Opinion
418 2023
05-23-2024
WILLIAM J. WEBB, JR., Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Appellee.
Submitted: April 9 2024
Court Below-Superior Court of the State of Delaware Cr. ID Nos. 9907017204 (N) 9702013762 (N) 91000534DI (N)
Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.
ORDER
Gary F. Traynor, Justice
Upon consideration of the opening brief, motion to affirm, and record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, William J. Webb, Jr., filed this appeal from a Superior Court order summarily dismissing his motion for reconsideration of postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Webb's opening brief that his appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.
(2) In March 1991, Webb pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary and unauthorized use of a vehicle in Criminal ID No. 91000534DI. The Superior Court sentenced Webb as follows: (i) for second-degree burglary, one year of Level V incarceration, suspended for one year of Level II probation; and (ii) for unauthorized use of a vehicle, six months of Level V incarceration, suspended for one year of Level II probation. In February 1992, Webb was discharged early from probation.
(3) In May 1997, Webb pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary in Criminal ID No. 9702013762. The Superior Court sentenced Webb to eight years of Level V incarceration, suspended after one year for seven years of Level III probation, suspended after eighteen months for the balance at Level II probation. In February 2010, Webb was discharged from probation.
(4) In March 2000, Webb pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary, first-degree assault, and endangering the welfare of a child in Criminal ID No. 9907017204. The Superior Court sentenced Webb as follows: (i) for first-degree burglary, twelve years of Level V incarceration, suspended after five years for seven years of Level IV supervision, suspended after one year for Level II or Level III probation at the discretion of Probation and Parole; (ii) for first-degree assault, thirty months of Level V incarceration, suspended after two years for six months of Level II or Level III probation at the discretion of Probation and Parole; and (iii) for endangering the welfare of a child, one year of Level V incarceration, suspended for one year of Level II probation. In February 2010, Webb was discharged from probation.
(5) In March 2016, Webb filed a motion for postconviction relief under Rule 61 in Criminal ID No. 9702013762. The Superior Court denied the motion, finding that Webb had completed his sentence and was no longer in custody as required by Rule 61. Webb filed an untimely motion for reargument, which the Superior Court denied. This Court affirmed the Superior Court's denial of Webb's motion for reargument and did not consider Webb's arguments concerning the denial of his motion for postconviction relief because his appeal of that order was untimely.
Webb v. State, 2016 WL 6276905 (Del. Oct. 26, 2016).
(6) In April 2016, Webb filed a motion for postconviction relief under Rule 61 in Criminal ID Nos. 91000534DI and 9907017204. The Superior Court denied the motion, finding that Webb had completed his sentences and was no longer in custody as required by Rule 61. This Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.
Webb v. State, 2016 WL 6872970 (Del. Nov. 21, 2016).
(7) In August 2023, Webb filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 2016 postconviction motion he filed in Criminal ID No. 9702013762 and the April 2016 postconviction motions he filed in Criminal ID Nos. 91000534DI and 9907017204. He argued that the merits of the motions should be reconsidered because the Superior Court relied on the convictions in Criminal ID Nos. 91000534DI, 9702013762, and 9907017204 to declare and sentence him as a habitual offender for crimes he was charged with in 2019. The Superior Court summarily dismissed the motion, holding that "[a] defendant who has been discharged from probation has no standing to seek relief under Rule 61." This appeal followed.
State v. Webb, 2023 WL 6882426, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 2023).
(8) In his opening brief, Webb argues that this Court's decision in Martin v. State requires reversal of the Superior Court's summary dismissal of his motion for reconsideration. This argument is without merit. First, as the State emphasizes in the motion to affirm, a motion for reargument must be filed within five days of the Superior Court's decision and Webb filed his motion for reconsideration years after the Superior Court's decided his 2016 motions for postconviction relief.
306 A.3d 50 (Del. 2023)
Super. Crim R. 57(d) ("In all cases not provided for by rule or administrative order, the court shall regulate its practice in accordance with the applicable Superior Court civil rule or in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or the rules of the Supreme Court."); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(e) ("A motion for reargument shall be served and filed within 5 days after the filing of the Court's opinion or decision.").
(9) Second, Webb's reliance on Martin in misplaced. In Martin, this Court held that "a postconviction petition will not be mooted by a defendant's completion of their sentence after the petition is filed if the defendant pleads that there are continuing collateral consequences arising from the conviction." Webb completed his sentences in Criminal ID Nos. 91000534DI, 9702013762, and 9907017204 long before he filed his Rule 61 motions in 2016 and thus lacked standing to seek Rule 61 relief at the time he filed those motions. The Superior Court did not err in summarily dismissing Webb's motion for reconsideration.
Martin, 306 A.3d at 64 (emphasis added).
Id. at 57-64. See also Super. Ct. Crim. 61 (a) ("This rule governs the procedure on an application by a person in custody under a sentence of this court seeking to set aside the judgment of conviction or a sentence of death on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction or on any other ground that is a sufficient factual and legal basis for a collateral attack upon a criminal conviction or a capital sentence."); Steck v. State, 2015 WL 2357161, at *2 (Del. May 15, 2015) (concluding that defendant who was discharged from probation in July 2014 and filed postconviction motion challenging the conviction in December 2014 lacked standing to seek postconviction relief under Rule 61); Watson v. State, 2015 WL 1456771, at *2 (Del. Mar. 30, 2015) (holding that defendant who was discharged from probation by June 2013 and filed postconviction motion challenging the conviction in June 2014 no longer had standing under Rule 61).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Motion to Affirm is GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.