Opinion
NUMBER 2018 CA 1281
07-11-2019
Herman E. WELLS v. The LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, OFFICE OF MOTOR VEHICLES
Laura C. Hopes, Stephen A. Quidd, Baton Rouge, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant The Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles Joseph D. Lewis, New Orleans, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Herman E. Wells
Laura C. Hopes, Stephen A. Quidd, Baton Rouge, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant The Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles
Joseph D. Lewis, New Orleans, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Herman E. Wells
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., McCLENDON, HIGGINBOTHAM, THERIOT, AND CHUTZ, JJ.
WHIPPLE, C.J.
This matter is before us on appeal by the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles ("OMV") from a June 7, 2018 judgment of the district court rendered on request for judicial review, ordering that the proposed suspension of Herman E. Wells's commercial driver's license be recalled and that the OMV reinstate his commercial driver's license, based upon the district court's finding that the OMV failed to prove sufficient grounds existed to suspend plaintiff's license. For the following reasons, we reverse the district court's judgment and reinstate the OMV's suspension and disqualification.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
While patrolling Highway 442 in Tangipahoa Parish on June 11, 2017, Nathanial Cooper, a deputy with the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Office, observed a white commercial-grade truck parked five to ten feet off the roadway on the shoulder of the southbound side of Highway 442 near its intersection with Highway 51. Deputy Cooper observed that the truck was still running and approached the truck for further inspection. Upon closer inspection of the inside of the truck, Deputy Cooper discovered Herman E. Wells, whom Deputy Cooper identified at trial, laying across the front seat with the lights on, keys in the ignition, and the engine running. Eventually, Deputy Cooper was able to wake Mr. Wells and make contact with him, at which point Deputy Cooper noticed an obvious odor of alcohol on Mr. Wells' breath. Upon questioning by Deputy Cooper, Mr. Wells admitted that he had driven the truck from a family gathering in Independence, Louisiana after consuming multiple alcoholic beverages.
Deputy Cooper contacted Bobby Guy, another deputy with the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Office, requesting assistance in conducting field sobriety and breathalyzer tests, but he also conducted the horizontal gaze nystagmus test on Mr. Wells, during which he observed several signs of impairment.
Deputy Guy later testified that when he arrived on the scene, Mr. Wells was outside of the truck and Deputy Cooper briefed him of the situation. During his investigation, Deputy Guy asked Mr. Wells whether he had been driving the truck prior to being arrested, and Mr. Wells replied that he drove the truck from his brother's house and pulled over to sleep. After conducting field sobriety tests, Deputy Guy arrested Mr. Wells for violation of LSA-R.S. 14:98, driving while intoxicated ("DWI"). After being advised of his rights, Mr. Wells submitted to a breathalyzer test, the results of which showed a blood alcohol reading of 0.184 percent.
In pertinent part, LSA-R.S. 14:98 provides as follows:
A. (1) The crime of operating a vehicle while intoxicated is the operating of any motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, vessel, or other means of conveyance when any of the following conditions exist:
(a) The operator is under the influence of alcoholic beverages.
(b) The operator's blood alcohol concentration is 0.08 percent or more by weight based on grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.
As a result of his arrest for DWI, Mr. Wells's driver's license was surrendered, his personal license was suspended for ninety days in accordance with LSA-R.S. 32:667(B)(l)(b) and his commercial driver's license was disqualified for one year in accordance with LSA-R.S. 32:414.2(A)(4)(a)(i). After Mr. Wells timely requested an administrative hearing regarding the suspension of his license, the OMV's suspension was upheld. Mr. Wells then filed a request for judicial review of the administrative decision upholding the suspension. A trial was held on May 21, 2018, before the district court, and the only issue presented to the district court was whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Wells was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
Louisiana Revised Statute 32:667(B)(1)(b) provides that "if the person submitted to the test and the test results show a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or above by weight, his driving privileges shall be suspended for ninety days from the date of suspension on first offense violation, without eligibility for a hardship license for the first thirty days[.\"
Louisiana Revised Statute 32: 414.2(A)(4)(a)(i) provides, in part, that "any person shall be disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a minimum period of one year" subsequent to a "first reported submission to a chemical test in connection with an arrest of a commercial driver's license holder, while operating a commercial motor vehicle or a noncommercial motor vehicle, of operating under the influence of alcohol, operating with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more[.]"
