Opinion
HHDCV136039906S
06-28-2016
Watson Real Estate, LLC v. Woodland Ridge, LLC
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Nina F. Elgo, J.
A. Introduction
Before this court is the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, Woodland Ridge, LLC, and Daniel Zak. On July 11, 2013, the plaintiff, Watson Real Estate, LLC, filed the operative complaint alleging the following against the defendants: count two, breach of contract against Woodland Ridge; count four, material misrepresentations of fact as to Zak; count six, tortious interference as to Zak; count eight, violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110b as to Woodland Ridge; and count nine, violation of CUTPA as to Zak. For the foregoing reasons, this court grants the motion for summary judgment as to counts four, six, eight and nine.
The other defendants to this suit are/were Leonard Bourbeau, a member of Woodland Ridge and Attorney Peter J. Alter, the escrow agent. On June 15, 2016, the plaintiff withdrew its complaint against Attorney Alter.
B. Legal Standard
" Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). " [T]he party moving for summary judgment . . . is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including affidavits." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 324 n.12, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). " Likewise, [t]he existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counteraffidavits and concrete evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Foote, 151 Conn.App. 620, 632-33, 94 A.3d 1267, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 930, 101 A.3d 952 (2014).
" [I]t is only [o]nce [the] defendant's burden in establishing his entitlement to summary judgment is met [that] the burden shifts to [the] plaintiff to show that a genuine issue of fact exists justifying a trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mott v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 139 Conn.App. 618, 626, 57 A.3d 391 (2012). " In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Patel v. Flexo Converters U.S.A., Inc., 309 Conn. 52, 57, 68 A.3d 1162 (2013).
C. Facts
Woodland Ridge is the developer and owner of a four-lot subdivision in South Glastonbury, Connecticut. On or about June 30, 2006, the plaintiff purchased Lot No. 1 and, thereafter, constructed a single-family home. In connection with the purchase of Lot No. 1, the plaintiff entered into an escrow agreement with Woodland Ridge and Attorney Peter Alter, whereby $51,000 of the funds used in the purchase were deposited with Attorney Alter as the escrow agent. The escrow agreement provided that Attorney Alter was to continue to hold the funds, in the event of a dispute between the plaintiff and Woodland Ridge, until the dispute was resolved by mutual agreement, or until such time as a final determination by a court resolved the dispute. Further, the agreement provided that the escrow sum constituted a reasonable estimate of the cost of the work to be performed as set forth in the agreement. The work included " completion of the common driveway to the point at which it becomes an individual driveway for each approved lot. Any driveway used by more than one lot owner is deemed a part of the common driveway and shall be completed by the Developer. The parties acknowledge and agree that the Developer will not put the final course of bituminous pavement on the common driveway until construction of all four houses is complete . . . or five years from the date of this Agreement, whichever shall first occur."
In September 2011, Zak wrote to Attorney Alter indicating that Woodland Ridge intended to immediately complete all remaining work required under the terms of the escrow agreement. Zak further requested that the remaining escrow funds be released to him upon completion of the work. Zak provided to Attorney Alter an invoice from R& J Paving, LLC, for $9,000 for grading and paving of the final section of the common driveway. On September 30, 2011, Attorney Alter released all of the funds from escrow to Zak, Leonard Bourbeau, and R& J Paving, LLC. The plaintiff alleges that Attorney Alter released these funds without the permission of the plaintiff and notwithstanding that a dispute existed between the plaintiff and Woodland Ridge as to whether the paving of the driveway had been properly completed. The plaintiff further alleges that the common driveway had not been, and was never, completed within the parameters set forth in the escrow agreement.
Neither the plaintiff nor the defendants have submitted this letter as an exhibit.
D. Discussion
1. Misrepresentation Claim
The plaintiff alleges that in seeking a release of the escrow funds from Attorney Alter, Zak " made material misrepresentations of fact, including, inter alia, that the Plaintiff had agreed to the release of the funds in the manner requested; that the work contemplated by the escrow agreement had been performed; that no dispute existed between the Plaintiff and Woodland Ridge; and that Zak was a member of Woodland Ridge, when at all times material he was not; and that Woodland Ridge would complete all of the paving of the driveway."
In support of its motion for summary judgment as to this count, the defendants argue that even if Zak made the above misrepresentations of fact to Attorney Alter, the plaintiff could not have relied upon such misrepresentations because they were not made to it and, in addition, Attorney Alter did not rely upon the misrepresentations because he performed his own independent investigation before releasing the funds. The court agrees that based on the undisputed material facts, the plaintiff has not established an action in misrepresentation as to Zak.
