Watts v. Hospitality Ventures, LLC

Full title: HEATHER WATTS, Plaintiff, v. HOSPITALITY VENTURES, LLC, Defendant

Court: United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division

Date published: Jan 25, 2008

CASE NO. 2:06-cv-1149-MEF (M.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 2008)

Opinion

CASE NO. 2:06-cv-1149-MEF.

January 25, 2008

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARK FULLER, District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This cause is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 13) and Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 34). This case arose out of the termination of Plaintiff's employment as the Director of Sales and Marketing at the Fairfield Inn by Marriott in Montgomery, Alabama. Plaintiff argues that the termination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII") and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA").¹ The Court does not need to reach the merits of Plaintiff's claims because the sole named defendant cannot be liable under Title VII or the FMLA. Defendant's motions are due to be GRANTED.

1 Initially, Plaintiff asserted state law claims for breach of contract and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In her response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss these claims. (Doc. # 40, at 29). This motion is due to be granted, and these claims will not be discussed in this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff brings claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the Court finds a sufficient factual basis for each.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "An issue of fact is `genuine' if the record as a whole could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. An issue is `material' if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law." Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-23. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). On the other hand, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must believe the evidence of the nonmovant and must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the Court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).

IV. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Court has carefully considered all deposition excerpts and documents submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion. The submissions of the parties, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, establish the following relevant facts:

A. Relationships of the relevant individuals and entities

Since 2002, Montgomery Ventures, LLC ("Montgomery Ventures") has owned the Fairfield Inn by Marriott in Montgomery, Alabama (the "Hotel"). (Doc. # 34-16, ¶ 9). Montgomery Ventures employed and paid Plaintiff and the other employees of the Hotel. Aff. of Karen Kish (Doc. # 34-22, ¶ 2). There is a close relationship between Montgomery Ventures and Hospitality Ventures Management, Inc. ("HVMI"). HVMI provides Montgomery Ventures with "support and tools in all facets of the hospitality business," including "management, sales and marketing, guest satisfaction, [and] operations." Dep. of Roger Miller (Doc. # 32-4, at 24). Montgomery Ventures pays management fees for these services. ( Id. at 27-28). HVMI provides similar services to other hotels.

Although Montgomery Ventures technically was Plaintiff's employer, HVMI had a significant, employer-like relationship with Plaintiff. Roger Miller, HVMI's Vice President of Sales and Marketing, interviewed Plaintiff for her position, supervised her, helped to determine her salary, and established performance goals for her. ( Id. at 28-29, 37). Although Miller's approval was not required to hire Plaintiff, "[m]ost managers look at [Miller] as being the last person to interview and bless a hiring." ( Id. at 37).

When Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, she named only one Defendant, Hospitality Ventures, LLC. On May 16, 2001, Defendant was formed in Delaware. Aff. of Carol Twardoch (Doc. # 34-16, ¶ 2). Defendant never owned or operated the Hotel, and it never employed or paid Plaintiff. ( Id. ¶ 9). On June 1, 2005, approximately five months prior to the termination of Plaintiff's employment, the Delaware Secretary of State issued a certificate of cancellation with respect to Defendant, which meant that Defendant was no longer in existence and in good standing under the laws of Delaware. ( Id. ¶ 3); (Doc. # 34-16). Since this cancellation, Defendant has had no affilation or relation to the Hotel. (Doc. # 34-16, ¶ 4). Since January 1, 2003, HVMI has not owned or operated Defendant, and Defendant has not owned or operated HVMI. ( Id. ¶¶ 7-8).

B. The termination of Plaintiff's employment

On June 24, 2004, Plaintiff began working as the Director of Sales and Marketing at the Hotel. Plaintiff's supervisors were Miller and Hotel General Manager Todd Epplin. Plaintiff reported mainly to Miller on a weekly basis. Dep. of Plaintiff (Doc. # 32-2, at 70). Tammy Dominguez replaced Epplin as General Manager during Plaintiff's maternity leave. ( Id. at 88).

