Opinion
No. 1-660 / 00-1948.
Filed March 13, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, THOMAS KOEHLER, Judge.
The respondent appeals the district court's ruling on judicial review, which found a lack of subject matter jurisdiction over his workers' compensation claim. REVERSED.
Matthew G. Novak and Stephanie L. Hinz of Pickens, Barnes Abernathy, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Chris J. Scheldrup and Cynthia Scherrman Sueppel of Moyer Bergman, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellees.
Heard by SACKETT, C.J., and VOGEL and EISENHAUER, JJ.
The location where employee Arthur Skeens was hired became the pivotal fact question of this worker's compensation case, as the answer determined whether Iowa had jurisdiction over his claim. When the district court ruled the record before the agency did not contain substantial evidence Iowa's workers' compensation law governed the injury, Skeens appealed. Because we find the district court impermissibly substituted its own judgment for that of the agency, we reverse.
Background Facts and Proceedings . Arthur Skeens was hired as an over-the-road truck driver by Dixie Midwest, Inc. (Dixie) in June 1994. The hiring occurred in either Indiana or Pennsylvania. Dixie was owned by Don Vogt, who was a shareholder and the CEO and president of West Side Transport (West Side), an Iowa trucking company headquartered in Cedar Rapids. Although the two companies were separate entities, they intermingled equipment and West Side was responsible for handling Dixie's billing, receivables, payroll, workers' compensation claims, and insurance benefits. On April 25, 1995, Skeens was routed to Cedar Rapids, where he claims he was hired as a West Side employee. Approximately two months later, on June 30, 1995, Dixie and West Side merged, with West Side assuming all of Dixie's contract rights, obligations, and liabilities. In November 1996, Skeens suffered a work-related injury.
During the workers' compensation proceedings, West Side argued the agency was without subject matter jurisdiction under Iowa Code section 85.71(2) (1995), because Skeens had not been working under a contract of hire made in Iowa. West Side argued Skeens's employment as one of its drivers was a mere continuation of his Dixie employment, placing formation of the employment contract in either Indiana or Pennsylvania. West Side pointed to documentary evidence, which listed Skeens's date of hire as June 1994, demonstrated that his vacation accrual calculation was based on the 1994 date, and verified that his health and life insurance coverage, first obtained through Dixie in 1994, had continued uninterrupted.
Although West Side initially challenged the applicability of the 1995 Code, that issue is not before us on appeal.
Skeens countered he had entered into a new contract of hire during his April 1995 stop-over in Cedar Rapids. According to Skeens, he had completed a new W-4 withholding form, job application, and insurance papers. Skeens also claimed he went through orientation, met with his new West Side dispatcher, as well as safety, payroll, and fuel department employees, was welcomed aboard by West Side personnel, and was given a West Side employment manual, a new fuel card, and a truck with a West Side logo. The only the documentary evidence specifically backing up Skeens's claims regarding the stop-over and new hire, and the only relevant item found in his West Side file, was the new W-4. According to Dixie's payroll records, Skeens continued to be paid by Dixie for runs dispatched on and before May 3, 1995. Although it is undisputed he began to be paid by West Side sometime thereafter, no evidence was produced by either party establishing the specific date of the change or whether it occurred before or after the June 1995 merger of the two companies.
The deputy commissioner ruled that all jurisdictional prerequisites had been met. Making credibility findings in favor of Skeens and against West Side personnel, the deputy found Skeens's employment with Dixie ended and new employment with West Side began during the 1995 stop-over in Cedar Rapids. The deputy awarded permanent partial disability benefits, healing period benefits, medical expenses reimbursement, and interest. The award was affirmed on agency appeal. While recognizing there were indications Skeens's employment had been continuous, the chief deputy commissioner ruled that "under all the facts of this case," Skeens was working under a new contract of hire made in Iowa. Upon West Side's petition for judicial review, the district court reversed the agency's jurisdictional finding, determining there was not substantial evidence Skeens and West Side entered into a new contract in 1995. Skeens appeals.
