Opinion
C.A. No. 06A-10-011 WCC.
Submitted: August 14, 2007.
Decided: November 30, 2007.
Appeal from Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. AFFIRMED.
Edward W. Wentzell, Newark, Delaware, Pro Se Appellant.
Mary Page Bailey, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Counsel for Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
DaimlerChrysler Corporation, Newark, Delaware.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Introduction Before this Court is Edward Wentzell's appeal from the Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's ("Board") decision, in which it found that Mr. Wentzell was terminated by DaimlerChrysler ("Appellee") for just cause. Upon review of the record in this matter, the Court finds the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is therefore AFFIRMED.
Facts
Appellant was employed full-time by Appellee as a millwright from June 8, 1984 until March 30, 2006 when his employment was terminated. Appellee claims that Mr. Wentzell attempted to leave work on March 25, 2006 with company property. During a routine package check as the Appellant was leaving the plant, security personnel found a silver disk with a swivel wheel, and a subsequent search of Mr. Wentzell's locker yielded the discovery of more company equipment not assigned to Appellant. The Newark Police were called and Appellant was arrested and charged with theft. He later pled no contest to the charges in Alderman's Court.
Appellee claims Mr. Wentzell's conduct violated the company's Standards of Conduct, specifically, Rule 23, which prohibits actual or attempted theft, fraud, or misappropriation of property. Mr. Wentzell maintains that the tools in his locker were tools he used on the job at Appellee's plant, and that he believed the
wheel was his property. It was Mr. Wentzell's understanding that DaimlerChrysler purchased a work cabinet for each employee that was a "skilled trades employee" at the Newark plant, and that these cabinets and the material therein were theirs to keep upon retirement.
Appellant's Opening Br.; See also Appellant's letter of March 27, 2007 (styled as "Appellee's Answering Brief," but Appellee never filed memoranda in this matter). Ms.West, the Appellee's representative, testified before the Board that no such policy existed that gave work cabinets or equipment to employees upon retirement.
As a consequence of his termination, Mr. Wentzell sought unemployment benefits through the Division of Unemployment Insurance. His claim was denied and Mr. Wentzell appealed the decision. A hearing was held on June 15, 2006 before the Appeals Referee of the Division of Unemployment Insurance. In a decision issued June 20, 2006, the Referee determined that Mr. Wentzell was discharged from his employment with DaimlerChrysler for just cause and was disqualified from the receipt of unemployment benefits pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314(2).
"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: For the week in which the individual was discharged from the individual's work for just cause in connection with the individual's work and for each week thereafter until the individual has been employed in each of 4 subsequent weeks (whether or not consecutive) and has earned wages in covered employment equal to not less than 4 times the weekly benefit amount."
Mr. Wentzell appealed the Referee's decision and on September 20, 2006 the Board held a hearing to address the appeal. Both Mr. Wentzell and Shannon West, a representative for Appellee, appeared and testified. The Board's decision affirmed
the Referee's decision and denied benefits to Mr. Wentzell, finding that he was terminated for just cause. Specifically, the Board found Appellant's willful or wanton act of attempting to leave the Newark DaimlerChrysler plant with company property justified his termination for just cause.
Wentzell v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., Decision of the Appeal Bd. Docket No. 240200 (October 26, 2006).
On February 23, 2007 a briefing schedule for this appeal was issued by this Court, and on March 8, 2007, Appellant filed his opening brief. On June 29, 2007, a Final Delinquent Brief Notice was sent to Appellee DaimlerChrysler indicating that it must file its responding brief within ten days. Appellee did not file a brief within the required time limit, and on August 8, 2007 this Court issued an order pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 107(e), indicating the Court would make a determination of the issues on the papers currently before it.
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 107(e) states, in pertinent part: "If any brief, memorandum, deposition, affidavit, or any other paper which is or should be a part of a case pending in this Court, is not served and filed within the time and in the manner required by these Rules or in accordance with any order of the Court or stipulation of counsel, the Court may, in its discretion, dismiss the proceeding if the plaintiff is in default, consider the motion as abandoned, or summarily deny or grant the motion, such as the situation may present itself, or take such other action as it deems necessary to expedite the disposition of the case."
