Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-151, Section "K"(1)
August 30, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively to Stay the Proceedings filed by Willie Mae Williams ("Williams") (Doc. 8) and a Motion for Dismissal and/or Transfer Based Upon Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(B) filed by Ivan David Warner, III (Doc. 9). Defendants seeks relief based on a parallel state court proceeding originally filed on May 15, 2000. The Court has reviewed the pleadings, memoranda and the relevant case law and finds that the motions to dismiss should be granted for the reasons that follow.
Background
On May 15, 2000, Williams, in her individual capacity and on behalf of the estate of Willie Abram, her deceased father, filed suit against Ivan David Warner, III, PLC; John Musser, IV; the Estate of Edward H. Stevens, III; and three nominal insurance companies. Williams alleges that original petition filed in Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans that Warner, Musser and Stevens were negligent in the handling of Williams' 1996 wrongful death suit which was filed in Mississippi state court and dismissed on July 29, 1988 because of alleged failures on the part of the attorneys. The Court would assume that upon Warner being served he would have contacted his insurers in order for them to defend this suit, because on January 17, 2000, Westport Insurance Company ("Westport") and Coregis Insurance Company ("Coregis") filed the instant declaratory judgment action against Warner claiming no duty to defend Warner. On February 15, 2000, plaintiff amended her state law suit, naming Westport and Coregis in lieu of two of nominal insurance company defendants.
Analysis
Plaintiffs have raised a number of arguments as to why this matter should be dismissed or stayed: however, the Court will focus on the broad discretion this Court has under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. As this Court has noted before:
"Since its inception, the Declaratory Judgment Act has been understood to confer on federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants." Agora Syndicate, Inc. v. Robinson Janitorial Specialists, Inc., 149 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 1998)(quoting Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 2142 (1995)). As such, "[i]t is well settled. . . . that the granting of a declaratory judgment rests in the sound discretion of the trial court exercised in public interest." Wright, Miller Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 3d, § 2759: Mission Ins. Co. v. Puritan Fashions Corp., 706 F.2d 599. 604 (5th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court has held that the Declaratory Judgment Act "created an opportunity, rather than a duty, to grant a new form of relief to qualifying litigations [; therefore,] . . . a district court is authorized in the sound exercise of its discretion, to stay or to dismiss an action seeking a declaratory judgment before trial . . ." Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 2143 (1995).
The Wilton Court instructed district courts to consider whether the clams of all parties in interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated in a pending state court proceeding. Id. at 2141. Prior to the Wilton decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set forth several factors for a court to consider in deciding whether to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. Those factors include, but are not limited to, 1) whether there is a pending state action in which all of the matters in controversy can be fully litigated; 2) whether the plaintiff filed suit in anticipation of a lawsuit filed by the defendant; 3) whether the plaintiff engaged in forum shopping in bringing this suit; 4) whether possible inequities in allowing the declaratory judgment action plaintiff to gain precedence in time or to change forum exist; 5) whether the Federal Court is a convenient forum for the parties and for the witnesses; and 6) whether retaining the lawsuit in Federal Court would serve the purpose of judicial economy. Travelers Insurance Company v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Federation, Inc. 996 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir. 1993).State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Thayer, 2001 WL 224808 (E.D.La. March 6, 2001) at *2. An application of these criteria in this instance mandates that the Court decline to hear the declaratory judgment suit.
Of paramount consideration is that there is a pending state action in which all the issues in controversy may be fully litigated. Indeed, it is the existence of that suit which triggered the instant declaratory judgment action to be filed. "`[A]t least where another suit involving the same parties and presenting opportunity for ventilation of the same state law issues is pending in state court, a district court might be indulging in `gratuitous interference' if it permitted the federal declaratory action to proceed.'" Axa Marine Aviation Insurance Ltd. v. Robinson International (USA), Inc. 1996 WL 96894, citing Wilton, 115 S.Ct. at 2141. Considering the procedural history of this suit, and the fact that the insurers have been sued directly in that suit, it is clear that all of the insurance coverage issues maybe fully litigated in one state court forum by a single judge.
This case can be distinguished from Travelers Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Federation, 996 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1993). As noted by Judge Vance in Axa Marine the insurance company "was faced with the possibility of multiple suits being brought against it in various courts throughout Louisiana and Mississippi." That factor is not present in the instant case. Likewise, there has been no discovery or litigation in this suit whereas the defendant in Travelers had engaged in discovery and litigated the in issues in the federal declaratory action before asserting abstention as a defense to a motion for summary judgment. A trial date has not even been assigned in this matter.
In addition, considering the chronology of the suits filed and the fact that Williams had initially filed suit against nominal insurers of Warner, Westport and Coregis filed this suit in anticipation of being added in the state court suit. As such, it can also be said that these insurers shopped for a federal forum as opposed to filing this declaratory judgment action in the state suit.
Certainly, this forum is no more convenient for the parties than Civil District Court, both being in New Orleans. In addition, it must be said that it would be more inconvenient for there to be two suits in which Warner would have to participate rather than one suit. In addition, retaining this lawsuit in federal court would not serve the purpose of judicial economy as all matters concerning this case can be litigated in state court.
Thus, it is clear that it is within the Court's discretion to decline to render a declaratory judgment in this case Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively to Stay the Proceedings filed by Willie Mae Williams (Doc. 8) and the Motion for Dismissal and/or Transfer Based Upon Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(B) filed by Ivan David Warner, III (Doc. 9) are GRANTED.