At trial, the OMV presented the testimony of both Deputy Cooper and Deputy Guy and others. At the conclusion of the OMV's case and before Mr. Wells was called to the stand by his counsel, the district court granted the relief requested by Mr. Wells, noting that from the evidence presented, it could not determine whether or not the area occupied by Mr. Wells was, in fact, a public highway. In accordance with the district court's finding, the district court signed a judgment recalling the proposed suspension of Mr. Wells's license and ordering the OMV to reinstate his commercial driver's license. The OMV then filed the instant appeal.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 32:667(A)(1), when a law enforcement officer places a person under arrest for violation of LSA-R.S. 14:98 and the person submits to an approved chemical test for intoxication, which results show a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or above by weight, the officer is required to seize the driver's license of the person under arrest and issue in its place a temporary receipt of license. If the person holds a commercial driver's license, he may be disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for one year in accordance with LSA-R.S. 32:414.2(A)(4)(a)(i).
Louisiana Revised Statute 32:668(A) permits a person whose license has been suspended to request an administrative hearing to contest the OMV's decision and to determine whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person had been driving under the influence of alcohol, whether the person was placed under arrest and advised by the officer as provided in LSA-R.S. 32:661, and whether the driver voluntarily submitted to an approved chemical test and the test resulted in a blood alcohol reading of .08 percent or above by weight. LSA-R.S. 32:668(A) ; Flynn v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety & Correction, 608 So. 2d 994, 996 (La. 1992) ; Millen v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 2007-0845 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/21/07), 978 So. 2d 957, 961. At the administrative hearing, the OMV bears the burden of proving that these factors were present. Millen, 978 So. 2d at 961.
Moreover, pursuant to LSA-R.S. 32:668(C), a person who has exhausted his administrative remedies with the OMV may seek judicial review in the appropriate judicial district court, Kunow v. Louisiana Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 2018-0608 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/5/18), 258 So. 3d 917, 921, which reviews the decisions of the administrative law judge de novo and is not restricted to the findings of the administrative tribunal. Flynn, 608 So. 2d at 998-99 ; Kunow, 258 So. 3d at 921, Millen, 978 So. 2d 961, n.4.
The only issue presented to the district court in this case was whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Wells was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. The district court determined that because the OMV did not establish that the area occupied by Mr. Well's truck was actually a public highway, Mr. Wells was entitled to a recall of the proposed suspension of his license and the reinstatement of his commercial driver's license. However, for the reasons that follow, we find the district court erred, as the question of whether "the area occupied by Mr. Wells was actually a public highway" was not determinative of the issue actually before the district court. Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 32:668(A)(1), the scope of an administrative hearing following the revocation of a license is the determination of:
[w]hether a law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person, regardless of age, had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state, or had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor-powered watercraft upon the public navigable waterways of this state, while under the influence of either alcoholic beverages or any abused substance or controlled dangerous substance as set forth in R.S. 40:964.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the proper issue for adjudication by the district court was whether Deputy Cooper and Deputy Guy had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Wells "had been driving" or "was in actual physical control" of his truck on the public highways of the state while intoxicated.
At trial, Deputy Cooper testified that he came upon Mr. Wells in his truck in the area of Highway 442 near Highway 51 in Tickfaw, which is a public highway in the Parish of Tangipahoa. When Mr. Wells was found in his truck, the vehicle was running and the lights were on. Mr. Wells was the sole occupant of the vehicle, and he admitted to Deputy Cooper that he had been driving his truck prior to stopping on the side of Highway 442. Deputy Cooper also testified that Mr. Wells had an obvious odor of alcohol on his breath and admitted to consuming multiple alcoholic beverages. Based on Mr. Wells's admissions and the officer's observations, the law enforcement officer in this case clearly had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Wells had, in fact, been driving his truck on a public highway of this state. See State v. Franks, 31,641 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 2/24/99), 730 So. 2d 998, 1004 (finding that the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for DWI where the officer found the defendant asleep in a truck off of the road, observed the defendant clearly intoxicated, and the defendant admitted to drinking at a bar ten miles away).
