ransom to James Ransom, and the defendant under a sale of the stable from Johnson's administrators. The trespass consisted of an entry by the defendant, and the removal of the stable.
Devereux for defendant.
Badger contra.
The jury, under the direction of his Honor, returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.
after stating the case, proceeded: The word "land (390) legally includeth all castles, houses and other buildings, so as passing the land or ground, the structure or building thereupon passeth therewith." (1 Thomas' Coke, 197.) "If a man grant all his lands, he grants thereby all his mines of metal, and other fossils, his woods, his waters, and his houses, as well as his fields and meadows." (2 Bl. Com., 18.) The word "land" includes not only the face of the earth, but everything under it or over it. The stable was fixed to the land, and was in law a part of it. It could not be, nor was it severed by the unsealed writing which Ransom gave to Johnson. It remained as part of the land, and passed under the deed to James Ransom, and again it passed with the land by the deed to the plaintiff. The written license given by Ransom might have excused a trespass committed in entering and taking the stable, whilst he was the owner of the premises. It did not operate as a conveyance of the stable, for the stable being a part of the realty, could not pass, except by such a conveyance as would pass the land. A license to commit a trespass is a very different thing from a conveyance, which will pass the land, or any of its appurtenances. When Ransom sold the land, the stable passed, and the license to enter was revoked; it was not incorporated in the deed to Ransom, and it was therefore, as to his bargainee, a nullity.
PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed.
Cited: Dills v. Hampton, 92 N.C. 571; McCoy v. Lumber Co., 149 N.C. 3.