Opinion
No. FST CV10-6005818S
October 19, 2011
Memorandum of Decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (No. 119) and Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (No. 123)
Procedural/Factual Background
This is an appeal pursuant to Conn. Gen Stat. § 45a-186 from a June 16, 2010 decree of the Stamford Probate Court, denying the petition filed by the Clayton C. Wheat, Executor in the matter of the Estate of Mary Chappel Wheat, deceased, seeking a summary dismissal of a claim filed in that estate by the Stamford Hospital. The Probate Court for the District of Stamford, Hon. Gerald M. Fox, Jr., denied the petition for summary dismissal of the Stamford Hospital claim and appointed a committee pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-123 to determine the claim of Stamford Hospital against the estate after consultation between the committee and counsel of record.
Section 45a-186(a) provides, in part: "Any person aggrieved by any order, denial, or decree of a court of probate in any matter, unless otherwise specially provided by law, may . . . appeal therefrom to the Superior Court . . . The complaint shall state the reasons for the appeal. A copy of the order, denial, or decree appealed from shall be attached to the complaint . . ."
The procedural background as set forth in the Reasons of Appeal and affidavits and attachments is undisputed.
Jennifer Wheat and Clayton Wheat are the children and beneficiaries of Mary Chappell Wheat, the decedent. The decedent died on February 10, 2007, and the Stamford Probate Court appointed the plaintiff, Clayton Wheat, as the executor of the estate on October 16, 2007. Notice to Creditors was published on November 11, 2007. On December 10, 2007, the defendant, The Stamford Hospital, entered its appearance in the probate court and made claims in the total amount of $179,136.64 against the estate relating to two hospital admissions of the decedent. The claims were presented to the executor within the one hundred fifty day period set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-356 (one hundred fifty days from the date of appointment of the first fiduciary). On December 28, 2007 the executor filed an inventory showing total assets of $19,492.80. The plaintiff executor denied defendant's claim for the hospital admission of January 15, 2007 through February 10, 2007 in the Return of Claims and List and List of Notified Creditors of April 11, 2008, and by an amended filing of May 17, 2008 denied the defendant's claim for the hospital admission of October 4, 2006 through October 24, 2006. On May 14, 2008, the executor filed an Application/Declaration of Insolvent Estate, claiming that assets of the estate were insufficient to pay creditors, asking the court to allow the fiduciary to settle the estate, without claims procedures otherwise required, in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-383 (applicable to insolvent estates). The defendant objected to that application, claiming that the estate was not insolvent.
The basis of the argument that the estate was not insolvent was an allegation that the decedent Mary Chappel Wheat was the beneficiary of three trusts held in New York and that such assets were subject to the claims of creditors, including the hospital. On July 13, 2009 the New York Surrogate's Court, in a proceeding initiated by the trustee seeking advice inter alia as to the rights of creditors to reach the trust assets, in which proceeding the parties hereto appeared, ruled that the trust assets were subject to the claims of creditors of Mary Chappel Wheat. No appeal was filed.
The defendant hospital then filed suit against the executor in the Superior Court for this judicial district as to the denial of its claims, served on May 30, 2008. On June 27, 2008, the executor filed a motion to dismiss the hospital's suit pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-382. Over the hospital's objection the motion to dismiss that action was granted by Judge Downey on October 8, 2008.
The court takes judicial notice of the Return of Service of State Marshal Edmund K. Makowski in Docket No. FST CV08-5007654S, confirming that he made abode service on the defendant Clayton C. Wheat, Executor on May 30, 2008. The affidavit of Atty. Tobin, at ¶ 15 indicates that suit was commenced on May 27, 2008. The difference is inconsequential in terms of the 120-day deadline.
Section 45a-382 provides, in part: "Except as provided by section 45a-380, no suit shall be brought against the fiduciary of an estate in course of settlement as insolvent . . ."
