Opinion
November 12, 1959.
December 17, 1959.
Unemployment Compensation — Voluntary termination of employment — Good cause — Assertion of refusal of needed glasses — Evidence — Credibility of witnesses — Findings of fact — Appellate review.
1. In an unemployment compensation case, in which it appeared that claimant, a truck driver 64 years of age, was involved in three accidents within a period of two months; that he was laid off until he obtained glasses; and that claimant stated to his employer that he would rather quit than wear glasses, whereupon he was treated as having quit his job, and when he appeared a few days later with glasses the employer refused to re-employ him; it was Held that the board was not guilty of a capricious disregard of the competent evidence in finding that claimant severed his employment without good cause.
2. In unemployment compensation cases, the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of their testimony, and the reasonable inference to be drawn from it are for the board.
3. Where the board finds against the claimant, the appellate court must determine whether the findings of fact are consistent with each other and with its conclusions of law and its order, and whether such findings of fact can be sustained without a capricious disregard of the competent evidence.
Before HIRT, GUNTHER, WRIGHT, WOODSIDE, ERVIN, and WATKINS, JJ. (RHODES, P.J., absent).
Appeal, No. 138, April T., 1959, by claimant, from decision of Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, No. B-51762, in re claim of John Weckerle. Decision affirmed.
Ivan E. Birsic, and Cauley Birsic, for appellant.
Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, with him Anne X. Alpern, Attorney General, for appellee.
Argued November 12, 1959.
The claimant in this unemployment compensation case appealed to this Court after having been denied benefits by the bureau, the referee and the board. They each found that the claimant voluntarily chose to leave his employment without good cause.
When the board finds against the claimant, we must determine whether the findings of fact are consistent with each other and with its conclusions of law and its order, and whether such findings of fact can be sustained without a capricious disregard of the competent evidence. Standish Unemployment Compensation Case, 189 Pa. Super. 471, 473, 151 A.2d 842 (1959). The appellant argues here that the board was guilty of a capricious disregard of competent evidence.
Because the claimant, a truck driver 64 years of age, was involved in three accidents within a two months period, he was "laid off until he obtained glasses." He had his eyes examined and was told he needed glasses, which he thereupon ordered. The next day he cancelled the order for the glasses, and the employer was so advised by the examining physician.
According to the testimony of the employer's witnesses, the claimant "thanked Mr. Costello [the superintendent under whom he worked] for being fair with him while working there and he said he didn't intend to get glasses and he was quitting his job." . . . "He said if he had to wear glasses he would quit." As the claimant was getting close to the age when he would receive a pension, his employer's representative said to him, "John, I think you are foolish. You are throwing a lot away." When the claimant said he would quit rather than wear glasses, Costello asked him, "`Is that what you want me to tell them upstairs' and he said, `Yes'". With this information the employer treated the claimant as having quit his job, and when he appeared a few days later with glasses, the employer refused to re-employ him.
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight of their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it are for the board. Ristis Unemployment Compensation Case, 178 Pa. Super. 400, 403, 116 A.2d 271 (1955). The above quoted evidence demonstrates that the board was not guilty of a capricious disregard of the competent evidence in finding that the claimant severed his employment without good cause.
Decision affirmed.