Opinion
No. 12–P–681.
2013-09-27
COMMONWEALTH v. Ernest J. BOBILIN, Jr.
By the Court (KAFKER, VUONO & FECTEAU, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant was convicted of assault and battery and vandalism, and was acquitted of intimidation of a witness and threatening to commit a crime. The charges resulted from an episode that occurred at the home of the victim, the defendant's former girlfriend. The defendant, who was intoxicated at the time, broke furniture and threw the victim to the floor. The police officer who responded to the victim's apartment testified that he heard screaming when he arrived and upon entering the apartment he observed a broken lamp on the living room floor, a broken telephone handset, and magnets all over the kitchen floor. The issues on appeal are whether the trial judge erred by admitting the prior bad acts testimony consisting of the defendant's threatening and violent behavior toward the victim on other occasions and by improperly instructing the jury regarding the prior bad acts testimony. We affirm.
The defendant was subsequently found guilty of being a habitual offender following a jury-waived trial.
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior assaultive behaviour toward the victim. Following a hearing, the motion was allowed in part. At trial, over the defendant's objection, the victim testified that in the past the defendant had verbally abused her by calling her names like “bitch” and “whore,” thrown her over a coffee table, and beaten her in the face so severely that she required surgery. The victim also testified that she was afraid of the defendant, who often came to her home uninvited and would beat on the door until she opened it.
The defendant acknowledges that the prior bad acts testimony in question was relevant to show the absence of accident and the hostile relationship between the defendant and the victim. See Commonwealth v. Julien, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 679, 686–687 (2003). He claims, however, that the judge erred by admitting the testimony in question because its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. We disagree.
“Determinations of the relevance, probative value, and prejudice of such evidence are left to the sound discretion of the judge, whose decision to admit such evidence will be upheld absent clear error.” Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144, 158–159 (2007). In this case the judge properly considered all of the proffered evidence and, as required by our case law, balanced the probative value of the evidence against its potential for prejudice. As a result, much of the more inflammatory evidence was excluded. For example, the judge prohibited the Commonwealth from soliciting evidence that the defendant had been arrested, convicted, and incarcerated in connection with prior assaults against the victim. Furthermore, contrary to the defendant's assertion, the judge adequately guarded against any potentially prejudicial effect by forcefully and accurately instructing the jury, when the evidence was presented and again during the final charge, that consideration of the prior bad acts evidence was limited to demonstrating the nature of the relationship between the parties. In his final instructions, the judge further explained that the evidence was limited to show “an absence of accidents or inadvertence” and not that the defendant has a “criminal personality[ ] or bad character.” The jury clearly followed these instructions as evidenced by its split verdict. See Commonwealth v. Ramos, 63 Mass.App.Ct. 379, 382 (2005). Under these circumstances, the defendant has not demonstrated error resulting in prejudice to warrant reversal of his convictions.
Judgments affirmed.