Opinion
A151911
04-10-2018
JODIE WESTPHAL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. KIRSTEN PRIEBE, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Lake County Super. Ct. No. CV-415102)
Plaintiff Jodie Westphal, appearing in propria persona, appeals after a jury returned verdicts against her on her claims against defendant Kirsten Priebe. In her complaint, Westphal alleged that she had sold real property to Priebe but Priebe never paid her as promised. On appeal, Westphal complains about various aspects of the proceedings below. As she has not supported her claims with citations to the record and makes no reasoned argument in support of reversal, we affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
In June 2015, Westphal brought this suit against Priebe, alleging causes of action for quiet title, ejectment, and fraud. The complaint alleged that Westphal had transferred title of a property in Clearlake to Priebe in exchange for $20,000, but Priebe never paid the money promised "and in fact lied to [Westphal] telling her the funds had been sent to [Priebe's] son."
After the trial court overruled Priebe's demurrer to the complaint, a three-day jury trial took place in May 2017. After deliberating less than three hours, the jury returned verdicts finding in Priebe's favor on all claims. The court then found that the quiet-title claim was equitable, construed the verdict on that claim as an advisory opinion, and accepted that opinion.
Five days later, Priebe served a document entitled "Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order" representing that a judgment had been entered on May 5, the last day of trial, and attaching the minute orders from the trial. There is no indication in the record, however, that Priebe prepared a judgment or that a judgment was ever actually entered. Westphal's notice of appeal identifies the appeal as being from a judgment or order entered on May 5.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Despite the Lack of a Judgment, We Need Not Dismiss the Appeal.
We begin by discussing the effect of the fact that a judgment was never entered, an issue neither party addresses. A judgment is not "effectual for any purpose until entered." (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.) Thus, if a judgment is not entered after a jury trial, an appeal that purports to be of the judgment "is of no effect" and is subject to dismissal. (Ochoa v. Dorado (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 120, 133-134.) But Priebe does not contend that we should dismiss the appeal on this ground, and she will not be prejudiced if we resolve the case on the merits. "Under these circumstances, '[to] dismiss the appeal "merely to have a judgment formally entered below with a new appeal would be a useless waste of judicial and litigant time." ' " (Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795, 800.) Therefore, we direct the trial court to enter a judgment in favor of Priebe nunc pro tunc as of the date the jury returned its verdicts, "and we then construe the notice of appeal to refer to such judgment." (Ibid.)
B. Westphal Has Failed to Demonstrate Prejudicial Error.
In a single paragraph of argument, Westphal complains about numerous aspects of the proceeding below, including (1) the duration of the trial court's examination of jurors for possible bias, (2) various claimed deficiencies in the verdict forms, (3) the lack of authority to support the jury instructions, and (4) the court's purported rushing of the case. For the most part, however, she fails to specify what she actually objects to, and she provides no citations to the record to enable us to understand her claims. Indeed, at least some of her claims arise from proceedings for which she has not provided reporter's transcripts. Nor has she offered any cogent legal arguments in support of reversal.
"The most fundamental rule of appellate review is that a judgment is presumed correct, all intendments and presumptions are indulged in its favor, and ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance." (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286.) Thus, "the appellant has the burden of demonstrating prejudicial error," which requires the appellant to provide an adequate record. (Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348.) Westphal has not only provided an inadequate record but also failed to offer a single citation to that record to support her arguments. As a result, she has waived them: we are not required to "scour the record unguided" in an attempt to understand her position. (City of Santa Maria, at pp. 286-287.) Moreover, she has not supported her claims " ' "with reasoned argument and citations to authority." ' " (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.) Although we understand that Westphal is representing herself, the same standards that apply to attorneys apply to her. (County of Orange v. Smith (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1444.) Because she has failed to identify any adequate basis on which the judgment should be reversed, we have no choice but to affirm.
III.
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to enter, nunc pro tunc as of May 5, 2017, a judgment in favor of Priebe. The judgment is affirmed. Priebe is awarded her costs on appeal.
/s/_________
Humes, P.J. We concur: /s/_________
Margulies, J. /s/_________
Dondero, J.