Opinion
No. WD 56608.
Submitted: June 16, 1999. Filed: January 18, 2000. February 29, 2000. CORRECTED OPINION
APPEAL FROM THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION.
Before Howard, P.J., Ulrich and Smart, JJ.
The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission ("Commission") affirmed the decision of an administrative law judge, awarding workers' compensation benefits to Ladonna Wells on her claim against her employer, Dr. T.J. Brown. Dr. Brown appeals, contending that Wells' injury was not compensable because it did not arise out of and in the course of her employment.
Factual Background
Ladonna Wells worked as a dental technician for Dr. T.J. Brown, a dentist practicing in Liberty, Missouri. Dr. Brown's practice is located in an office complex housing approximately thirty different professional offices, most of which are providers of medical care. The parking lot of the office complex is used by the staff and patients of Dr. Brown and the other tenants. The lot is open to the public. Dr. Brown's lease made no provision for specific parking spaces for Dr. Brown's staff or patients.
On the morning of December 23, 1996, Wells' husband drove her to work before regular office hours, partly because of threatening weather. The weather was cold and the ground was very icy from precipitation. When the couple arrived at the complex, Mr. Wells stopped in the front space closest to the entrance to the hallway which led to Dr. Brown's office. Both Wells and her husband got out of the vehicle. Immediately upon getting out, Wells slipped on the ice in the parking lot. As she was falling, she reached to her left in an effort to stop her fall, grabbing the truck door; however, she was unsuccessful in preventing her impact with the pavement.
Wells experienced immediate pain in her arm, lower buttocks and back. Her family physician diagnosed a fractured sacrum and an elbow or arm strain. Wells attempted to return to work on January 20, 1997, but could not do her job because of the swelling in her left arm. She did not return to work.
Wells filed a worker's compensation claim on January 31, 1997, and a hearing on the matter was held April 9, 1998. The administrative law judge held that Wells had shown a compensable injury. Wells was awarded $13,104.64 in workers' compensation benefits. The Commission upheld the award.
Dr. Brown appeals, contending that the Commission erred in finding that Wells' fall arose out of and in the course of her employment. He contends that the hazard that Wells encountered was weather-related, not unique to the workplace and that there was an equal risk to the general public. He further argues that the evidence fails to establish any other factual circumstance that would extend an employer's liability to the process of coming and going under these specific facts.
Standard of Review
Art V, § 18 provides that rulings of administrative bodies are subject to direct review by the courts, and that such review shall include a determination of whether such rulings are "authorized by law." In the case of hearings, review shall include a determination of whether the rulings are supported by competent and substantial evidence on the whole record. Section 287.495, RSMo 1994 provides, in pertinent part:
Upon appeal no additional evidence shall be heard and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact made by the commission within its powers shall be conclusive and binding. The court, on appeal, shall review only questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the award upon any of the following grounds and no other:
(1) That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers;
(2) That the award was procured by fraud;
(3) That the facts found by the commission do not support the award;
(4) That there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award.
§ 287.495, RSMo 1994.
"Arising Out Of" and "In the Course Of"
A claimant must demonstrate that his injury was caused by an accident "arising out of" and "in the course of his employment" in order to receive workers' compensation benefits. § 287.120.1, RSMo 1994. In our determination of whether an injury arises out of and in the course of employment, we consider the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Wamhoff v. Wagner Elec. Corp. , 190 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Mo.banc 1945). Where no factual dispute exists, the question of whether or not an accident arises out of or in the course of employment is one of law. Rogers v. Pacesetter Corp. , 972 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Mo.App. 1998). This is a case without factual dispute. Consequently, the ruling of the Commission is reviewed as an issue of law. Id .
The General Assembly amended the Worker's Compensation Law in 1993. Prior to 1993, the phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment" was defined judicially in the cases arising under the act. Also, the cases regarded the one phrase as constituting two separate requirements: 1) arising out of employment, and 2) in the course of employment. Although the amendments did not change the fundamental principle of worker's compensation, the legislature provided further statutory clarification of the concepts of "accident," "injury," and "arising out of and in the course of employment." Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc. , 984 S.W.2d 852, 853-54 (Mo.banc 1999). To be specific, subsection 2 of § 287.020, which defines "accident," states that an injury "is compensable if it is clearly work related."
