Opinion
No. 02-10-00046-CR
Delivered: July 7, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Appealed from Criminal District Court No. 1 of Tarrant County.
PANEL: McCOY, WALKER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
I. Introduction
In one point, Appellant Equaile De-Van Westmoreland a/k/a Equaile Westmoreland asserts that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motions for mistrial during the punishment phase of trial. We affirm.II. Factual and Procedural History
Richard Dowell, the eighteen-year-old victim in this case, was friends with Westmoreland, one of the leaders of "Gang B," which was allied with "Gang A." Dowell was known by the police as a member of Gang B. Happiness Osunde associated with "Gang C," which was on good terms with "Gang D." On July 9, 2007, Dowell called Osunde, seeking to set up a rematch fight with Desmond Blair of Gang C. Gangs C and D arranged to meet Gangs A and B for a fistfight that evening. Witnesses estimated that there were around 100 gang members present that evening for the fight, and fighting between the gangs erupted before Dowell and Blair could have their rematch: Osunde testified that the fight began when someone from the Gang A-B side threw a bottle that hit someone on the Gang C-D side. Gang A members Percy Demerson and Lamar Stone testified that the Gang C-D side threw the bottles. Osunde said that when the fighting began, he heard Westmoreland say, "f — — that," and that he saw Westmoreland draw a gun — either a nine-millimeter or a .380 — from his waist, point it at the crowd, and begin shooting. Other members of Gangs A and B fired their guns too. Stone testified that Demerson yelled to the Gang A and B members with guns, "Shoot, shoot, they're throwing bottles," and that he heard Westmoreland say, "Get out the way." As soon as Stone heard Westmoreland say this, shots were fired. Demerson testified that Westmoreland did not shoot at the crowd, but he also admitted that he had told Arlington police officers that the shots came from where Westmoreland was standing and that Westmoreland shot level into the crowd. Dowell was in the crowd in the area where Westmoreland fired his gun, and Stone testified that when Westmoreland started shooting, Dowell was in the line of fire of Westmoreland's gun. Dowell was hit by gunfire; he later died at the hospital during surgery. Westmoreland was charged with engaging in organized criminal activity (murder). A jury found him guilty and assessed twenty-seven years' confinement as punishment. This appeal followed.III. Motions for Mistrial
Westmoreland complains that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motions for mistrial during the punishment phase of trial "upon the erroneous introduction by the State of evidence concerning an allegation against Appellant that was inadmissible."A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 (2006); Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1070 (2000). Generally, the declaration of a mistrial is appropriate when the improperly-offered statement of evidence is "clearly calculated to inflame the members of the jury and is of such a character as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the impression produced on the minds of the jury." Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 567; Hernandez v. State, 805 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 960 (1991). That is to say, the offending statement or erroneously offered evidence must be so prejudicial or incurable that an instruction to disregard the statement or evidence cannot withdraw the impression produced on the minds of the jurors, and hence, the expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful and futile. Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 905 (2004). To determine whether a mistrial should have been granted, we review the case's facts and circumstances in light of the arguments that were before the trial court at the time the ruling was made, bearing in mind that the jury is presumed to have followed the trial court's instruction to disregard. Wead v. State, 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Hinojosa v. State, 4 S.W.3d 240, 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Hernandez, 805 S.W.2d at 414; Waldo v. State, 746 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Generally, a prompt instruction to disregard will cure error associated with an improper question and answer. Ovalle v. State, 13 S.W.3d 774, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).B. Unadjudicated Offense
During the punishment phase of trial, Westmoreland's counsel stated that he had "[n]o objection" to State's Exhibits 140 and 141, and the trial court admitted these exhibits into evidence. These exhibits contained court documents concerning the revocation of Westmoreland's deferred adjudications in two misdemeanor offenses (possession of marihuana under two ounces and criminal trespass), including copies of the State's motions to adjudicate guilt based on alleged violations of the terms of Westmoreland's community supervision. At a hearing on these motions, Westmoreland had entered pleas of true to an allegation that he had violated the terms of his community supervision. Following the admission of these exhibits, the State, again without objection by Westmoreland, read the following into the record:Allegations in both [State's Exhibits 140 and 141] for the petition to revoke his probation constitute the offense here of murder and while in the course of committing theft of property and with intent to obtain or maintain control of said property, the defendant intentionally or knowingly caused serious bodily injury to Pauline Cobb, an elderly woman over the age of 65 in Gregg County, Texas, on or about the 20th day of March 2008.Subsequently, during the cross-examination of two defense witnesses, the State asked about the Pauline Cobb incident. During cross-examination of defense witness Reverend Willie Burton, the following took place:
[State]: As it relates to the revocation of his probation, you were in here for that being prosecuted by Ms. Simpson. Were you aware of the situation involving the aggravated robbery of the elderly lady in Gregg County —
[Witness]: No, sir, I wasn't.
[State]: — that he pled true to?
