Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-1022.
June 10, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Now before the court is the motion of West Virginia Rivers Coalition ("WVRC"), a nonprofit environmental agency, for attorneys' fees and costs for its successful claim under the Administrative Procedures Act against the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and two of its officials.
In our order dated January 14, 2004, we granted summary judgment to WVRC on its claim that the EPA had violated the Administrative Procedures Act by approving West Virginia's Water Quality Standard ("WQS") for 3-methyl-4-chlorophenol without proper review. We declined to find that the EPA violated any statutory enactments with regard to its actions related to other water quality standards for West Virginia, partly on the grounds of mootness.
The first question raised by the parties is which feeshifting statute applies. The Clean Water Act ("CWA") is not the applicable statute since the plaintiff did not prevail on any claims brought directly under that legislation. Rather, WVRC's successful claim related to 3-methyl-4-chlorophenol was only brought under the Administrative Procedures Act, and therefore the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, is the relevant statute.
The EAJA provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . ., incurred by that party in any civil action . . ., including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). In this case, the plaintiff "prevailed" because it achieved at least some of the benefit it sought by bringing suit. Pub. Interest Research Group v. Windall ("PIRG"), 51 F.3d 1179, 1185 (3d Cir. 1995).
Our Court of Appeals has instructed that, in general, "reasonable attorneys' fees are the product of the hours reasonably expended and the applicable hourly rate for the legal services. This product is called the lodestar. . . ." Id. at 1185 (citation omitted). Materials submitted by WVRC indicate that its counsel expended the following hours on the matter, prior to the preparation of the fee petition:
Mr. May (2002 hours): 3.25 hours Mr. May (2003 hours): 38.00 hours Mr. May (2004 hours): 2.00 hours Mr. Stuhltrager (2002 hours): 28.75 hours Mr. Stuhltrager (2003 hours): 111.00 hours Mr. Stuhltrager (2004 hours): 1.50 hours Ms. Murphy (2003 hours): 26.50 hours Interns (2002-2004 hours): 95.00 hours
It is clear that our court may reduce the number of hours proposed by the plaintiff if they were not "reasonably expended."Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Our Court of Appeals has explained:
A plaintiff requesting attorney fees must provide evidence supporting the time claimed. The district court should review the time charged, decide whether the hours set out were reasonably expended for each of the particular purposes described and then exclude those that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Hours that would not generally be billed to one's own client are not properly billed to an adversary.PIRG, 51 F.3d at 1188 (citations, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted). The defendants have not suggested that the hours that WVRC's lawyers spent on this litigation were "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary" such that they "would not generally be billed to" the plaintiff itself. Upon review of the billing records submitted by WVRC along with its fee petition, we conclude that its attorneys expended their time in a reasonable and responsible manner.
As the plaintiff points out, the WVRC also has the potential to recover for hours spent on the fee petition. See Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1998). However, "the fee petition litigation [is] a separate entity subject to lodestar and Hensley reduction analysis." Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 924 (3d Cir. 1985). The WVRC has submitted time records for its staff members showing that the following hours were spent on the fee petition:
Mr. May (2004 hours): 11.50 hours Mr. Stuhltrager (2004 hours): 15.50 hours Interns (2004 hours): 0.50 hours
Again, the defendants have not argued that these hours are "excessive, redundant, or unnecessary" in the way that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals used these terms in PIRG. Upon review of the time records that are submitted by WVRC, we again find that WVRC's staff expended an appropriate number of hours to prepare the fee petition.
Having determined the relevant number of hours under the lodestar method, we will next turn to the question of the hourly rate that should apply. See PIRG, 51 F.3d at 1185-86. WVRC submits that the hourly fee for Mr. May and Mr. Stuhltrager prescribed by the EAJA, properly adjusted for inflation, is $143.32 for 2002, $146.59 for 2003, and $147.55 for 2004. The proposed hourly rate for Ms. Murphy is $140.00, and the proposed rate for interns is $70.00 per hour. The defendants do not dispute the validity of these rates. Therefore, we will employ these rates in our lodestar calculation.