Here, the district court found that the OMV failed to establish that Mr. Wells's truck was found on a public highway. However, this question is not determinative of the issue to be resolved in this case. Instead, the determinative issue is whether the OMV established that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Wells "had been driving" or "was in physical control" of his truck on a public highway of this state, and not whether the truck was actually located on the public highway when the officer encountered Mr. Wells. Thus, the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling on this basis. The evidence presented by the OMV amply supports and establishes that the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Wells had been driving or was in actual physical control of his truck on a public highway of the state while under the influence of alcoholic beverages. Accordingly, the district court erred in concluding that the OMV failed to prove that there were sufficient grounds to suspend Mr. Wells's license pursuant to LSA-R.S. 32:667(A)(1). As to the disqualification of commercial driving privileges, LSA-32:414.2(A)(4)(a)(i) provides, in part, that "any person shall be disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a minimum period of one year" subsequent to a "first reported submission to a chemical test in connection with an arrest of a commercial driver's license holder, while operating a commercial motor vehicle or a noncommercial motor vehicle, of operating under the influence of alcohol, operating with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more[.]" This provision does not require that the operation of the motor vehicle be on a public highway. Accordingly, to be disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle under LSA-32:414.2(A)(4)(a)(i), OMV must establish a first reported submission to a chemical test in connection with an arrest of a commercial driver's license holder operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and an alcohol concentration of .08 percent or more.
The manifest error standard of review applies to a district court's determination of fact. Bonin v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 2003-3024 (La. 7/2/04), 877 So. 2d 89, 94-95. However, when a decision of the district court involves a legal question, the appellate court owes no deference to the lower court's legal conclusions and simply questions whether the district court was legally correct. Kunow, 258 So. 3d at 919 (citing Jackson v. BASF Corp., 2004-2777 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/4/05), 927 So. 2d 412, 415. writ denied, 2005-2444 (La. 3/24/06), 925 So. 2d 1231 ).
In this case, Mr. Wells was a commercial driver's license holder who had a first reported submission to a chemical test with an alcohol concentration of. 184 percent, which test submission was in connection with his arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. While Mr. Wells was discovered by Deputy Cooper sleeping in his truck on the side of Highway 442, Mr. Wells admitted to Deputy Cooper that he consumed alcoholic beverages at a family member's house and then drove his truck before stopping alongside Highway 442. He also admitted to Deputy Guy that he had been driving before stopping off of the road.
At the beginning of the trial, the parties stipulated to the admissibility of all evidence submitted by the OMV, which included the certification of arrest, arrestee's rights form relating to the chemical test for intoxication, and results from Mr. Wells' chemical test for intoxication.
In order to "operate" a vehicle, one must exercise or have exercised some control or manipulation over the vehicle, such as steering, backing, or the physical handling of the controls for the purpose of putting the car in motion. State v. Lewis, 2017-0081 (La. 10/18/17), 236 So. 3d 1197, 1199 (per curiam) (citing State v. Rossi, 98-1253 (La. App. 5th Cir. 4/14/99), 734 So. 2d 102, 102-103, writ denied, 99-0605 (La. 4/23/99), 742 So. 2d 886 ). In addition to Mr. Wells' admission to the officers that he drove after drinking alcoholic beverages, Deputy Cooper observed that Mr. Wells was the sole occupant of the truck, which was running with the keys in the ignition and the lights on. After waking Mr. Wells, Deputy Cooper detected the obvious odor of alcohol on his breath. At trial, counsel for Mr. Wells informed the court that he was not arguing that Mr. Wells was not under the influence, but, instead, was only arguing, for purposes of trial, that Mr. Wells was not driving when the officer encountered him.
Here, the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Wells, a commercial driver's license holder, had been driving or was in actual physical control of his truck while under the influence of alcohol. Accordingly, Mr. Wells was arrested for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, underwent a first reported submission to a chemical test in connection with his arrest, which resulted in a finding of an alcohol concentration of more than .08 percent, and the administrative tribunal upheld his suspension of his driving privileges and disqualification from operating a commercial vehicle. With all factors of LSA-R.S. 32:414.2(A)(4)(a)(i) being met, the OMV was required to disqualify Mr. Wells from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a minimum period of one year. Therefore, the district court's ruling, ordering that Mr. Wells's commercial driver's license be reinstated, must be reversed.
See Kunow, 258 So. 3d at 921-923. (The statutes relating to the suspension of commercial driving privileges provide stronger penalties for commercial drivers committing certain offenses, like DWI).
CONCLUSION
After carefully considering the record herein, we reverse the district court's June 7, 2018 judgment ordering the recall of the suspension of Mr. Wells's driving privileges and reinstatement of Mr. Well's commercial driver's license. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the OMV and against Herman E. Wells reinstating the ninety-day suspension of Mr. Well's driving privileges and the one-year disqualification of Mr. Wells' commercial driver's license. All costs of this appeal are assessed to appellee, Herman E. Wells.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
Chutz, J. Dissents without reasons
Higginbotham, J. dissents and would uphold the district court's ruling.