The General Assembly went on to define "clearly work related" in such a way as to legislatively overrule a substantial number of court decisions which allowed compensation for injuries resulting from chronic medical conditions where the work did no more than "trigger" or "precipitate" the medical condition of the claimant. E.g., Wynn v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. , 654 S.W.2d 87, 89-90 (Mo.banc 1983) (fatal heart attack was compensable where the stress of work was a triggering cause); Bone v. Daniel Hamm Drayage Co. , 449 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. 1970) (heavy work was a "precipitating" cause of death where employee had severe heart and lung conditions). The legislature accomplished this exclusion of benefits in such cases by defining "clearly work related" as follows:
An injury is clearly work related if work was a substantial factor in the cause of the resulting medical condition or disability. An injury is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.
§ 287.020.2.
Also, for the first time, the General Assembly decided to provide more specific guidelines for determining when an injury has arisen out of and in the course of employment. While retaining the previous language requiring that the injury involve "violence to the physical structure of the body. . . ." The General Assembly provided that the injury must be "incidental to and not independent of" the employment relationship. Section 287.020.3(1). The legislature then specifically provided that an injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment only if the injury meets all of the following four tests:
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the employment is a substantial factor in causing the injury; and
(b) It can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work; and
(c) It can be fairly traced to the employment as a proximate cause; and
(d) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal non-employment life[.]
§ 287.020.3(2), RSMo 1994.
These four tests may be given the following shorthand labels for purposes of this opinion: (a) the "substantial factor" test; (b) the "natural incident" test; (c) the "fair proximate cause" test; and (d) the "unrelated hazard" test. All four tests are to be applied to all claims of injury.
The key thing in construing the Act in its present form is to determine how radically the General Assembly intended to alter traditional common law applications. It is clear, for instance, that the legislature intended to directly remove from coverage the cases in which the work was a very minor factor in an injury, such as cases in which the work causes only the "triggering" of the injury. We note also that the legislature adopted the phrase "natural incident of the work" as opposed to the phrase "incidental to the work" in the second test for eligibility. This, it would seem, was intended to exclude compensation for some injuries arising out of freakish circumstances. The legislature also specified that coverage is excluded unless the injury can "fairly" be traced to the employment as a proximate cause. This would seem to be a test of reasonableness. Finally, the fourth test would operate to exclude injuries in which the hazard is actually unrelated to the employment in any practical sense because the hazard is a general one to which the larger community is also exposed.
We note that the last three of the four tests (natural incident, fair proximate cause, and unrelated hazard) all were taken directly from the predecessor statute providing compensation for occupational disease. § 287.067 RSMo 1986. This section was amended in 1993 by S.B. No. 251, § A. This is the same bill that amended § 287.020 to include the four tests. It would appear that the legislature decided to take the language it had formerly applied to occupational disease and used it to govern compensable injuries in the new section. The legislature seems to have taken a slightly less restrictive and rigid approach to determining the compensability of occupational disease, while taking an arguably more restrictive approach with regard to injuries.
Our research indicates that only one other state applies the same four tests to all injury claims. See Wyoming Statutes 1977, Section 27-14-603. Some other states apply these tests to claims of occupational disease. See Ariz. Revised Statutes Annotated § 23-901.01 ; West's Colo. Revised Statutes Annotated §§ 8-40-201 and 8-41-302; West's Annotated Indiana Code, § 22-3-7-10; Minnesota Statutes 1999, § 176.011, subd. 15; Montana Code Annotated, § 39-72-408; Nevada Revised Statutes, § 617.440; Code of Laws of South Carolina 1976 Annotated, § 42-11-10; Tennessee Code Annotated, § 50-6-301 .
