Opinion
No. 1-749 / 00-638
Filed August 28, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Carroll County, Joel E. Swanson, Judge.
Defendants Arthur Winker and Cletus Winker, d/b/a Glidden Body Shop, appeal from a district court judgment entered against them in plaintiff's personal injury action arising from a car accident.
AFFIRMED.
Rene Charles Lapierre of Klass, Stoik, Mugan, Villone, Phillips, Orzechowski, Clausen Lapierre, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellants.
Gregory T. Racette and Marci B. H. Tooman of Hopkins Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Arthur Winker and Cletus Winker, d/b/a Glidden Body Shop, appeal from a district court judgment entered against them in Jane Weber's personal injury action arising from a car accident. The Winkers contend the court erred in ruling, on a motion for adjudication of a law point, that they owned a vehicle involved in the accident because their efforts to transfer title prior to the accident were ineffective by virtue of their failure to comply with Iowa Code section 321.52(4)(a) and accompanying administrative regulations concerning out-of-state salvage titles. We affirm.
All references to the Iowa Code, except references to section 321.493, are to the 1997 Code. References to section 321.493 are to the 1997 Code Supplement.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS.
Jane Weber was severely injured when her vehicle collided head-on with a vehicle driven by Michael Warnke. Warnke had pulled out into her lane to pass a semi but had insufficient space, and both drivers swerved onto the shoulder into each other. Weber sued Warnke, his employer, Glidden Body Shop, Glidden's owners, Arthur and Cletus Winker, and her own insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Only Weber's claim against Glidden and the Winkers (collectively the Winkers) is involved on appeal.
Weber's claim against the Winkers was ultimately based on their alleged ownership of the vehicle driven by Warnke. The Winkers moved for summary judgment on grounds they did not own the vehicle. Though the Winkers had owned the car, having purchased it at an auction, they claimed they had sold it to Warnke. The court denied the motion.
Weber filed a motion for adjudication of law points, seeking a determination that the Winkers were the owners of the vehicle based on section 321.52(4)(a) and provisions of the Iowa Administrative Code. Specifically, Weber claimed that because the Winkers had failed to transfer the Nebraska salvage certificate of title for the vehicle to an Iowa salvage title, they could not have sold it to Warnke. The district court sustained the motion. The Winkers conceded Warnke's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, and that Weber's damages exceeded the limits of their liability insurance. Following a jury determination of Weber's damages the district court entered judgment of $783,549.79 against all defendants except State Farm, which had previously been dismissed from the case. The Winkers appeal.
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW.
We review the ruling on a motion for adjudication of law points for the correction of errors at law. State v. Friend, 630 N.W.2d 843, 844 (Iowa Ct.App. 2001).
III. MERITS.
The Winkers contend the court erred in its ruling on the motion for adjudication of law points by determining that section 321.52(4)(a) rather than section 321.493 governed with respect to their liability. They point to facts which they claim demonstrate a bona fide sale actually took place, for instance Warnke drove the vehicle at his own discretion to and from work for a period of time and repaired the vehicle himself, and argue that for liability purposes under section 321.493 it should not matter that they failed to comply with section 321.52(4)(a). In the last paragraph of their single-issue brief the Winkers assert that the trial court failed to address the issue of consent, and there is no evidence that Warnke was driving the vehicle with the Winkers' consent. Weber responds in part that error, if any, concerning consent was not preserved for review.
Section 321.52(4)(a) requires a vehicle rebuilder or a person engaged in the business of buying, selling, or exchanging vehicles of a type required to be registered in this state to acquire a salvage certificate of title to a wrecked or salvage vehicle they obtain and sets forth the procedure for doing so. It thereafter authorizes the assignment of such salvage certificates of title to other entities and individuals. Section 321.45(2) provides that no person acquires any right, title, claim, or interest in or to any vehicle subject to registration under chapter 321 except by virtue of a certificate of title. This section excepts from its provisions "the purposes of section 321.493." Section 321.493(2) provides as follows:
A person who has made a bona fide sale or transfer of the person's right, title, or interest in or to a motor vehicle and who has delivered possession of the motor vehicle to the purchaser or transferee shall not be liable for any damage thereafter resulting from negligent operation of the motor vehicle by another, but the purchaser or transferee to whom possession was delivered shall be deemed the owner. The provisions of subsection 2 of section 321.45 shall not apply in determining, for the purpose of fixing liability under this subsection, whether such sale or transfer was made.