Scope of Review . When a district court renders a decision pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.19 (West Supp. 1999), review is limited to correcting errors at law. IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 2001). A party challenging agency action bears the burden of demonstrating the action's invalidity and resulting prejudice. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(a). The party must demonstrate the action was unsupported by substantial evidence in the record, when that record is viewed as a whole. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f). The agency decision will be upheld where the entirety of the record, including both the supporting and detracting relevant evidence, as well as any credibility assessments by the fact finder, is sufficient to allow a reasonable, neutral, and detached person to reach the same conclusion as the agency. Id. Iowa Contract . When an employee suffers a work-related injury in another state, and his employment is not principally localized in any one state, he is entitled to benefits under Iowa's workers' compensation law only if he is working under a contract of hire made in Iowa. Iowa Code § 85.71(2) (1995). Accordingly, the establishment of a new contract in Cedar Rapids is critical to the agency's jurisdiction over Skeens's claim. We agree with West Side that very little of the documentary evidence in this case supports a finding that a new contract was formed. However, where West Side attempts to draw negative implications from all the non-testimonial evidence, many items have only neutral connotations. For example, while Skeens did not obtain new life or health insurance, West Side was already managing Dixie's insurance benefits at the time of his 1994 hire. Both companies utilized the same agencies, and nothing in the record establishes any driver separating from Dixie and joining West Side prior to the merger would have been required to cancel and then re-enroll for coverage.
Skeens appears to contend the 1999 amendments to Iowa Code § 17A.19 altered the standard of review. While the amendments did add definitions for key concepts, such as "substantial evidence" and the "record viewed as a whole," s ee Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1), (3), an examination of prior cases demonstrates the new subsections serve only to clarify and codify preexisting case law. See, e.g., Dunlavey v. Economy Fire and Cas. Co., 526 N.W.2d 845, 853 (Iowa 1995) (ascribing to the agency the duty to assess credibility and weigh evidence); Freeland v. Employment Appeal Bd., 492 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Iowa 1992) (finding substantial evidence is that from which a reasonable person could draw the same conclusions as the decision maker); Briggs v. Board of Directors of Hinton Community School Dist., 282 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Iowa 1979) (requiring consideration of detracting evidence); City of Davenport v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 264 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Iowa 1978) (requiring consideration of the entire agency record, not merely evidence supporting the agency decision).
The telling evidence in this case is Skeens's testimonial claims about what occurred during the 1995 Cedar Rapids stop-over. It is clear from the deputy's findings that he believed Skeens's testimony and disbelieved the contradictory testimony offered by West Side's witnesses. Assessing the weight of testimony is within the exclusive domain of the agency fact finder. Burns v. Board of Nursing, 495 N.W.2d 698, 699 (Iowa 1993). Courts are not allowed to reassess the weight of the evidence upon judicial review. Christensen v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 602 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). We see nothing in the record that would call the deputy's credibility determinations into doubt and must view the evidence in light of his assessments regarding both Skeens and the witnesses offered by West Side.
Granting Skeens's testimony the same deference as the agency, his contentions regarding the stop-over provide significant evidence in support of his claim a contract of hire was entered into in Cedar Rapids, prior to the merger. West Side could offer nothing to directly refute Skeens's assertions about what occurred on that day, beyond the absence of supporting documentation or corroborating testimony for those assertions and discredited contradictory testimony. As previously noted, much of the remaining evidence is subject to a neutral or dual interpretation. See 2800 Corp. v. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Iowa 1995) ("[a]n agency's decision does not lack substantial evidence because inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the same evidence").
While a lack of payroll paperwork prevented Skeens from establishing West Side paid him prior to the June 30, 1995 merger, upon the record before the agency it does appear Dixie stopped paying Skeens well in advance of that date. The intermingling of West Side and Dixie assets and departments simultaneously supports and detracts from West Side's argument, as does the existence of the new W-4 form. Although Skeens stated his employment was continuous, there is nothing to indicate he was giving the word its legal, as opposed to common, meaning. Finally, while West Side puts great weight on a 1996 internal memo and other post-merger facts, these things have little effect on determining the existence of a pre-merger contract.
Although West Side produced a 1995 W-2 form in response to Skeens's discovery requests, it was unable to produce any 1995 payroll records to refute Skeens's claim of an April 25 hiring date.
The only question before us is whether a neutral and reasonable agency fact finder, who found Skeens credible and the West Side witnesses to be less than credible, could determine a contract was formed despite the detracting evidence and any necessary implications to be drawn therefrom. While a reasonable fact finder would be free to draw negative implications from a number of facts in this case, he or she would be equally free to draw a neutral inference or one that supported Skeens's position. The only items presented which significantly detract from the agency's finding are the use of the June 1994 hire date on various documents and the fact Skeens's vacation continued to accrue using the 1994 date. While these details are significant, their existence does not alter the fact that the remainder of the record contains substantial evidence to support the finding a contract was formed in April 1995. We therefore reverse the district court, and affirm the agency's decision.
REVERSED.