Section 287.067.1, RSMo 1986 formerly defined an "occupational disease" as:
[A] disease arising out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except where the diseases follow as an incident of an occupational disease as defined in this section. A disease shall be deemed to arise out of the employment only if there is apparent to the rational mind upon consideration of all the circumstances [subsection a] a direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational disease, and which can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work [subsection b] as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment and which can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate cause [subsection c], and which does not come from a hazard to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of the employment [subsection d]. The disease must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of employer and employee. The disease need not to have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.
Section 287.067.1 now reads:
In this chapter the term "occupational disease" is hereby defined to mean, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, an identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except where the diseases follow as an incident of an occupational disease as defined in this section. The disease need not to have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.
"Going and Coming" Cases
An injury going to work or coming home from work is generally not compensable, especially if the employee is not on the employer's premises at the time of the injury. When the employee is on the premises and in an area where the employee might reasonably be expected to be, the claim may be compensable, even if the injury occurs before or after work. Garrison v. U.S. Cartridge Co. , 197 S.W.2d 675 (Mo.App. 1946) (employee worked on second floor of ordinance plant; injured on stairs in building at end of workday as a result of a "rush of people" leaving work and pushing to get down the stairs); Cherry v. Powdered Coatings , 897 S.W.2d 664 (Mo.App. 1995) (employee injured after hitting a pothole in employer's parking lot while attempting to comply with employer's instructions concerning parking, and driving on a route the employer could anticipate). On the other hand, when accidents occurred en route to work, or on the way home after work, and off the employer's premises, the accident generally was not compensable. E.g., Tucker v. Daniel Hamm Drayage Co. , 171 S.W.2d 781 (Mo.App. 1943) (employee injured while crossing railroad tracks 150 or 200 feet from employer's building; it was necessary to cross railroad tracks to get to work).
Parking Lot Cases
The parking lots maintained by employers for the employees are generally considered part of the employer's premises. Cherry , 897 S.W.2d 664 ; Zahn v. Associated Dry Goods Corp. , 655 S.W.2d 769 (Mo.App. 1983). In many jurisdictions, compensation attaches to parking lot injuries to the same degree as injuries on the main premises. 1 Arthur Larson, Larson's Worker's Compensation Law § 13.04[2][a] (1999). In some jurisdictions, this rule has been extended beyond parking lots owned and controlled by the employer to lots used by the employees with permission of the employer. Id . In 1996, Missouri applied the rule to parking lots used with the permission of the employer. See, e.g., Cox v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 920 S.W.2d 534 (Mo.banc 1996) (employee injured walking from parking lot to plant; parking lot not owned by employer, but regularly used by employees with permission of owner); Frye v. Viacom, Inc. , 927 S.W.2d 545 (Mo.App. 1996) (employee injured walking from public parking garage; employer had arranged for parking in garage for employees). No case in Missouri has specifically extended the employer's premises to a general parking area such as that of a shopping center or office complex, but it would appear that the principles of Cox and Frye would result in such an extension, even though the employer may have no control over the parking area in question.
Cox and Frye : Extended Premises Applies, But Special Hazards Rule Does Not Apply to Extended Premises Cases
In Cox , 920 S.W.2d 534 , the claimant was employed by Tyson Foods, Inc. During a break in the course of the workday, the claimant, who had gone to a nearby convenience store, was returning to his employer's premises. The claimant had taken his car to the convenience store and had then parked in a parking lot across the highway and to the south of the facility where Cox worked. He was walking along the customary route between the parking lot and the plant when he slipped on ice and fell. He was not on Tyson property when he fell. Also, the lot in which the claimant parked was not owned by Tyson, but most of the "dock and freezer employees" of Tyson parked in that lot. Tyson supervisors told employees that they could park in the lot because the supervisors understood that Tyson employees had specific permission from the owner of the lot to park in that lot.