Plaintiff took maternity leave on August 11, 2005, and delivered her baby the next day. Plaintiff initially planned on taking eight to ten weeks of maternity leave, but on September 27, 2005 she asked to take the full twelve weeks allowed under the FMLA.² ( Id. at 297). This request was granted. ( Id. at 367).

2 Plaintiff's leave began on Thursday August 11, 2005, and thus her FMLA leave period would have ended twelve weeks later, or Thursday, November 3, 2005.

On November 2, 2005, Dominguez called Plaintiff and asked if Plaintiff would return to work full time on November 9, 2005. ( Id. at 95-98). Plaintiff thought that full-time status meant 35 hours a week, with some hours outside the hotel, pursuant to her job description and work schedule prior to the maternity leave and the hiring of Dominguez as General Manager. However, Dominguez wanted Plaintiff to work 40 hours per week, with fewer hours spent away from the hotel. ( Id. at 96). Dominguez ended the conversation with Plaintiff and called Miller to discuss the matter. After talking to Miller, Dominguez called Plaintiff back and told Plaintiff that she had to either resign or be terminated. ( Id. at 101). Miller was surprised to learn that Dominguez terminated Plaintiff because general managers normally contact Miller before they fire a sales director. (Doc. # 32-4, at 80, 103). The next day, Plaintiff cleaned out her office and received her final paycheck.

On November 9, 2005, Dominguez called Plaintiff and told her that she could not have been fired on November 2 because she was on FMLA leave. Dominguez offered Plaintiff two front desk clerk positions that required working 35 hours a week. Plaintiff refused to accept these positions.

V. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that it should be granted summary judgment because Hospitality Ventures, LLC does not exist and does not meet the definition of an employer such that it could be held liable under Title VII or the FMLA. Thus, it argues that it is not an entity from which Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Alternatively, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Title VII and FMLA claims lack merit.

Only an "employer" can be liable for a violation of the FMLA or Title VII. Faulkner v. Woods Transp., Inc., 174 Fed. Appx. 525, 528 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Arbaugh v. Y H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514-16 (2006) (Title VII); Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 685 (11th Cir. 1999) (FMLA)). Title VII defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The FMLA defines an employer as an entity that employs "50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i).

In this case, Defendant is not an employer under Title VII or the FMLA. From 2003 to the present, Defendant had no employees, and it never owned or managed the Hotel. (Doc. # 34-16, ¶ 5). Five months before Plaintiff was terminated, the Delaware Secretary of State issued a certificate of cancellation with respect to Defendant. Therefore, Defendant cannot be liable under Title VII or the FMLA, and its motion is due to be granted.

Plaintiff argues that she was employed by Defendant because Roger Miller hired and supervised her. Plaintiff's argument that Defendant was her employer under Title VII and the FMLA might be supported if the named Defendant was Hospitality Ventures Management, Inc., and not Hospitality Ventures, LLC. Indeed, there was a close relationship between Montgomery Ventures, LLC — the owner of the Hotel — and HVMI. However, Plaintiff did not name a defendant who could be liable, she did not amend her complaint, and the deadline for amending the pleadings passed on June 26, 2007. Therefore, Plaintiff's Title VII and FMLA claims cannot be made against Defendant.

VI. CONCLUSION

It is hereby ORDERED as follows:

(1) Plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss her state law claims (Doc. # 40, at 29) is GRANTED.

(2) Plaintiff's state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

(3) Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 13) and Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 34) are GRANTED.

(4) Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Title VII and the FMLA in this case are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

(5) This Court will enter a separate final judgment taxing costs.

A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at www.ca11.uscourts.gov Effective on April 9, 2006, the new fee to file an appeal will increase from $255.00 to $455.00. CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST 1. Appealable Orders : Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: 28 U.S.C. § 158Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre 701 F.2d 1365 1368 28 U.S.C. § 636 In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, 54Williams v. Bishop 732 F.2d 885 885-86 Budinich v. Becton Dickinson Co. 486 U.S. 196 201 108 S.Ct. 1717 1721-22 100 L.Ed.2d 178LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc. 146 F.3d 832 837 Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5 28 U.S.C. § 1292 Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541 546 69 S.Ct. 1221 1225-26 93 L.Ed. 1528Atlantic Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. 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