Opinion
99 CIV. 1298 (DLC).
April 20, 2000.
Curtis Douglas Wells, Jr., Pro Se, 99-A-4855, for plaintiff.
Michael D. Hess, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, Lisa J. Black, Esq., for defendants.
OPINION ORDER
Plaintiff pro se, Curtis Douglas Wells, Jr. ("Wells"), filed this civil rights action on March 22, 1999; he filed an amended complaint on March 30, 1999. At a conference held on October 15, 1999, the Court set a schedule for the motion to dismiss that defendants indicated they wished to file. That motion, filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., for failure to state a claim, is granted.
BACKGROUND
The facts as alleged by Wells are as follows. On July 29, 1998, Wells was arrested in Manhattan. He was informed that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest in Brooklyn, and he was transferred to a police station there. The following day, he was arraigned in Brooklyn and given a five day sentence for failure to comply with an order to perform community service. He expected to be released at that time, but instead was informed that there was a warrant for his arrest in Manhattan, and was detained.
Although he was arrested on July 29, and sentenced to five days in prison on July 30, Wells alleges that he expected to be released because "the 5 days w[ere] finish[ed] because of the time had in [custody] already on 7/30/98."
The warrant is attached to Wells' amended complaint as Exhibit C.
Beginning on July 31, Wells was transported to Manhattan Criminal Court every day from the facility in Brooklyn without being arraigned, and without being informed of the nature of the charges against him. Finally, Wells was arraigned on August 17. As a result of the physical and emotional stress of the delay in arraignment and the daily travel between Brooklyn and Manhattan, Wells, who is on medication for hypertension, suffered high blood pressure and kidney problems. Wells does not allege that the charges on which he was arraigned were ever dismissed.
According to the Clerk's certificate submitted by defendants in support of their motion, the Manhattan warrant involved a charge of burglary in the second degree, on which Wells was tried, convicted, and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment.
DISCUSSION
A court may dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., only if "`it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which will entitle him to relief.'" Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1172 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). In considering the motion, the court must take "as true the facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Jackson Nat. Life Ins. v. Merrill Lynch Co. 32 F.3d 697, 699-700 (2d Cir. 1994). The court can dismiss the claim only if, assuming all facts alleged to be true, the plaintiff still fails to plead the basic elements of a cause of action.Where, as here, a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court must liberally construe the complaint. See. e.g., Boddie v. Schneider, 105 F.3d 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1997). "A complaint should not be dismissed simply because a plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits." Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814, 818 (2d Cir. 1995). Even afforded the liberal construction to which his pleadings are entitled, however, Wells' amended complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
1. Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action under Section 1983.
Wells' allegations regarding the delay in his arraignment do not state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"). An arraignment is a procedure designed to protect an individual's interest in freedom from confinement. See Watson v. City of New York, 92 F.3d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1996). Where a suspect is arrested without a warrant, he has a right to a prompt determination of probable cause; the Supreme Court has established a presumption that a delay in arraignment of more than 48 hours violates this right. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991); Watson, 92 F.3d at 37.
Here, however, Wells acknowledges that he was held based on an outstanding warrant. Moreover, he does not allege that he was denied any particular right that a prompt arraignment is designed to secure. Instead, he claims that the delay itself, and the daily transportation between Brooklyn and Manhattan during the time before he was arraigned, violated his constitutional rights. Absent an allegation of the deprivation of a right secured by prompt arraignment, however, a delay in arraignment does not in itself support a cause of action under Section 1983. See Bradford v. Lefkowitz, 240 F. Supp. 969, 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (dismissing Section 1983 claim because "failure to arraign a defendant who subsequently proceeds to trial is not an omission which tends to prejudice his rights"). See also Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing Section 1983 action where there was a "gross disconnect" between the alleged constitutional violation and the asserted injury); Chubbs v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (dismissing Section 1983 delay in arraignment claim).
To the extent Wells seeks to challenge his confinement pursuant to judicial process as unlawful, the appropriate avenue of redress is a Section 1983 action for malicious prosecution. See Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),). See also Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 1999) (Glasser, J., dissenting) (successful malicious prosecution plaintiff may recover "compensation for any arrest or imprisonment, including damages for discomfort or injury to his health, or loss of time and deprivation of the society") (quotingHeck, 512 U.S. at 484). The elements of a malicious prosecution claim are borrowed from state law. See Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1994). Under New York law, to prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show that
In certain cases, courts have stated that a malicious prosecution claim is proper with respect to the period following arraignment, while a claim of false arrest is proper with respect to the period from arrest to arraignment. See. e.g., Bender v. City of New York, 78 F.3d 787, 793 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Under New York law, damages for false arrest are to compensate for injuries from the beginning of custody to arraignment, and damages for malicious prosecution are to compensate for injuries after arraignment."). These cases, however, seem to refer to an arrest without a warrant, where a judicial determination of probable cause would be made for the first time at arraignment. In Singer, for example, the Second Circuit clarified that a malicious prosecution claim is available with respect to a deprivation of liberty effected "pursuant to legal process." Singer, 63 F.3d at 117 (quoting Heck). "Ordinarily, this legal process will be either in the form of a warrant . . . or a subsequent arraignment." Id. See also Broughton v. New York, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 94 (N.Y. 1973) ("When an unlawful arrest has been effected by a warrant an appropriate form of action is malicious prosecution.")
(1) the defendant commenced a criminal proceeding against him; (2) the proceeding ended in the plaintiff's favor; (3) the defendant did not have probable cause to believe the plaintiff was guilty of the crime charged; and (4) the defendant acted with actual malice.Id. (citing Martin v. City of Albany, 396 N.Y.S.2d 612, 614 (N Y 1977)). Here, Wells notably fails to allege the second element of malicious prosecution: that the proceedings ended in his favor.
Finally, although Wells alleges a violation of N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.20, that provision does not create a liberty interest that is protectible under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause. See Watson, 92 F.3d at 37-38. Consequently, Wells' allegations do not support a cause of action under Section 1983.
2. Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment.
Wells also fails to state a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" protects an inmate from being denied medical care with "deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs."Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994). Here, however, Wells does not allege that he was denied any necessary medical care. He alleges that he was physically harmed from being transported to court numerous times before the court appearance during which he was actually arraigned, and by the emotional burden of the delay in his arraignment. He asserts that defendants were deliberately indifferent to the physical and psychological impact on him of an "extended confinement pending arraignment." These are not claims of deliberate indifference to his medical needs, but allegations of damages relating to his delay in arraignment claim. They do not support a separate cause of action.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Wells has failed to state a claim under federal law upon which relief can be granted. In the absence of a viable federal claim, to the extent Wells' claims are brought under New York state law, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. The Court will, however, grant Wells leave to amend his complaint to address the deficiencies in his Eighth Amendment claim, and to address the personal involvement and municipal liability issues raised in defendants' opposition papers. Any amended complaint must be filed by June 16, 2000. Failure to file an amended complaint by that date will result in the dismissal of this action.
SO ORDERED:
Dated: New York, New York April 20, 2000