The issue on appeal before the court was whether claimant's accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. The court, on review, did not discuss the four tests adopted in 1993 to determine whether an injury arose "out of and in the course of employment, presumably because the injury pre-dated the 1993 amendments. The court instead considered the applicability of the "going and coming" rule articulated in Zahn , 655 S.W.2d 769 and Kunce v. Junge Baking Co. , 432 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Mo.App. 1968). Cox , 920 S.W.2d at 535-36 . The court analyzed the claim according to the two portions of the test discussed in those cases. The court concluded that the injury in this case occurred on premises which, while not actually owned or controlled by the employer, had been so "appropriated by the employer or so situate, designed and used by the employer and his employees incidental to their work as to make them, for all practical intents and purposes, a part and parcel of the employer's premises and operation." Id . at 536. The court also concluded that the evidence supported the second part of the Kunce test, which is whether the injury occurred on a portion of the premises which is the "approved, permitted, usual and acceptable route or means employed by workmen to get to and depart from their places of labor" and was "being used for such purpose at the time of the injury." Id . at 535-36.
Tyson employed the tests enunciated in Kunce although Kunce itself employed the language to defeat a claim involving a bakery employee who utilized a side door and an alley way for a personal errand instead of using the front door and sidewalk. The employee tripped on some wire object while walking on the employer's premises adjacent to the alley. Kunce , 432 S.W.2d at 604-07 .
Tyson argued that even if the employer's premises could be extended to the place of injury, the employee's injury was not compensable because the injury was not due to some special hazard to which the general public was not subjected. Id . at 536. The court did not specifically decide the issue of whether the hazard in question in that case (the ice) was a hazard to which the general community was exposed. Rather, after its review of case law, the court decided that the special hazards element applies only to "accidents occurring on the way to or from work at sites not owned, controlled or actively appropriated by the employer." Id . at 537. The court reversed the decision of the Commission, holding that the claimant was entitled to compensation.
Cox thus not only extended the employer's premises to the route between the plant and the parking lot; Cox also seemed to hold that once the employer's premises are extended, it does not matter whether the hazard causing the injury was specifically related to the employment.
Several months after Cox , the Eastern District of this court reversed the denial of benefits by the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission in a case in which the claimant fell on ice on a sidewalk while walking approximately two blocks in a commercial area from a parking garage to his workplace. Frye v. Viacom, Inc. , 927 S.W.2d 545 (Mo.App. 1996). In that case, the employer had arranged for its employees to park at the garage approximately two blocks from the employer's building. The court concluded that the issues were governed by Cox . The court determined that because the extended premises exception to the "going and coming rule" applied, the injury could be regarded as having arisen out of and in the course of employment. Frye , 927 S.W.2d at 550-51 . The court in Frye did not discuss or attempt to apply the amendments adopted by the legislature in 1993 because the injury in question occurred in 1991, two years before § 287.020.3(2), with its four tests, was adopted.
Applying the 1993 Amendments
On February 9, 1999, the Missouri Supreme Court handed down two cases in which it affirmed decisions of the Commission awarding benefits to claimants. Only one of the cases was an off-premises injury, but both cases purported to introduce a new analysis in that, for the first time since the 1993 amendments were adopted, the court discussed the contents of the 1993 amendments as part of the analysis. The cases are Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc. , 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo.banc 1999) and Drewes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , 984 S.W.2d 512 (Mo.banc 1999). The claimant in Kasl suffered an injury when she rose from her chair while engaged in her employment at a nursing home. Her foot had fallen asleep, and as a result she fell and broke her ankle. The court noted that the 1993 amendments require the work to be a "substantial factor" and not merely triggering a precipitating factor causing the injury. Kasl , 984 S.W.2d at 853 . The court also noted that the injury cannot come from a hazard or risk unrelated to employment. The court thus referred to two of the tests specified in § 287.020.3(2)(a) and (d) (the "substantial factor" test and the "unrelated hazard" test). Id . at 254. The court then found the injury to be compensable, finding evidence of sufficient work-relatedness to bring the injury under the Act. Id .
In Drewes , the claimant was employed by TWA and worked on the second floor of an office building used by TWA and other business tenants. While on a 30 minute lunch break, she injured her ankle while carrying food and heading to a cafeteria on the first floor of the building, where she planned to eat and then return to work. Drewes , 984 S.W.2d at 514 . Although TWA leased space on both the first and second floors, TWA did not lease or control the common break room where the claimant fell. Id . TWA permitted its employees to use the break room and cafeteria, and they regularly did.