[Witness]: Right, I didn't know about that.
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I'm going to object to that.[Emphasis added.] After a bench conference, during which one of the prosecutors said, "I think we inadvertently published allegations," the trial court sustained Westmoreland's objection, instructed the jury to disregard the State's last statement, and told the jury, "It is as if it did not happen." Outside of the jury's presence, the State acknowledged that there had been a misunderstanding about whether Westmoreland pleaded true to the charge involving Cobb, and the trial court stated, "[Y]our question was about the robbery of an elderly lady. There is no allegation of an elderly person in this — that is specifically going into the facts, and you-all know that that's not allowed." Westmoreland's counsel moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. The prosecutor then asked Reverend Burton if he knew that Westmoreland was in a criminal street gang, and Reverend Burton said no. Westmoreland objected again when the prosecutor asked defense witness Cynthia Westmoreland, Westmoreland's mother, the following:
[State]: You know that [Westmoreland] was arrested for an offense in Gregg County, Texas?
[Witness]: Yes. They was [sic] doing stops, pulling people over for insurance.
[State]: And the offense was aggravated robbery
[Witness]: That's what they say it is.
[State]: And I'm not alleging there was a weapon, but did you know who the victim was?
[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, again, I object.The trial court sustained Westmoreland's objection and instructed the jury to disregard the last statement by the State. When Westmoreland moved for a mistrial, the trial court asked both sides' attorneys to approach the bench and then asked the State, "You have a reason to go into this again?" The prosecutor replied, "Absolutely. . . . They are asking for probation. I am entitled to test her knowledge of his pending legal issues. He is still going to have to face these charges after he's done here." The trial court asked, "How would she know anything about it?" and the prosecutor replied, "She's his mother." The trial court said that it was hearsay and then denied Westmoreland's motion for mistrial.
C. Analysis
Westmoreland articulates his complaint thusly:The trial [c]ourt's instruction to the jury to disregard the erroneous evidence may well have been sufficient to vitiate the harm in the first instance of error. However, when the State repeated its misconduct, requiring the trial [c]ourt to once again instruct the jury, that instruction has less ameliorating effect. To uphold this misconduct by failing to reverse this case for a new trial on punishment would encourage the State to repeat this form of conduct. Here, the erroneous evidence was not a slight claim of misbehavior on the part of [Westmoreland], but a claim that he had robbed an elderly person to the extent of causing [her] serious bodily injury. While we may speculate that after [the] second infraction by the State that the jury somehow overlooked this claim, it strains reason to believe that was the case.Westmoreland cites Cliburn v. State, 661 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), to support his argument. We first observe that the complained-of allegations concerning the Pauline Cobb incident were already before the jury and had been admitted without objection prior to Reverend Burton's or Cynthia's testimonies, Westmoreland's objections, and Westmoreland's motions for mistrial during their testimonies. Specifically, as previously recounted, during the punishment phase of trial, during the reading of State's Exhibits 140 and 141 into evidence, the prosecutor recited, without objection:
Allegations in both [exhibits 140 and 141] for the petition to revoke his probation constitute the offense here of murder and while in the course of committing theft of property and with intent to obtain or maintain control of said property, the defendant intentionally or knowingly caused serious bodily injury to Pauline Cobb, an elderly woman over the age of 65 in Gregg County, Texas, on or about the 20th day of March 2008.[Emphasis added.] See Rico v. State, 707 S.W.2d 549, 553 n. 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (distinguishing Cliburn based on appellant's failure to object to the admission of an unadjudicated extraneous offense contained in a motion to revoke probation); Ytuarte v. State, No. 03-01-00168-CR, 2002 WL 820927, at *2 (Tex. App.-Austin May 2, 2002, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication) (stating that although the State incorrectly presented documents concerning the details of the offenses used to revoke appellant's probation, appellant did not object when the evidence was presented and therefore waived error); see also Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Further, because the jury was already aware of the Pauline Cobb incident when the State began cross-examining Reverend Burton and Cynthia, Westmoreland's only possible objections to the questions to these witnesses concerned whether Burton was aware Westmoreland "pled true to" the allegations and whether Cynthia was aware that Westmoreland was arrested for the offense. And the trial court sustained the objections to both questions and instructed the jury to disregard each time. See Russeau, 171 S.W.3d at 885 ("The asking of an improper question will seldom call for a mistrial, because, in most cases, any harm can be cured by an instruction to disregard."). Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the questions Westmoreland complains of — particularly the second question — were of "such a character as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the impression produced on the minds of the jury," as the underlying basis for both objections was the State's unobjected-to recitation that Westmoreland had caused serious bodily injury to an elderly woman while robbing her. See Hernandez, 805 S.W.2d at 414; see also Rico, 707 S.W.2d at 553 n. 1; Yuarte, 2002 WL 820927, at *2; Harris, 1990 WL 39468, at *2-3. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motions for mistrial, and we overrule Westmoreland's single point.