Under the lodestar method, we find that the dollar values for all legal services involved in the case are calculated as follows:
Mr. May (2002 hours): 3.25 hours x $143.32 = $465.79 Mr. May (2003 hours): 38.00 hours x $146.59 = $5,570.42 Mr. May (2004 hours): 13.50 hours x $147.55 = $1,991.93 Mr. Stuhltrager (2002 hours): 28.75 hours x $143.32 = $4,120.45 Mr. Stuhltrager (2003 hours): 111.00 hours x $146.59 = $16,271.49 Mr. Stuhltrager (2004 hours): 17.00 hours x $147.55 = $2,508.35 Ms. Murphy (2003 hours): 26.50 hours x $140.00 = $3,710.00 Interns (2002-2004 hours): 95.50 hours x $70.00 = $6,685.00 Total: $41,323.43
Importantly, "[t]he product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. "After a district court determines the lodestar, its discretion comes into play and it can adjust the fee for a variety of reasons." PIRG, 51 F.3d at 1185. The relevant factors include:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of alternative employment; (5) the customary fee for similar work; (6) the nature of the fee payment arrangement; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the attorney-client relationship; and (12) fee awards in similar cases.Id. at 1185 n. 8, citing Hensley and Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). "The most important factor in exercising [our] discretion is the `results obtained by the plaintiff.'" PIRG, 51 F.3d at 1185.
The defendants do not dispute that most of these factors (specifically, (1)-(7) and (9)-(12)) support the plaintiff's proposal for hours and monetary rate. Indeed, this litigation presented some difficult questions, required legal skill on the part of the plaintiff's attorneys, and occupied time that could have been spent on matters for other clients. However, the defendants argue that under the most important factor, "results obtained," the plaintiff garnered only limited success. For one thing, the plaintiff cannot recover attorneys' fees on the theory that it "catalyzed" action by the EPA before a judicial decision was rendered. John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Delaware County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 555-56 (3d Cir. 2003). Additionally, the defendants prevailed on plaintiff's claims brought directly under the CWA. Furthermore, while the plaintiff succeeded under the Administrative Procedures Act with respect to the EPA's approval of one water quality standard, the plaintiff did not win on its claims related to eight other standards. The defendants argue that the plaintiff is entitled to at most one-ninth of the fees that they claim.
It is true that "[t]he congressional intent to limit awards to prevailing parties requires that . . . unrelated claims be treated as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (footnote omitted). However, the Supreme Court has specifically rejected the mathematical approach urged by the defendants here. "A simple, mechanistic reduction based solely on the ratio of successful to unsuccessful issues is . . . precluded by Hensley." PIRG, 51 F.3d at 1190. This is especially true in the case at bar because the work that the plaintiff did on its successful claim was related to the work that it did on unsuccessful claims. See id. at 1189. Certainly, a fair amount of the background research and client communications performed by the plaintiff's lawyers would have been required for a claim limited to 3-methyl-4-chlorophenol. Therefore, we decline to accept the small fraction that the defendants propose. At the same time, the defendants' arguments do convince us that the WVRC expended many hours that would not have been required if the plaintiff had only pursued the Administrative Procedures Act claim related to 3-methyl-4-chlorophenol.
The defendants next argue that the plaintiff should be denied attorneys' fees for any hours spent in preparing the "60-day notice letter." We agree. The notice letter is a prerequisite to a CWA citizen suit, but not required for an Administrative Procedures Act action. Therefore, we must subtract out the 2.75 hours spent by Mr. May on the "60 day notice" (1.75 hours in 2002; 1.00 hour in 2003) as well as the 36.25 hours spent by Mr. Stuhltrager on this topic (28.75 hours in 2002; 8.00 hours in 2003).