In looking at whether the injury "arose out of" the employment, the court once again referred only to the "substantial factor" test and the "unrelated hazard" test, and did not specifically discuss the "natural incident" test or the "fair proximate cause" test. The court found that the claimant's act of carrying her lunch to a table to eat her meal was a "substantial factor" in causing the injury, finding no evidence that this fall was caused by an innate or underlying pathology. Id . The court also said that the claimant was not equally exposed to the same risk of falling outside of her employment because if she had not been working that day she would not have been carrying her lunch in the break room. The court then decided that the injury also arose "in the course of" her employment because she was "in or about" her employer's premises at the time of he injury. Id . at 515.
"Arising Out of and in the Course of Employment"
Cox v. Tyson and Frye v. Viacom applied common law principles without discussing the 1993 amendments, apparently because in those cases the injuries occurred before the effective date of the amendments. In this case, the injury occurred after the effective date of the amendments. The rights of a claimant in worker's compensation are derived from statutory law, of course, and not from the common law. The General Assembly, as the deliberative legislative body in Missouri, has the right to modify the compensation scheme under the statute, even in ways the courts find unwise or inappropriate, as long as the General Assembly acts within its constitutional authority. We have no authority to apply aspects of court decisions which have been legislatively overruled. Accordingly, we cannot apply Cox and Frye in this case to the extent that those cases have been legislatively overruled by the clear language of the amendments. Kasl and Drewes acknowledged the content of the amendments and applied them to the analysis in those cases. However, neither one was a "going and coming" case because each occurred during the regular work day. And neither involved a general condition unrelated to work, such as a general condition of ice in the community. Thus, in both cases the hazard was seen by the court as substantially related to the claimant's employment.
The appellant, Dr. Brown, argues that the commission erred in awarding compensation because the evidence shows that the claimant had not commenced work nor encountered hazards unique to the workplace in that the risk in question was weather related, not unique to the workplace, but rather of equal risk to the general public. Accordingly, we must resolve the issue of whether the fourth test of the 1993 amendments is applicable here to exclude this injury from coverage. The fourth test provides that in order for an injury to be deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment the injury cannot have arisen "from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment" to which workers "would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal non-employment life." The question is what the legislature had in mind in setting forth this language. Was the legislature simply restating the rule that applies to defeat a claim when the origin of the claim is unrelated to work, and when it is simply fortuitous that the injury occurred at work (such as, for instance, when a worker's personal enemy (from off-duty activities) comes on the premises of the employer and assaults the claimant)? If that is all the legislature had in mind, then the test was simply a restatement of existing law. On the other hand, it is also possible that the legislature was intending to overrule cases such as Zahn , 655 S.W.2d 769 in which an employee of a department store was assaulted and raped in the parking lot of the store (used by both customers and employees) in the middle of the day after getting off work, and after shopping for 30 or 40 minutes before going to the parking lot. Similarly, the legislature may have intended to exclude from coverage incidents such as the slip on ice while coming toward the employer's premises as in Cox and Frye .
It is possible to view the holding in Cox as surviving the implementation of the amendments. The court in Cox determined that the unrelated hazards test applied only to injuries occurring "to or from work at sites not owned, controlled, or actively appropriated by the employer." Cox , 920 S.W.2d at 537 . If the "unrelated hazards" test was intended to incorporate its traditional common law usage, then Cox is not legislatively overruled. It is not necessary for this court to address that issue.
Kasl and Drewes do not supply a definitive answer. The Missouri Supreme Court found that the amendment language did not exclude the injuries in those cases from coverage. However, neither Kasl nor Drewes involved a slip and fall in a general parking lot due to a general condition of ice in the community.
A partial answer is supplied by the decision of the Southern District of this court in Willeford v. Lester E. Cox Medical Center , 3 S.W.3d 872 (Mo.App. 1999). The court there affirmed an award in favor of a claimant who slipped on ice on her employer's parking lot while walking toward the employer's building. The claimant said she slipped on ice that "looked like it had been melted and refroze." Id . at 874. The court in Willeford considered and applied the four tests of § 287.020.3(2), finding no evidence that the injury was independent of her employment, and noting that she fell during an activity that was incidental to her employment. Id . at 877. While Willeford specifically addresses the issue of an injury on the employer's parking lot, it does not address the issue of an injury on a general parking lot serving an office complex following a recent, general ice storm.
