Opinion
03-CV-0794E(Sc).
June 25, 2004
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
This decision may be cited in whole or in any part.
Weigand filed this suit on October 24, 2003. He filed an Amended Complaint on November 17, 2003 asserting claims for alleged violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), and the New York State Human Rights Law, Executive Law § 292 et seq., stemming from his termination as a bus mechanic with the Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority ("NFTA") and the Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc. ("NFTMSI") (collectively "NFTA defendants"). On December 23, 2003 the State of New York ("NYS") filed a motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, NYS's motion will be granted.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to FRCvP 12(b)(6), this Court "must accept the material facts alleged in the [Amended Complaint] as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Moreover, a motion to dismiss cannot be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Accordingly, this Court must not consider whether the claims will ultimately be successful, but merely "assess the legal feasibility of the complaint." Moreover, when reviewing a motion to dismiss, this Court must of course limit its review to the face of the Amended Complaint and documents incorporated therein that are properly subject to judicial notice.
Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Cooper v. Parsky, 140 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1998).
Newman Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 102 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1996).
Weigand was employed as a bus mechanic by the NFTA defendants on January 30, 1992 when he was injured at his workplace. Weigand suffered a herniated cervical disk in his neck and was on leave until September 3, 1992. On May 18, 1994 Weigand was notified that he would be terminated on June 4, 1994. Weigand subsequently brought this employment discrimination action.
NYS argued that this action should be dismissed as against it because, inter alia, Weigand failed to state a claim against it. The Amended Complaint alleges that the NFTA defendants are each "an agency and/or political subdivision" of NYS, which "has general supervisory and administrative authority over the [NFTA defendants'] operations." Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9-10, 12. Consequently, Weigand alleges that NYS "is the ultimate entity to which the [NFTA defendants] are responsible for their wrongful acts, discrimination and/or omissions." Id. ¶ 14. Weigand further alleges that NYS "acts through" NFTA defendants. Ibid. NYS contends that (1) Weigand was an employee of the NFTA defendants, not NYS and (2) neither NFTA defendant is a subdivision of NYS. Weigand responds by suggesting that the legal relationship between NYS and the NFTA defendants is a question of fact that may not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, NYS's motion to dismiss will be granted.
NFTA is a "body corporate and politic constituting a public benefit corporation" under section 1299-c of New York's Public Authority Law. Herzog Contracting Corp. v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 1987 WL 4796, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. 1987). NFTMSI is a subsidiary of NFTA. Section 1299-e grants the NFTA many powers, including the right to sue and be sued. Ibid. As other courts have recognized, "[a] public benefit corporation is a separate entity, distinct from the state." Consequently, NYS's motion to dismiss will be granted because NFTA is a separate legal entity over which NYS is not responsible and the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against NYS.
See Roman v. Niagara Frontier Transit Metro Sys., Inc., 1983 WL 458, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. 1983); Mohamed v. Cellino Barnes, P.C., 300 A.D.2d 1116, 1116 (4th Dep't 2002).
Riverhead Transit Mix Corp. v. Walsh Constr. Co. (In re Riverhead Transit Mix Corp.), 1995 WL 1051649, at *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that the Dormitory Authority is a public benefit corporation that "is not the same entity as the State of New York"); see also Herzog Contracting Corp., at *4 (finding that the NFTA was "sufficiently autonomous" from the State of New York such that it was not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment); In re Dormitory Auth. of the State of New York, 18 N.Y.2d 114, 117-118 (1966) (finding that the Dormitory Authority "enjoy[s] a separate existence" from the State of New York because, inter alia, it transacts its own business and hires its own personnel); Bell v. Manhattan Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 364 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275-276 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1974) (holding that the Manhattan and Bronx Transit Authority was distinct from the state and noting that "[t]he very name, 'public benefit corporation', imparts a distinct connotation of separateness and judicial distinction from the state, its political subdivisions and municipal corporations") (citations omitted); Hyde Park Fire Water Dist. v. County of Dutchess, 410 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1978) (citing Bell with approval). Additionally, discrimination suits against other transportation authorities/public benefit corporations fail to name NYS. Cf. Shannon v. New York City Transit Auth., 189 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Rooney v. Capital Dist. Trans. Auth., 109 F. Supp. 86 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); compare N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 1299-c, 1299-e (McKinney 1999) (establishing Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth. and its powers) with N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 1201, 1204 (McKinney 1999) (establishing New York Transit Auth. and its powers) and N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 1303, 1306 (McKinney 1999) (establishing Capital Dist. Transp. Auth. and its powers).
Because the nature of the legal relationship between NYS and NFTA is a question of law, it is appropriately resolved on a motion to dismiss.
Furthermore, Weigand did not contest NYS's assertion that he failed to name NYS in an administrative charge — which is an alternative basis for dismissing this action as against NYS.
See, e.g., Vital v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 620 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of Title VII claim against party not named in plaintiff's administrative complaint). The Court will not address NYS's remaining arguments.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant State of New York's motion to dismiss is granted, that the Clerk of this Court shall dismiss this action as against the State of New York and that the caption of this action shall be changed to read:
"ARTHUR J. WEIGAND, Plaintiff, -vs- NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSIT METRO SYSTEM, INC., a Subsidiary of Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, and CHRISTOPHER ANTHOLZNER, ANTHONY SCHILL, JOHN H. MacVITTIE, as Employees of Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc. and the Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, Defendants.