" The essential elements of an action in fraud . . . are: (1) that a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) that it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) that it was made to induce the other party to act on it; and (4) that the latter did so act on it to his injury." Miller v. Appleby, 183 Conn. 51, 54-55, 438 A.2d 811 (1981). " To make out a claim of fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation a plaintiff must show . . . that there was a false statement of fact by the defendant and justifiable reliance on the statement by the plaintiff to its detriment." Retrofit Partners I v. Lucas Industries, 201 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 2000). " The correct standard is whether [the defendant] knew, or should have known, [its] statements were untrue at the time they were made . See Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc., 274 Conn. 33, 74 n.32, 873 A.2d 929 (2005) (noting general rule that misrepresentation must relate to existing or past fact) . . . It is not enough to simply present evidence of a statement of present intention that, in retrospect, did not come to fruition. Rather, the plaintiff must present evidence that indicates the statement was false when made." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Bellsite Development, LLC v. Monroe, 155 Conn.App. 131, 152, 107 A.3d 1028, cert. denied, 318 Conn. 901, 122 A.3d 1279 (2015).
In the present case, the undisputed facts demonstrate that even if Zak misrepresented to Attorney Alter 1) his position and/or authority to release the escrow funds, 2) the degree to which the common driveway had been completed, and 3) that the property owners were in agreement that said funds should be released, the plaintiff has not shown that Zak made these misrepresentations to the plaintiff .
The defendants also claim that Attorney Alter did not rely upon the alleged misrepresentations made by Zak and performed his own independent investigation as to whether the common driveway had been completed. Attorney Alter's affidavit states that in determining whether to release the remaining escrow funds, he did not rely upon any representations by Zak as to the condition of the common driveway and instead inspected the common driveway with John Heagle, the professional engineer and land surveyor who worked with him on the subdivision approval process for Woodland Ridge. " Upon inspection of the recently paved portion of the common driveway, I determined visually by looking at the edge of the driveway that the course of bituminous concrete appeared to be greater than the 2" required by regulation and by the subdivision approval. After requiring that Mr. Zak provide written notice to all lot owners of his intention to complete the driveway and because I had not received any notice of any dispute regarding the terms of the Escrow Agreement from any lot owner, including the Plaintiff, and because I satisfied myself by personally inspecting the common driveway that it had been completed pursuant to the Escrow Agreement, and after consulting with a professional engineer as to the driveway's apparent compliance with all Town regulations and subdivision approval, I disbursed the balance of the escrow fund . . ." Furthermore, Attorney Alter's affidavit states that the plaintiff never made any demand upon him as escrow agent for reimbursement or payment from the escrow.
The plaintiff does not directly challenge Attorney Alter's above claims, namely that he made an independent investigation, however, the plaintiff does challenge the quality of that investigation by asserting that Attorney Alter " did nothing more than visit the property and view the driveway." The plaintiff also does not produce evidence to contradict that Attorney Alter believed that there was an agreement that the funds could be released and fairly concedes that " it is reasonable to believe that [Attorney Alter] would not have released the funds unless he thought the other parties, including the Plaintiff, agreed to the release." Moreover, the plaintiff argues that Zak's statements to Attorney Alter may be the basis of a misrepresentation claim, notwithstanding the fact that they were not made directly to the plaintiff, because they were made to another party to the same agreement to which the plaintiff was a party.
In support of this theory, the plaintiffs relies on Teal Associates, LLC v. Alfin, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X04-CV-12-6028814-S, KAVITA (September 5, 2014, Sheridan, J.). The court in Teal Associates, LLC v. Alfin, however, faced the issue of alleged misrepresentations that were made to two individuals in their individual capacity but not to the plaintiff LLC, which was subsequently formed. The court found that the alleged misrepresentations were made to the predecessors of the plaintiff LLC and therefore, the plaintiff LLC succeeded to their legal rights. Id. (" Although the investment activity was initiated by the two individuals operating as a partnership or joint venture, a decision was soon made to continue the activity in a limited liability company form, and the LLC was formed expressly for that purpose of carrying forward the investment begun by the individuals.")
The court does not find that the court's reasoning in Teal Associates, LLC v. Alfin applies to the present case. The plaintiff has failed to present evidence that it, as opposed to Attorney Alter, relied on Zak's statements, and indeed, has not refuted the evidence that Attorney Alter performed his own investigation to ensure that the driveway was completed. In the absence of evidence that the plaintiff relied on Zak's alleged misrepresentations, the motion for summary judgment is granted as to count four.