See Stamford Hospital v. Wheat, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 08 5007654 (October 10, 2008, Downey, J.) ( 46 Conn. L. Rptr. 403). The court held that the defendant's suit against the estate for the denial of its claim was precluded under General Statutes § 45a-382. The court reasoned that "a fiduciary's representation of insolvency is sufficient to terminate any claims made against the decedent's estate," even if a court has not yet made a determination on whether the estate is in fact insolvent. Id., 405.
Following the dismissal of the defendant's suit, Atty. Tobin representing Stamford Hospital wrote to Atty. Philips, counsel for the executor, on December 26, 2008 referencing the claims the defendant had filed in 2007 which had been denied by the executor, and stating "[t]o the extent Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-383 (setting forth the procedures for settlement of insolvent estates) requires us to resubmit our claims, please consider this letter as compliance therewith." That letter further stated that Atty. Tobin had asked the probate court "to set the matter of Stamford Hospital's bill down for a status conference and hearing," and made this proposal to Atty. Phillips:
I am in the process of reviewing the possibility of an appeal from Judge Downey's most recent ruling. I will not file an appeal if you indicate in writing that you have no objection to proceeding in the Stamford Probate Court to determine the amount of the estate's liability. This will undoubtedly save a substantial amount of money for the estate and a substantial amount of time for both of us.
The Stamford Probate Court then held a status conference/hearing on the plaintiff's application for a declaration of insolvency on January 26, 2010. (The hearing had been originally scheduled for June 12, 2008, but was continued at the request of counsel for the hospital with the consent of counsel for the plaintiffs. The hearing was further continued on July 3, 2008 at the request of counsel for the hospital without objection by any party.) Following the January 26, 2010 hearing Attorney James Rubino wrote to the probate court on February 3, 2008 reporting an agreement reached by all counsel involved in the estate that the parties were jointly asking the probate court to schedule a hearing or hearings at the court's earliest convenience for the purpose of determining the claims against the estate. On February 8, 2010, Atty. Tobin representing the defendant submitted a letter to the probate court requesting a hearing on its claims for payment relating to the two hospital admissions of the decedent. The plaintiff then moved in the probate court for summary dismissal of the defendant's claims three days later. By order and decree dated June 16, 2010, the probate court denied the motion. This appeal followed.
The record before this court does not reflect Atty. Rubino's role in the administration of the Wheat estate, or the identity of his client(s). Nonetheless his letter of January 26, 2010 reporting an agreement reached by himself, Atty. Phillps and Atty. Tobin after the hearing of January 26, 2010, as attached as an exhibit to Atty. Tobin's affidavit, is not denied or contested by the plaintiffs or the defendant. The existence of the agreement is therefore established beyond any issue of material fact, for purposes of summary judgment.
Now before the court is defendant's motion for summary judgment, accompanied by memorandum of law and the affidavit of Atty. Tobin with exhibits, as to the plaintiff's appeal on the grounds that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with regard to the timeliness of its claims and as to whether the defendant was required to request a hearing within thirty days of the rejection of its claims. Also before the court is the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment, with memorandum of law and affidavit of Atty. Phillips with exhibits seeking judgment as a matter of law on the sole ground that the defendant's claims are barred because it failed to request a hearing in the probate court within thirty days of the denial of its claims pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-360(b). Defendant has also briefed a claim that that the defendant's claims are barred because it failed to present its claims against the estate within two years of the decedent's death pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-375. (The court will consider both claims because the cross motion references the plaintiff's memorandum of law and the defendant has addressed both claims in its memorandum.)
Discussion
"An appeal from a Probate Court to the Superior Court is not an ordinary civil action . . . When entertaining an appeal from an order or decree of a Probate Court, the Superior Court takes the place of and sits as the court of probate . . . In ruling on a probate appeal, the Superior Court exercises the powers, not of a constitutional court of general or common law jurisdiction, but of a Probate Court." Marchentine v. Brittany Farms Health Center, Inc., 84 Conn.App. 486, 489-90 (2004). "The function of the Superior Court in appeals from a Probate Court is to take jurisdiction of the order or decree appealed from and to try that issue de novo." Kerwin v. Stangle, 209 Conn. 260, 264 (1988).