We have previously stated that the legislature "requires us to determine whether there has been a bona fide sale or transfer and to discount the effect of the registration of the vehicle for purposes of establishing liability." Desy v. Rhue, 462 N.W.2d 742, 745 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990); see also W. States Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 602 N.W.2d 360, 362 (Iowa 1999) (stating that under section 321.493, a seller shall not be accountable for the negligent operation of the vehicle by another, and that the purchaser shall be deemed the owner for purposes of fixing liability). This case presents a somewhat different issue, however, in that a salvage vehicle, with particular and specific statutory requirements for acquiring and assigning a salvage certificate of title, is involved.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that compliance with section 321.52(4)(a) and related administrative rules is a condition precedent to a bona fide transfer of sale for the purposes of section 321.45(2). The transfer of salvage vehicles is strictly circumscribed, as is the process for converting a salvage title into a regular title. Salvage is defined as follows: "the vehicle is damaged and shall not be registered to be driven or moved upon a highway until it is no longer designated as salvage." Iowa Admin. Code r. 761-405.8(1) (emphasis added). Salvage titles may only be assigned as provided in section 321.52(4). Iowa Admin. Code r. 761-405.3(2). Section 321.52(4)(a) limits the persons and entities to whom persons other than authorized vehicle recyclers and new motor vehicle dealers may assign a salvage certificate of title.
Before a salvage title may be converted to a regular title, the salvaged vehicle must be repaired and inspected to ensure that neither it nor any of its components are stolen. Iowa Code § 321.52(4)(b), (c). A salvage theft examination may only be conducted on a vehicle with an Iowa salvage title. Iowa Admin. Code r. 761-405.15. The vehicle shall not be examined until it has been completely repaired, except for minor body parts. Id. A vehicle owner may drive the vehicle to the salvage theft examination, but only after executing an affidavit stating that the vehicle is reasonably safe for operation and listing the parts that have been replaced on the vehicle. Iowa Admin. Code r. 761-405.15(1)(b).
Our state has determined to closely regulate salvage titles and salvage vehicles brought into this state. The Winkers were required to surrender their Nebraska salvage title together with an application for a salvage certificate of title to the county treasurer of the county of their residence in this state within fifteen days after the date of assignment of the Nebraska certificate of title. Iowa Code § 321.52(4)(a). It is undisputed that they failed to do so. We conclude that the transfer of a salvage vehicle differs from the sale or transfer of a vehicle with a regular title in that acquiring an Iowa salvage certificate of title pursuant to section 321.52(4)(a) and related administrative rules is a condition precedent to any bona fide sale or transfer of a salvage vehicle for the purposes of section 321.493(2).
The Winkers conclude their argument on the single issue presented in their brief and discussed above by asserting that the trial court failed to address the "issue of consent," and that there was no evidence of consent in the record. To the contrary, the trial court concluded, in its ruling on Weber's motion for adjudication of law points, that Warnke was operating the Winkers' vehicle at the time of the accident with the Winkers' consent. Furthermore, to the extent that the Winkers contend that the trial court erred in resolving this issue against them in its ruling on the motion for adjudication of law points, we do not address this issue, as the Winkers raised it randomly, without elaboration or supportive authority. Soo Line R. Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 521 N.W.2d 685, 691 (Iowa 1994) (holding that a litigant's random mention of an issue, without elaboration or supportive authority, is not sufficient to raise the issue for our review). Finally, although not necessary to our decision, we note that in view of the Winkers' assertion Warnke was driving the vehicle as a result of their sale of it to him there can be no genuine issue as to whether he was driving it with their consent.
IV. CONCLUSION.
We affirm the trial court's challenged ruling on Weber's motion for adjudication of a law point.
AFFIRMED.