Standard of Review
This Court's role in reviewing an appeal from the Board is limited to an evaluation of the record, in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, to determine if it includes substantial evidence that a reasonable mind accepts as adequate support for the conclusion and is free from legal error. Therefore, the Court does not address issues of credibility or independently weigh the evidence presented to the Board. If the record supports the Board's findings, the Court must accept those findings even though the Court might reach a different conclusion on the facts presented.Discussion
The sole question before this Court is whether the Board had substantial evidence to determine that Mr. Wentzell acted wilfully and wantonly when he attempted to remove the wheel from the plant, and kept company equipment in his personal locker, thus providing his employer "just cause" for his termination, andexcluding him from eligibility to receive employment benefits. The Court finds, based on the record, that the answer to this question is yes and the Board had substantial evidence to reach its conclusion.
At the Board's hearing, DaimlerChrysler had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Wentzell was terminated for just cause. Just cause is a "wilful or wanton act . . . in violation of the employer's interest, the employee's duties, or the employee's expected standard of conduct." This includes conduct that is a conscious act by the claimant, or "reckless indifference leading to a deviation from established and acceptable workplace performance." Additionally, "just cause" exists if an employee violated a company rule, especially if he was on notice of the rule.
Majaya v. Sojourners' Place 2003 WL 21350542 (Del.Super. June 6, 2003) (quoting Avon Prods., Inc. v. Wilson, 513 A.2d 1315 (Del. 1986).
MRPC Financial Management LLC v. Carter, 2003 WL 21517977 (Del.Super. June 20, 2003).
Mosley v. Initial Sec., 2002 WL 31236207 at *2 (Del.Super. Oct. 2, 2002).
The Court agrees with the Board's finding that DaimlerChrysler had met its burden on two separate bases. First, Mr. Wentzell testified that he attempted to take the wheel home because he thought it was his personal property. He stated that the work cabinets the wheel came from were given by the company to tradesmen like
himself, and they were free to take them home upon retirement. However, upon questioning by the Board members, Wentzell admitted he did not plan on retiring for another eight years. When questioned about the other company tools kept in his locker, he admitted he did not follow the company's sign-out policy to take the tools from the storage area. By doing so, the Appellant acted with reckless disregard for company policies regarding the use of equipment and there is substantial evidence to support the Board's finding of just cause for his termination on this ground.
Unemployment Ins. App. Bd. Hr'g. Tr. at 7.
Second, the Board found that Wentzell was terminated for just cause under the McCoy test. Under McCoy, the employer must prove (1) that a company policy existed, and (2) that the employee was aware that the policy existed. Constructive knowledge can be found where there is a written policy such as an employer's handbook. If the employee violated the policy, just cause for termination exists.
McCoy v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 1996 WL 111126 (Del.Super. Feb. 7, 1996).
Id. at *3.
Id.
The Board heard testimony from DaimlerChrysler's representative that Mr. Wentzell violated the company's Standard of Conduct number 23, which prohibits "actual or attempted theft, fraud or misappropriation of property." The
Unemployment Ins. App. Bd. Hr'g. Tr. at 14.
representative further testified that the Standards of Conduct are part of the union contract with DaimlerChrysler, thereby providing Mr. Wentzell with constructive notice of the provision. The Board concluded that this satisfied both prongs of the McCoy test and the Court agrees. The Court also notes that the Appellant did not, except by his own testimony, attempt to establish what the Court would call a "skilled tradesmen exception" to the company's general policy of prohibiting the removal of company material from the plant location. He could have called other tradesmen or a union representative to support this position but failed to do so. As such, the Board had only the Appellant's word versus that of the company representative and did not find the Appellant's "exception" argument to be credible. Therefore, after examining the record below, the Court finds that there was substantial evidence before the Board to show that DaimlerChrysler terminated Mr. Wentzell's employment for just cause, and the Board's decision is affirmed.
Id. at 16.
While the Court has affirmed the Board's decision based on the record presented, it feels compelled to comment that the termination of a long term employee for removing a twenty-eight dollar swivel wheel seems harsh and out of proportion to the conduct. Certainly the time and effort to pursue this decision before the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board and the Court were significantly greater than
the cost of the material allegedly appropriated. It would seem to the Court that common sense and some degree of loyalty to its employees would have justified a lesser sanction than termination. However, while concerned, this is not a decision for the Court to question under its limited appellate review. It can only suggest that the next time a similar situation arises the Appellee appreciate the cost associated with the administrative process, not only to them but also to the public through the Board and the Court, before using a sledge hammer to resolve a matter that could have been solved by a small mallet.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.