The hearing in the Stamford Probate Court on the plaintiff's motion to summarily dismiss the defendant's claims was not a hearing of record. Consequently, the standard of review for an appeal following a hearing of record, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-186b, does not apply.
The standard governing motions for summary judgment is well established. "Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sherman v. Ronco, 294 Conn. 548, 553-54 (2010). "The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Viola v. O'Dell, 108 Conn.App. 760, 763-64 (2008). "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500 (1988). "The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts . . . A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if it raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiff's claim and involves no triable issue of fact." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Byrne v. Burke, 112 Conn.App. 262, 268 (2009).
In this case the court finds from the affidavits and other materials submitted that there is no genuine issue of fact as to any issue raised. The underlying facts are all uncontested facts, and the issues presented are issues of law. Under these circumstances the Supreme Court has held in Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 401 (2005), that the court may proceed to determine the legal sufficiency of a party's position if the court concludes that an opportunity to amend the pleadings would not help non-moving party. Here the court does conclude that, with respect to both the motion for summary judgment and the cross motion for summary judgment, an opportunity to amend would not be helpful to either party, and the court will therefore address the legal issues presented.
Keeping in mind that this is a trial de novo, and not just a review of the Probate Court's decision for legal correctness or freedom from clear error, this court has carefully reviewed the June 16, 2010 Decree of the Stamford Probate Court, and finds it to be comprehensive, well-reasoned, and legally correct. This court, after careful analysis and consideration, acting de novo, and under the summary judgment standards, reaches the same conclusions of law on the same underlying facts as did the Probate Court.
Specifically and without limitation, this court finds and concludes that:
1. The Defendant's claims are not barred by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-363b or § 45a-364(a)
Section 45a-363(b) provides, in part:
Unless a person whose claim has been rejected (1) commences suit within one hundred twenty days from the date of rejection of his claim, in whole or in part, or (2) files a timely application pursuant to section 45a-364, he shall be barred from asserting or recovering on such claim from the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent, or any creditor or beneficiary of the estate, except for such part as has not been rejected.
Section 45a-364(a) provides, in part:
Whenever a claim has been rejected, in whole or in part, as provided in section 45a-360, the person whose claim has been rejected may, within thirty days from and including the date of such rejection, make application to the Court of Probate to hear and decide such claim . . .
The defendant's claim in this case is saved from being barred under § 45a-363(b) because the claim of the defendant, having been rejected by the fiduciary on April 11 or May 17, 2008, served a civil action on those claims, Docket No. FST CV08-5007654S on May 30, 2008, which was approximately forty-nine days from the earlier rejection date, and clearly within the 120 days allowed by § 45a-363(b). Defendant was not required to satisfy both prongs of § 45a-363(b). The statute clearly requires only satisfaction with part (a) or part (b). The defendant's claims were saved from being barred under § 45a-363b when it commenced suit against the executor for nonpayment of its claims.
