Opinion
No. 4-309 / 03-0933
May 26, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Glenn E. Pille, Judge.
Girard Weber appeals the jury's verdict for the defendants in this tort action arising from an automobile accident. AFFIRMED.
Patrick W. O'Bryan, Des Moines, for appellant.
Mark Wiedenfeld and Joseph McLaughlin of Wiedenfeld Law Office, Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Miller, JJ.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
On December 12, 1999, at about 7 p.m. Girard Weber and Katy Ross were involved in an automobile accident at the intersection of Clifton Street and S.W. Seventh Street. The southern end of S.W. Seventh Street is Clifton Street, creating a T-intersection. Ross entered the intersection from a parking lot on the south end of the intersection. She was most of the way through the intersection when she was struck by Weber, who was proceeding westbound on Clifton. Both parties claimed to have a green light.
Weber filed suit against Ross and her father, Gregory Ross, the owner of the vehicle. He alleged he received neck, back, and shoulder injuries in the accident. The jury returned a verdict finding Ross was not at fault.
Weber filed a "motion to vacate the verdict," which included a request for a new trial. The district court determined the verdict was supported by substantial evidence. The court also found the "weight to be given that evidence was clearly for the jury's determination." The court denied Weber's posttrial motion.
Weber appeals, claiming the district court should have granted his posttrial motion because the jury's verdict was not supported by substantial evidence. He also claims the district court erred by allowing interrogatory answers to be taken to the jury room.
II. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
Weber's motion to vacate the verdict may be considered as combining elements of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for new trial. Our review of a ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Midwest Home Distrib. v. Domco Indus., Ltd., 585 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Iowa 1998). A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict must stand or fall on the grounds asserted in a motion for directed verdict. Channon v. United Parcel Serv., 629 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2001). We inquire whether substantial evidence exists to support the plaintiff's claim, justifying submission of the case to the jury. Id.
In this case, Weber did not file a motion for directed verdict. A motion for directed verdict is necessary prior to bringing a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. To the extent Weber's posttrial motion is considered a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it was properly denied by the district court.
III. Motion for New Trial
Weber claims he is entitled to a new trial because the jury's verdict is not supported by substantial evidence. A ruling on a motion for new trial, as it pertains to the adequacy of a jury verdict, is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Johnson v. Knoxville Cmty. Sch. Dist., 570 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Iowa 1997). If a jury verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence and fails to effectuate substantial justice, a new trial may be ordered. Seastrom v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 601 N.W.2d 339, 345-46 (Iowa 1999); Bredberg v. Pepsico Inc., 551 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Iowa 1996).
We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Weber's motion for new trial. The jury's verdict is supported by substantial evidence. The jury may have believed Ross's testimony that she thought east-west traffic was stopped for a red light, and that she would be able to cross the intersection in safety. Both parties testified that another westbound vehicle, in the lane beside Weber, was stopped at the intersection, and did not proceed into the intersection as Weber did. The front of Weber's vehicle struck the rear passenger side of Ross's vehicle. The causation of Weber's injuries was also in dispute; Weber had back pain before the accident, and was in a collision subsequent to this one.
IV. Exhibit S
Weber objected to letting Exhibit S go to the jury room. Exhibit S was selected answers to interrogatories by Weber. The answers involved Weber's medical condition prior to and after the accident with Ross. Another answer involved Ross's statements after the accident. Weber did not object to this exhibit being used as evidence, but claimed the exhibit unduly emphasized a particular portion of the record, and should not be allowed to be considered by the jury during deliberations.
Submission of exhibits to the jury room is a matter resting in the trial court's sound discretion. Brooks v. Holtz, 661 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Iowa 2003); State v. Voll, 655 N.W.2d 548, 550 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002). We note Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.926(2) provides, "When retiring to deliberate, jurors . . . shall take with them all exhibits in evidence except as otherwise ordered." Generally, however, depositions are not taken to the jury room. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.926(2). In considering this distinction, the supreme court stated, "In this we perceive an intent to exclude from the jury room evidence of a type which might be overemphasized to the exclusion of other evidence adduced at trial." State v. Baumann, 236 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Iowa 1975). The court noted a deposition could "assume a disproportionate importance." Id.
In other cases, trial courts have been given considerable discretion in determining whether an exhibit should be taken to the jury room. See Brooks, 661 N.W.2d at 532 (finding no abuse of discretion in not allowing a videotape of the location of an accident to go to the jury room); State v. Thompson, 326 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Iowa 1982) (finding defendant was not prejudiced when gun which was not in its original condition was permitted to go to the jury room); Baumann, 236 N.W.2d at 366 (finding no abuse of discretion to keep an audiotape of a drug deal out of the jury room); State v. Shea, 218 N.W.2d 610, 616 (Iowa 1974) (finding defendant was not prejudiced by the presence in the jury room of substances which were not the controlled substances involved in his case); Heth v. Iowa City, 206 N.W.2d 299, 303 (Iowa 1973) (finding no abuse of discretion in decision not to permit beer cans to go to the jury room); State v. Jackson, 387 N.W.2d 623, 629 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (finding no abuse of discretion in permitting a film of a robbery to go to the jury room).
In the present case, the district court ruled:
Let the record show I've considered the plaintiff's motion not to allow Exhibit S to go back to the jury room. The Court agreed with defense counsel that these are unlike the deposition testimony of doctors. These are sworn written statements of a party opponent to the lawsuit, and as such are properly admitted and may be properly considered by the jury. The Court does not find that as such they would unduly emphasize any particular portion of the record. The Court overrules the motion to exclude Exhibit S from the jury's consideration.
We find no abuse of discretion under the facts of this case. Exhibit S had been admitted into evidence and it did not unduly emphasize any particular portion of the record. The evidence found in the answers to interrogatories was also testified to at trial. We find it is unlikely the exhibit "assume[d] a disproportionate importance." See Baumann, 236 N.W.2d at 366.
We affirm the jury's verdict.