As the defendants point out, the plaintiff also cannot recover for hours they spent replying to the EPA's motion for partial summary judgment filed on September 15, 2003, since this motion did not implicate the claim related to 3-methyl-4-chlorophenol. Upon examination of the billing records submitted by plaintiff, we will accordingly reduce the compensable hours of Mr. May by 4.00 hours in 2003, the hours of Mr. Stuhltrager by 25.25 hours in 2003, the hours of Ms. Murphy by 6.50 hours in 2003, and the intern hours by 15.75 hours.
Applying these hourly reductions to our lodestar formula, we arrive at the following totals for hours expended prior to the fee petition:
Mr. May (2002 hours): 1.50 hours x $143.32 = $214.98 Mr. May (2003 hours): 33.00 hours x $146.59 = $4,837.47 Mr. May (2004 hours): 13.50 hours x $147.55 = $1,991.93 Mr. Stuhltrager (2003 hours): 77.75 hours x $146.59 = $11,397.37 Mr. Stuhltrager (2004 hours): 17.00 hours x $147.55 = $2,508.35 Ms. Murphy (2003 hours): 20.00 hours x $140.00 = $2,800.00 Interns (2002-2004 hours): 79.75 hours x $70.00 = $5,582.50
Total: $29,332.60
Importantly, these charges do not yet reflect the fact that the plaintiff experienced only limited success in its lawsuit. Taking into consideration this fact, our determination that there were issues in common between the successful claim and unsuccessful claims, and our examination of the detailed hour logs submitted by the plaintiff, we conclude that the hours spent by the plaintiff prior to the preparation of its fee petition are now subject to a "negative multiplier" of 80 percent. See PIRG, 51 F.3d at 1189. In other words, we conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the value of one-fifth of the hours listed above for legal work prior to the preparation of the fee petition. Thus, only one-fifth of the hours for each of its legal staff is properly attributed to the successful claim involving 3-methyl-4-chlorophenol. Applying this "negative multiplier," we conclude that WVRC is entitled to fees in the amount of $5,866.52 for legal work performed prior to the preparation of the fee petition.
The plaintiff is also entitled to fees related to the preparation of its fee petition. We disagree with the defendants' argument that the plaintiff may only recover for the time spent on the fee petition in exact proportion to WVRC's success on the underlying litigation. As we have already noted, "the fee petition litigation [is] a separate entity subject to lodestar and Hensley reduction analysis." Institutionalized Juveniles, 758 F.2d at 924. Here, we again find that the plaintiff's attorneys spent a reasonable amount of time on the fee petition, and that none of this time was "excessive, redundant, or unnecessary" in the sense those terms were used in PIRG. The defendants do not argue to the contrary. Thus, under the lodestar, the amount of time spent by the plaintiff on the fee petition is as follows:
Mr. May (2004 hours): 11.50 hours x $147.55 = $1,696.83 Mr. Stuhltrager (2004 hours): 15.50 hours x $147.55 = $2,287.03 Interns: 0.50 hours x $70.00 = $35.00
Total: $4,018.86
We next turn to the Hensley factors. Again, most of the factors suggest that the time proposed by the plaintiff is appropriate. For example, preparation of the fee petition presented new questions, required skill, and precluded the WVRC's attorneys from applying their time to other cases. The defendants do not dispute this. However, the plaintiff devotes several portions of its fee petition on the contention that attorneys' fees should be awarded under the Clean Water Act. These arguments were unnecessary, since, as the plaintiff recognizes in the fallback argument in its fee petition, the EAJA applies here. In light of the time that the plaintiff spent unnecessarily developing the Clean Water Act line of argument in the fee petition, we will reduce the number of hours expended by twenty-five percent. Using this ratio, we find that the plaintiff may recover $3,014.15 for the preparation of the fee petition. Finally, the plaintiff asks for its $150.00 in court filing costs. The defendants do not dispute that this figure is proper, and we will therefore allow the plaintiff to recover this amount as well.