2. Tortious Interference Claim
The defendants also claim that because there is no genuine issue of material fact that Zak was authorized to act on behalf of a party to the contract in question, specifically, the escrow agreement, Zak did not act fraudulently. The plaintiff counters that Zak, even as an agent, may be liable for tortious interference where he does not act legitimately within the scope of his authority--essentially making the argument that Zak's actions were motivated by self-gain.
" A claim for intentional interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to establish: (1) the existence of a contractual or beneficial relationship; (2) the defendant's knowledge of that relationship; (3) the defendant's intent to interfere with the relationship; (4) that the interference was tortious; and (5) a loss suffered by the plaintiff that was caused by the defendant's tortious conduct." Rioux v. Barry, 283 Conn. 338, 351, 927 A.2d 304 (2007).
" [N]ot every act that disturbs a contract or business expectancy is actionable . . . [F]or a plaintiff successfully to prosecute such an action it must prove that the defendant's conduct was in fact tortious. This element may be satisfied by proof that the defendant was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation or molestation . . . or that the defendant acted maliciously . . . [A]n action for intentional interference with business relations . . . requires the plaintiff to plead and prove at least some improper motive or improper means . . . [A] claim is made out [only] when interference resulting in injury to another is wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480, 502 n.24, 656 A.2d 1009 (1995).
" However, it is well-settled that the tort of interference with contractual relations only lies when a third party adversely affects the contractual relations of two other parties . . . [T]here can be no intentional interference with contractual relations by someone who is directly or indirectly a party to the contract. [T]he general rule is that the agent may not be charged with having interfered with a contract of the agent's principal . . . [A]n agent acting legitimately within the scope of his authority cannot be held liable for interfering with or inducing his principal to breach a contract between his principal and a third party, because to hold him liable would be, in effect, to hold the corporation liable in tort for breaching its own contract . . . In other words, an exception to the general rule applies if the agent did not act legitimately within his scope of duty but used the corporate power improperly for personal gain." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Metcoff v. Lebovics, 123 Conn.App. 512, 520-21, 2 A.3d 942 (2010).
In the present case, the defendants argue that Zak was an authorized agent acting in the interest of his principal, Woodland Ridge, who was a party to the escrow agreement. Linda Muraski, Zak's then wife and member of Woodland Ridge, stated in her affidavit that she was not involved in the operations of Woodland Ridge and expected her husband at the time, Zak, to oversee the business of Woodland Ridge. She further stated that at all times during their marriage, Zak was authorized to act on behalf of her as a member of Woodland Ridge and he was also authorized to act on behalf of Woodland Ridge. The defendants have met their burden of proving that Zak was an agent authorized to act on behalf of Woodland Ridge. Since there cannot be an intentional interference by someone who is directly or indirectly a party to the contract, as Zak is here, a claim for tortious interference fails.
Linda Muraski and Daniel Zak were married from April 4, 1998 through June 30, 2014.
The plaintiff also claims that Zak may be liable for tortious interference where he has not acted legitimately within the scope of his authority. Further, the plaintiff argues that it has alleged that Zak has engaged in misrepresentation and CUTPA violations, which raise factual questions as to whether they were motivated by self-gain. The plaintiff makes these allegations with no proof to support them. " Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 317 Conn. 223, 228, 116 A.3d 297 (2015). " Such assertions are insufficient regardless of whether they are contained in a complaint or a brief." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Foote, supra, 151 Conn.App. 636. " It is axiomatic that in order to successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment by raising a genuine issue of material fact, the opposing party cannot rely solely on allegations that contradict those offered by the moving party, whether raised at oral argument or in written pleadings; such allegations must be supported by counteraffidavits or other documentary submissions that controvert the evidence offered in support of summary judgment." GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Ford, 144 Conn.App. 165, 178, 73 A.3d 742 (2013).
The defendants have met their burden and provided proper evidence that Zak was acting, at all times, as an authorized agent on behalf of Woodland Ridge. The plaintiff has not provided evidence to the contrary, besides the self-serving accusations and bald assertions made in the revised complaint and memorandum of law in opposition. The court grants the motion for summary judgment as to count six.
3. Violation of CUTPA as to Woodland Ridge
The defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Woodland Ridge did not violate CUTPA because none of the conduct alleged by the plaintiff constitutes the aggravated behavior that is necessary to support a CUTPA claim, such as willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. The plaintiff argues that affirmative misrepresentations are sufficient to support a finding of a CUTPA violation.