In attempting to discern the legislative intent in this regard, we can consider the following factors with regard to the amendments:
a. It is clear that at least some of the amendments were intended to legislatively overrule previous court decisions, as discussed above.
b. The use of the terms " clearly work related," and " substantial factor," (emphasis added in each instance) suggests generally an intent to narrow the range of injuries subject to compensation under the act.
c. The decision to import from the former occupational disease statute the concepts of the "natural incident" test, the "fair proximate cause" test, and the "unrelated hazard" test also suggests an intention to take a slightly more conservative approach to compensability.
For the foregoing reasons, we are inclined to believe that the General Assembly intended to exclude from coverage injuries such as Ms. Wells sustained in this case. It should be noted that this is not a case in which the parking lot was connected to her employment in any way other than the fact that it served the office complex occupied by her employer. It was not her employer's parking lot nor was it a lot "owned, controlled, or actively appropriated" by her employer for the employees. Accordingly, arguably Cox would not, even in the absence of the amendments, dictate a ruling in favor of the employee in this case. And, unlike the circumstances in Willeford , Ms. Wells' employer in this case had no duty to maintain the parking lot. Nor is it a case in which Ms. Wells, during the work day, went to her car to get a work-related item or an item related to her personal comfort while at work, and fell on the ice while in the process of going to or coming from her car. Rather, it is the case of a very recent general ice storm. Had Mrs. Wells gone anywhere that morning, even down her front sidewalk to pick up a newspaper, she would, as far as this record shows, have been subject to the identical risk which caused her fall.
Ms. Wells argues that Dr. Brown exercised control over the parking lot in that he informed his employees to reserve the parking spaces closest to the building for the handicapped and injured patients using the building. We fail to see how Dr. Brown's expression of common courtesy amounts to his having control of the parking lot.
It may be that we construe Kasl and Drewes incorrectly. Perhaps the court viewed the "unrelated hazard" exclusion as so limited that only the most unique situations (like the personal enemy assault mentioned above) are excluded by the "unrelated hazard" test. It is true that the terms of the act are to be liberally construed in favor of the injured employee. Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Service, Inc. , 646 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Mo.banc 1983). However, Cox recognized a broader common law application of the test. 920 S.W.2d at 537. Also, the legislative language set forth in the "unrelated hazard" test seems reasonably clear and unambiguous as it relates to the facts of this case. People over a wide area were exposed to the same ice storm that morning, whether going to work, stopping at a gas station or restaurant, getting out of their cars in a parking lot, or retrieving their morning newspaper.
The unrelated hazard test excludes coverage in this case because the nature of the hazard was unrelated to the employment. Under Kasl , Drewes , and Willeford , the result may be different if Dr. Brown had been responsible for maintaining the parking area in question for his employees. Those three cases suggest that once the employee has begun the work day or is on the premises maintained by the employer, the court will regard the work connection to an injury as being substantial when the precise cause of the injury is undetected (as in Kasl and Drewes ) or when the injury is the result of a slip on ice in the employer's parking lot. However, we conclude that the legislature would not have intended to extend this principle to include a slip occurring in a general parking area before the commencement of the work day due to a general ice storm.
In Willeford , as we have already noted, there was evidence that the ice "had been melted and refrozen." Id . at 874. While it is doubtful that this fact made any difference in the decision in Willeford , it could be argued that the fact that the ice had melted and refrozen made the hazard on the employer's parking lot a hazard which was specific to that workplace rather than a general, widespread hazard.
Conclusion
The facts are not in dispute. The issue is one of law: the meaning and effect of the Workers' Compensation Act in its present form. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the Commission erred in concluding that Mrs. Wells' injury arose out of and in the course of her employment under § 287.020.3.
The judgment of the Commission is reversed.
Howard, P.J., and Ulrich, J., concur.