Opinion
6 Div. 295.
March 1, 1934.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Cullman County; James E. Horton, Judge.
St. John St. John, of Cullman, and Lynne Lynne, of Decatur, for appellants.
Insanity must be established by clear and unexceptional evidence. Dominick v. Randolph, 124 Ala. 557, 27 So. 481; Cotton v. Ulmer, 45 Ala. 396, 6 Am. Rep. 703. In order to defeat the demands of complainants, Carothers must have been at the time of unsound mind to the extent that he was not capable of attending to the ordinary affairs of life. It must have been shown that he was incapable of transacting the particular business in question; that he had no reasonable perception or understanding of the nature and terms of the contract. Dominick v. Randolph, supra; McDaniel v. Mellen, 223 Ala. 181, 134 So. 873; Dyke v. Howe, 244 Mich. 129, 221 N.W. 127; Saffer v. Mast, 223 Ill. 108, 79 N.E. 32, 33; Swartwood v. Chance, 131 Iowa, 714, 109 N.W. 297, 298; Cathcart v. Matthews, 105 S.C. 329, 89 S.E. 1021; White v. Farley, 81 Ala. 567, 8 So. 215; Stanfill v. Johnson, 159 Ala. 548, 49 So. 223. The fact that he made improvident trades and that he is shown to have been generally unthrifty in his business or unsuccessful in his enterprises is not sufficient to establish his incompetency to make the contract in question. In re Carmichael, 36 Ala. 514. Contracting capacity does not require entire soundness of mind. Burgess v. Pollock, 53 Iowa, 273, 5 N.W. 179, 36 Am. Rep. 218; Waters v. Waters, 201 Iowa, 586, 207 N.W. 598, 600; Aikens v. Roberts (Sup.) 164 N.Y.S. 502. The verdict of the jury is not binding upon the court, but advisory merely. Hill v. Lindsey, 223 Ala. 550, 137 So. 395; Marshall v. Croom, 60 Ala. 121; Alexander v. Alexander, 5 Ala. 517.
W. E. James, of Cullman, and A. J. Harris, of Decatur, for appellees.
Whether the mental unsoundness of Carothers be characterized as lunacy, insanity, or non compos is immaterial, as these terms include all forms of mental unsoundness. Code 1923, § 1. The note or any other contract of an insane person, other than the statutory exception, is absolutely void, even where innocent parties are involved. Walker v. Winn, 142 Ala. 560, 39 So. 12, 110 Am. St. Rep. 50, 4 Ann. Cas. 537; Metropolitan L. I. Co. v. Bramlett, 224 Ala. 473, 140 So. 752. Partial insanity may invalidate a contract, and a mania on the part of the person for buying and selling regardless of profit or loss is a proper basis for the jury to find partial insanity. Dominick v. Randolph, 124 Ala. 557, 27 So. 481.
The only question involved upon this appeal is whether or not the appellees have shown such mental incapacity upon the part of William Carothers as would invalidate the indebtedness claimed by the complainants. We concede the soundness of the rule as laid down in the cases cited in brief of appellants' counsel that, to avoid a contract on the ground of insanity, it must be satisfactorily shown that the party was incapable of transacting the particular business in question. It is not enough to show that he was the subject of delusions not affecting the subject-matter of the transaction, nor that he was, in other respects, mentally weak. A party cannot avoid a contract, free from fraud or undue influence, on the ground of mental incapacity, unless it be shown that his insanity (which, under our statute, section 1 of the Code of 1923, includes "lunatics" or "non compos mentis," and means all persons of unsound mind) was of such character that he had no reasonable perception or understanding of the nature and terms of the contract. This question was submitted to a jury by the trial court, and, while their verdict was merely advisory and not conclusive, the record discloses many lay and expert witnesses were examined, including an alienist, the subject being present and observable to the experts and jury, and a careful consideration of the evidence does not convince us that the ruling of the trial court, which is set out in a clear and convincing opinion, is erroneous, and the decree of the circuit court is affirmed. The reporter will set out the opinion of the trial court in the statement of the case, as we feel that an elaboration of same can serve no useful purpose.
Affirmed.
THOMAS, BROWN, and KNIGHT, JJ., concur.