" To prevail on a CUTPA claim, the plaintiffs must prove that (1) the defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce . . . and (2) each class member claiming entitlement to relief under CUTPA has suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd. Partnership, 157 Conn.App. 139, 197, 117 A.3d 876, cert. denied, 318 Conn. 902, 122 A.3d 631 (2015). General Statutes § 42-110b(a) provides that " [n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." " A plaintiff bringing a CUTPA claim may plead that an act or practice is either unfair, deceptive, or both." Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., United States District Court, Docket No. 3:15-CV-89 (SRU), 158 F.Supp.3d 91, (D.Conn. January 29, 2016). " In determining whether a practice violates CUTPA, courts have used the cigarette rule adopted by the Federal Trade Commission, which looks to: (1) [w]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise--in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers, [competitors or other businesspersons] . . . All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness. A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bentley v. Greensky Trade Credit, LLC, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:14-CV-1157 (VAB), 156 F.Supp.3d 274, (D.Conn. December 30, 2015).
" However, a simple breach of contract does not offend traditional notions of fairness and does not violate CUTPA." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Aztec Energy Partners, Inc. v. Sensor Switch, Inc., 531 F.Supp.2d 226, 232 (D.Conn. 2007). The plaintiff " must allege sufficient aggravating circumstances beyond a mere breach of contract to adequately state a claim for a violation of CUTPA." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Not every contractual breach and not every misrepresentation rises to the level of a CUTPA violation. See Naples v. Keystone Building & Development Corp., 295 Conn. 214, 228, 990 A.2d 326 (2010); Hudson United Bank v. Cinnamon Ridge Corp., 81 Conn.App. 557, 571, 845 A.2d 417 (2004). " There must be some nexus with a public interest, some violation of a concept of what is fair, some immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous business practice or some practice that offends public policy." (Internal quotations marks omitted.) Gaynor v. Hi-Tech Homes, 149 Conn.App. 267, 276, 89 A.3d 373 (2014).
In the present case, the plaintiff argues in its memorandum of law in opposition that, in addition to " breaching its obligations to complete the driveway as called for in the escrow agreement or the purchase agreement, the Defendant unethically induced Attorney Alter to release the funds from escrow, falsely claiming that the work had been completed, falsely suggesting that the property owners were in agreement, falsely suggesting that no dispute between the parties existed as to the escrow or the work to be completed, and, inter alia, not reminding Attorney Alter that the utilities had not been installed per the escrow agreement." The plaintiff argues that affirmative misrepresentations such as these are sufficient to support a finding of a CUTPA violation.
In the present case, the unfair practice that the plaintiff argues is that Woodland Ridge " unethically induced" Attorney Alter to release the funds from escrow. This allegation, however, does not satisfy the cigarette rule test to establish a CUTPA violation. Even if the court assumes that Woodland Ridge's inducement to release the escrow funds is unfair, Woodland Ridge's conduct does not rise to a level that suggests substantial misconduct that offends public policy to satisfy the first prong of the test, such as where one of the parties is at a disadvantage in its bargaining position and the other party takes advantage of that fact. Here, the plaintiff and Woodland Ridge are both limited liability companies and there is no indication that one party has less negotiating power than the other. Furthermore, the plaintiff did not allege in its revised complaint nor argue in its brief that Woodland Ridge's acts or practice " offended public policy."
In addition, the court finds that the plaintiff's conclusory allegations that Woodland Ridge falsely claimed that the work had been completed and falsely suggested that the property owners were in agreement are inadequate to support the second prong that the defendant's conduct was immoral, unethical or unscrupulous. The facts, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, support a claim that Woodland Ridge breached its contract with the plaintiff, " but a simple breach of contract cannot be described as immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Aztec Energy Partners, Inc. v. Sensor Switch, Inc., supra, 531 F.Supp.2d 232.
Finally, the plaintiff did not allege in its revised complaint that Woodland Ridge has engaged in this type of conduct with any other businesses, other than this one instance with the plaintiff. " Absent any allegations that other consumers or businesses were injured by [the defendant's] business practices, [the plaintiff] cannot establish a CUTPA violation on the third prong of the test." Id., 233. " Although a single transaction may be the proper subject of a CUTPA count, the essence of the Act, despite its broad definition of 'trade' and 'commerce, ' is its effort to provide a remedy for the unfair practices purpose of an existing or continuing enterprise, not misconduct that might occur in the course of a one-time transaction by a private individual." Belanger v. Maffucci, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-05-4013892-S, (April 11, 2006, Keller, J.). Here, the plaintiff has failed to include any such allegation and consequently cannot satisfy any of the three prongs of the CUTPA criteria.
