Opinion
Civ. No. 93-4798 (DRD)
March 26, 1999.
Mr. John Werner, F.M.C. Fort Worth (Dallas Unit), Fort Worth, TX.,Pro Se Plaintiff.
Francis De Leonardis, Esq., Michael A. Cifelli, Esq., Office of the County Counsel, County of Hudson, Jersey City, New Jersey, Attorney for Defendants.
O P I N I O N
Plaintiff, John Werner ("Werner"), has filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's January 11, 1999, opinion and order dismissing the case pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(3). The motion is to be disposed of on the papers without oral argument pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 78. For the reasons set forth below, Werner's motion will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
This action was originally filed by Werner and two other inmates formerly incarcerated at the Hudson County Jail on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. The original complaint alleged a series of violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by defendants for acts including, inter alia, interference with the plaintiffs' legal mail, free access to the courts, and deprivation of necessary medical treatment. The plaintiffs thereafter sought and were denied class certification. Werner subsequently moved to supplement and amend the complaint to limit the action to himself and assert additional claims.
A long and protracted discovery period commenced in 1993. Several dispositive and non-dispositive motions were filed and dealt with by the Court and by several of the district's magistrate judges. On July 16, 1998, Magistrate Judge Joel A. Pisano issued a Report and Recommendation advising of Werner's flagrant and excessive discovery abuses. Judge Pisano specifically cited to Werner's incomplete responses to discovery requests made by the defendants and refusal to complete these responses even after ordered to do so by the court. Judge Pisano recommended dismissal of Werner's complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(3). On January 11, 1999, the Court adopted and supplemented Judge Pisano's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case.
II. DISCUSSION
Local Civil Rule 7.1(g) governs motions for reconsideration and states in relevant part that the motion must "be served and filed within 10 days after the entry of the order or judgment on the original motion by the Judge or Magistrate Judge." L.Civ.R. 7.1(g); see also Morris v. Siemens Components, Inc., 938 F. Supp. 277, 278 (D.N.J. 1996); Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 F. Supp. 1233, 1234 n. 1 (D.N.J. 1989). Motions filed outside of this strict time limitation may be denied for that reason alone. Morris, 938 F. Supp. at 278.
As previously stated, the order dismissing the case was signed on January 11, 1999. The order was entered on the docket and mailed to the parties on January 12, 1999. Under any calculation of the ten day time period, Werner's application was due no later than the close of business on January 26, 1999. Werner, however, did not file his motion with the clerk's office until February 25, 1999. The only excuse offered by Werner for this month long delay is that he failed to receive the opinion and order dismissing the case until February 9, 1999. This argument, however, is without merit because Local Rule 7.1(g) clearly states that the time period to file a motion for reconsideration begins to run after the entry of the order or judgment, not upon service or receipt. Cf. L.Civ.R. 72.1(c)(1)(A) ([a]ny party may appeal from a Magistrate Judge's determination of a non-dispositive matter within 10 days after the party has been served with a copy of the Magistrate Judge's order") (emphasis added). The entry of the order was on January 12, 1999, and Werner's time period for filing his motion ended on January 26, 1999.
Pursuant to Rule 6(a), "intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation" for any time period less than eleven days. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a). Accordingly, January 16, 17, 18, 23, and 24 are excluded in the computation.
Additionally, the reason Werner sets forth for failing to file his motion timely cannot be considered "excusable neglect." If Werner did not actually receive the opinion and order until February 9, 1999, then he should have immediately notified the court and requested an extension of time. Instead, Werner waited an additional two weeks to file his motion. At that point not only was he one month late in filing his motion, but he was also two weeks late in filing any appeal or motion to extend time to appeal. Accordingly, there is no reason to consider Werner's motion as anything but an untimely request for reconsideration.
Even if the Court were inclined to consider Werner's motion on its merits, however, it would likewise be denied. A motion for reconsideration will only succeed where dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law were presented to the Court but not considered. Pittston Co. v. Sedgwick James of N.Y., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 915, 918, 919 (D.N.J. 1997); Damiano v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 623, 633, 634 (D.N.J. 1996); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace Co., 849 F. Supp. 987, 990 (D.N.J. 1994) (citing Pelham v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (D.N.J. 1987)). The purpose of the motion is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. In re Sharps Run Assocs., L.P., 157 B.R. 766, 785 (D.N.J. 1993).
Local Civil Rule 7.1(g), limits the motion to facts and law "overlooked" in the original motion. United States v. Jones, 158 F.R.D. 309, 314 (D.N.J. 1994). The only proper ground for granting such a motion is that the matters or decisions overlooked, if considered by the court, might reasonably have altered the result reached. Starr v. JCI Data Processing, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 633, 635 (D.N.J. 1991); Maldonado v. Lucca, 636 F. Supp. 621, 630 (D.N.J. 1986).
The standard of review for a motion for reconsideration is high and relief is granted very sparingly. NL Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996); Hatco, 849 F. Supp. at 990; accord Jones, 158 F.R.D. at 314; Bakari v. Beyer, 870 F. Supp. 85, 88 (D.N.J. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 82 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 1996); Maldonado, 636 F. Supp. at 630.
A party must show more than a disagreement with the court's decision. Hatco, 849 F. Supp. at 990 (citing Panna v. Firstrust Sav. Bank, 760 F. Supp. 432, 435 (D.N.J. 1991)). A mere recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party's burden. Id. (citing Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Shushan, 721 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D.N.J. 1989)).
The papers submitted by Werner in connection to the current application voice nothing more than a disagreement with the Court's decision to dismiss his case. Werner points to no law or facts that the Court overlooked and merely recapitulates the arguments the Court considered when it rendered its original decision. Accordingly, Werner's application would be denied even if the Court were to consider it on its merits.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Werner's application for reconsideration pursuant to L.Civ.R. 7.1(g) will be denied as untimely. An appropriate order will issue.
O R D E R
Plaintiff, John Werner ("Plaintiff"), having moved for reconsideration of this Court's January 11, 1999, opinion and order dismissing the above captioned case pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(3); and the Court having considered all papers submitted; and for other good cause shown; and in accordance with this Court's opinion of even date;
IT IS this day of March, 1999, hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration be and hereby is DENIED as untimely.