Opinion
No. 2D21-463
04-20-2022
Akeem R. WELCH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Akeem R. Welch, pro se.
Akeem R. Welch, pro se.
Akeem R. Welch appeals from the order denying his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We reverse the portion of the order that denies ground one of Mr. Welch's motion, and we affirm without comment the portion of the order that denies ground two.
The postconviction record reflects that on January 2, 2007, Mr. Welch entered open pleas to several charges including driving without a valid driver's license causing death or serious bodily injury in violation of section 322.34(6), Florida Statutes (2005). The trial court sentenced Mr. Welch as a habitual felony offender to ten years' imprisonment.
Mr. Welch challenged this sentence in his rule 3.800(a) motion, asserting that the crime is a third-degree felony for which the statutory maximum punishment is five years' imprisonment because an enhanced habitual felony offender sentence is not authorized. The postconviction court ruled that although the crime is "ordinarily" punished by a sentence not exceeding five years' imprisonment, Mr. Welch's ten-year sentence is lawful under section 775.084(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), because the trial court found that he was a habitual felony offender. The postconviction court did not specifically address Mr. Welch's claim that a habitual felony offender sentence is not authorized for this offense.
Section 322.34(6) states:
(6) Any person who operates a motor vehicle:
(a) Without having a driver's license as required under s. 322.03; or
(b) While his or her driver's license or driving privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked pursuant to s. 316.655, s. 322.26(8), s. 322.27(2), or s. 322.28(2) or (4), and who by careless or negligent operation of the motor vehicle causes the death of or serious bodily injury to another human being is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
This court must strictly construe section 322.34(6), which does not authorize sentencing under section 775.084. See § 775.021(1) ("The provisions of this code and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused."). To the extent that section 775.084(1)(a) may conflict with section 322.34(6) by excluding only felonies defined in section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2005), from those that qualify for habitual felony offender designation and sentencing, "a specific statute covering a particular subject area always controls over a statute covering the same and other subjects in more general terms." McKendry v. State , 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994) (first citing Adams v. Culver , 111 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959) ; and then citing State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d 889, 894 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) ). The specific statute is "an exception to the general terms of the more comprehensive statute." 641 So. 2d at 46 ("[S]ection 790.221(2), which specifically addresses the criminal penalty for possession of a short-barreled shotgun, prevails over section 948.01[, Florida Statutes ], which generally gives a trial judge discretion to suspend criminal sentences.").
Notably, subsections 322.34(2)(c), (5), and (7)(b) specifically authorize sentencing under section 775.084.
We therefore reverse the portion of the postconviction court's order that denies ground one and remand for the circuit court to grant ground one of Mr. Welch's motion to correct illegal sentence and resentence him accordingly.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.
NORTHCUTT, SILBERMAN, and SMITH, JJ., Concur.