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is granted as to count eight.
4. CUTPA Violation as to Zak
The defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Zak did not violate CUTPA because none of the conduct alleged by the plaintiff arose out of Zak's primary trade or commerce, nor did it constitute the aggravated behavior necessary to support a CUTPA claim, such as willful, wanton, or reckless conduct.
" A claim under CUTPA requires that [the] plaintiff allege that [the] defendant engaged in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce where trade or commerce is defined as the advertising, the sale or rent or lease, the offering for sale or rent or lease, or the distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity or thing of value in this state . . . There is no viable claim under CUTPA when the practice complained of is incidental to the true trade or business conducted . . . In evaluating whether alleged actions were performed in the conduct of any trade or commerce, the inquiry focuses not only on the nature of the acts themselves, but on the relationship between the actor and the allegedly injured party. It strains credulity to conclude that CUTPA is so formless as to provide redress to any person, for any ascertainable harm, cause[d] by any person in the conduct of any trade or commerce." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Beckworth v. Bizier, 48 F.Supp.3d 186, 204 (D.Conn. 2014).
The defendants first argue that Zak's conduct, as alleged by the plaintiff, did not arise out of his primary trade or business and, therefore, such conduct cannot be a CUTPA violation. Zak states in his affidavit that his primary trade or commerce is property management, real estate brokerage, and insurance. The plaintiff's only basis for a CUTPA violation arises from the allegations that Zak " representing himself to be a member of the Defendant Woodland Ridge informed the Defendant Alter that the remaining work required under the escrow agreement was to be completed and that the escrow fund should be released to him, " the defendants argue that none of this conduct arises out of Zak's primary trade or commerce. The court disagrees.
The members of Woodland Ridge are Leonard Bourbeau and Linda Muraski. At all times relevant to the allegations made in the plaintiff's revised complaint, Zak was authorized to act on behalf of Muraski in regard to her interest in Woodland Ridge and was also authorized to act on behalf of Woodland Ridge. The defendants argue earlier in their brief that at all times relevant, Zak was acting as an authorized agent of a party to the escrow agreement--in short, he was acting on behalf of Woodland Ridge. Additionally, Attorney Alter sent a letter dated March 19, 2008, to Dr. Watson's attorney indicating that Zak would like all future communication in connection with the completion of Lot No. 1 to be directed to him and Attorney Alter would no longer be involved in the resolution of this matter except as the escrow agent. Moreover, " [t]he plain language of § 42-110b clearly indicates that an individual can be liable for a CUTPA violation." Joseph General Contracting, Inc. v. Couto, 317 Conn. 565, 587, 119 A.3d 570 (2015). " It is well established that an officer of a corporation does not incur personal liability for its torts merely because of his official position. Where, however, an agent or officer commits or participates in the commission of a tort, whether or not he acts on behalf of his principal or corporation, he is liable to third persons injured thereby . . . Thus, a director or officer who commits the tort or who directs the tortious act done, or participates or operates therein, is liable to third persons injured thereby, even though liability may also attach to the corporation for the tort . . . It is black letter law that an officer of a corporation who commits a tort is personally liable to the victim regardless of whether the corporation itself is liable . . . Additionally, the imposition of individual tort liability does not require the piercing of the corporate veil when there is ample evidence in the record that a defendant has personally committed a tort." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cohen v. Roll-A-Cover, LLC, 131 Conn.App. 443, 468, 27 A.3d 1, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 915, 33 A.3d 739 (2011). Because the plaintiff dealt solely with Zak in connection to the purchase of Lot No. 1 and everything that followed thereafter, the court finds that Zak's conduct arose out of his trade or commerce.
The defendants do not allege nor argue that Zak was ever a member of Woodland Ridge.
Next, the defendants argue that even if Zak's conduct were deemed to have arisen out of his primary trade or commerce, it was not aggravated so as to fall within the context of CUTPA. As to this claim, the court agrees.
While the court finds that Zak was engaging in the conduct of trade or commerce, the court does not find a violation of CUTPA in light of its previous discussions as to Woodland Ridge. The allegations that Zak had misrepresented that the driveways were completed and wrongfully demanded the release of the escrow funds simply do not rise to the level of immoral, unethical or unscrupulous conduct that would support a CUTPA claim. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is granted as to count nine.
E. Conclusion
The motion for summary judgment is granted as to counts four, six, eight and nine.