Furthermore, as the Probate Court points out at ¶¶ 13-19 of the Decree, the result suggested by plaintiff-that defendant's claims should be totally barred-is "wholly at odds" with the statutory scheme for the administration of insolvent estates. This court agrees with the Probate Court's conclusion in ¶ 17 of its Decree that "The statutory scheme governing the settlement of insolvent estates insures that the claims of all creditors are dealt with in a uniform fashion and in the same forum. That forum is the probate court. Section 45a-382 performs a significant role in that scheme. Its clear purpose is not to prevent creditors from asserting their claims against an estate. Rather it attempts to provide a fair and equitable process in which all claims of creditors are dealt with together so that the limited assets of an estate can be distributed equitably in accordance with the priorities established by statute." In keeping with that statutory scheme, the Probate Court concluded in ¶ 18: "The dismissal was premised on the notion that the matter would return to the probate court to be dealt with under the insolvency procedures discussed above." That conclusion is consistent with the language of § 45a-382 which does not even mention a dismissal as the remedy for the situation where a civil action is pending against an insolvent estate. Rather, the statute provides ". . . pending suits shall abate and the creditor shall submit his claim to the fiduciary and may request that costs incurred in connection with the suit up to the date of abatement be added to the claim." In construing that language the court in Zanoni v. Lynch, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV95-0546174 (Berger, J., April 8, 1997), 1997 Ct.Sup. 4077, considered the meaning of the term "abatement of action" and followed the "modern meaning" of the term as defined in Ballantine's Law Dictionary, Third Edition: ". . . an abatement signifies only a present suspension of all proceedings in the suit." Id. 4079. Finding that a dismissal of the pending suits "would inevitably be self defeating" Judge Berger instead ordered that "no further action will take place on any of these pending suits until the estate is fully probated." Id. See, also, Snaider v. Cooper, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 32-52-40 (Hadden, J., November 20, 1992), 1992 Ct.Sup. 10468, 8 CSCR 40 [ 8 Conn. L. Rptr. 16] ("In Connecticut, if the estate is insolvent, there should be a representation of insolvency so soon as that fact appears, and thereafter the payment of debts is conducted under the orders of the court of probate . . . Since the estate has been declared insolvent the statute [ § 45a-382] wrests jurisdiction from the Superior Court and places it with the Probate Court." (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 10471).
2. Defendant's claims are not barred by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-375
Section 45a-375 provides, in part:
. . . [N]o claim may be presented and no suit on such claim may be commenced against the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent, or any creditor or beneficiary of such estate but within (1) two years from the date of the decedent's death or (2) the date upon which the statute of limitations applicable to such claim . . . would otherwise have expired, whichever shall first occur.
There is no claim that the statute of limitations generally applicable to the hospital's claim against Mary Chappel Wheat or her executor for nonpayment of hospital services had expired. The plaintiff does claim, however, that Atty. Tobin's letter of February 8, 2010 to the probate court asking that the hospital's claim be scheduled for a hearing in that court was the making or presentation of its claim more than two years following the death of the decedent on February 10, 2007. But, as previously indicated, the defendant's claim was timely filed on December 10, 2007. Although that claim was denied by the executor, and later brought before the Superior Court, its timely filing in 2007 satisfied the two-year limitation of § 45a-375. The court concurs with ¶ 9 of the Probate Decree, that the February 8, 2010 letter was nothing more than a request for a hearing which "makes specific reference to claims having been `submitted' in the past."
Defendant's arguments are all couched in terms of policy favoring the prompt administration of estates and argues that the defendant's decision to bring suit in 2008 rather than seek a hearing in the probate court is inconsistent with that policy, and defendant should therefore suffer the consequences of the dismissal of its suit. But the policy does not compel that result. The consequence plaintiff seeks would bar the plaintiff forever from any forum in which to present its claim for determination on the merits or any remedy for nonpayment for hospital admissions. In many cases the decision to bring suit against an estate instead of asking for a claim hearing in the probate court will prove to be a time-saving strategy by getting an issue directly and promptly before the Superior Court instead of going through a Probate Court hearing followed by an appeal to the Superior Court. And, as the court has found, in this case there was an agreement among counsel in 2010 that all contested claims would go to the Probate Court for resolution, which, as Atty. Tobin points out in his December 26, 2008 letter to Atty. Philips, has the advantage of saving a substantial amount of time for all concerned. The goal of prompt administration was not disserved in the handling of this estate, and the process of resolving claims as ordered by the Probate Court in its June 16, 2010 decree is consistent with ". . . the policy preference to bring about a trial on the merits of a dispute whenever possible and to secure for the litigant his day in court." Millbrook Owners' Association v. Hamilton Standard, 257 Conn. 1, 16 (2001).
Order
For these reason the court concludes that the defendant — and not the plaintiff — is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the uncontested facts applicable to this appeal. The probate court's denial of summary dismissal of the defendant's claims was proper. The defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, and the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment is denied.