Opinion
112,285.
06-12-2015
Archie WATKINS, Appellant, v. KANSAS PRISONER REVIEW BOARD, Appellee.
Archie Watkins, appellant pro se. John Wesley Smith, assistant attorney general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Archie Watkins, appellant pro se.
John Wesley Smith, assistant attorney general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before BUSER, P.J., STANDRIDGE, J., and HEBERT, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Archie Watkins is an inmate in the custody of the Kansas Secretary of Corrections at the El Dorado Correctional Facility. Watkins appeals the district court's order summarily dismissing his writ of habeas corpus petition challenging the decision of the Kansas Prisoner Review Board (Board) to deny him parole.
Facts
In September 2013, Watkins appeared before the Board for a parole suitability hearing. He was incarcerated as a result of an aggravated robbery conviction. After considering the necessary statutory factors, the Board denied Watkins' request for parole and deferred, or passed, reconsideration of the request to October 2016. The Board provided the following reasons for its decision: the serious nature and circumstances of the crime, Watkins' history of criminal activities, and the fact that he had been imprisoned multiple times. Watkins asked the Board to reconsider its ruling, alleging that the proportionality factor specified in K.S.A. 22–3717 weighed in his favor. On January 27, 2014, the Board responded that it would not change its ruling after careful review of Watkins' letter and file.
After the Board denied Watkins' motion to reconsider, he petitioned the district court for habeas relief from the Board's decision under K.S.A. 60–1501. On February 17, 2014, Watkins delivered his petition to prison officials for mailing to the district court. That same date, Watkins filled out an account withdrawal request form for payment of his court filing fees. His request to withdraw money from his account, however, was denied due to his failure to provide sufficient documentation regarding the fees owed. On February 24, 2014, the district court clerk returned the petition to Watkins for failure to comply with the filing requirements of K.S.A. 60–2001, which prescribes the rules relating to the payment of docketing fees and other court costs. See K.S.A.2014 Supp. 60–2001. Thereafter, Watkins made attempts to pay the filing fee and refile his petition, ultimately doing so on March 24, 2014.
On March 25, 2014, the district court dismissed Watkins' petition for the following reasons: (1) failure to file within 30 days of final action, contrary to K.S.A. 60–1501(b) ; (2) failure to list all civil actions filed in the last 5 years, contrary to K.S.A. 60–1502 ; (3) failure to comply with K.S.A. 60–2001 ; and (4) failure to state a claim for relief. Watkins filed a motion to alter or amend, alleging that he had been denied access to the court by prison officials, had been denied the opportunity to correct the deficiencies in his petition, and had sufficiently stated facts that entitled him to relief. The district court denied Watkins' motion, stating: “The Court still does not think that the Petition filed states facts entitling the Petitioner to relief.” Watkins timely appeals.
Analysis
Watkins argues the district court erred in summarily dismissing his K.S.A. 60–1501 petition for failing to state facts that would entitle him to relief and for failing to meet the statutory filing requirements. Although the district court made a factual finding that Watkins failed to meet the statutory filing requirements, the court ultimately dismissed his petition for failing to allege sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief. Because the district court did go on to consider the merits of Watkins' claim—regardless of the alleged procedural defect in adhering to the filing requirements—this court need not consider whether the district court erred by finding that Watkins failed to meet the statutory filing requirements.
In support of his claim that the district court erred in finding he failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, Watkins claims the Board failed to properly consider the “proportionality of the time the inmate has served to the sentence a person would receive under the Kansas sentencing guidelines,” which is one of the factors the Board is required to consider under K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–3717(h)(2).
It is well-settled that “[p]arole from confinement in a penal institution prior to serving all of an imposed sentence is a privilege, a matter of grace, and no constitutional right is involved.” Johnson v. Stucker, 203 Kan. 253, 257, 453 P.2d 35, cert. denied 396 U.S. 904 (1969). Furthermore, a court may not substitute its discretion for the discretion of the Board. See Swisher v. Hamilton, 12 Kan.App.2d 183, 185, 740 P.2d 95, rev. denied 242 Kan. 905 (1987). Rather, a judicial review of a denial of parole is limited to whether the Board complied with applicable statutes and whether its action was arbitrary and capricious. K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–3710 ; Torrence v. Kansas Parole Board, 21 Kan.App.2d 457, Syl. ¶ 1, 904 P.2d 581 (1995).
In deciding whether to grant Watkins parole, the Board was statutorily obligated to consider
“all pertinent information regarding such inmate, including, but not limited to, the circumstances of the offense of the inmate; the presentence report; the previous social history and criminal record of the inmate; the conduct, employment, and attitude of the inmate in prison; the reports of such physical and mental examinations as have been made, including, but not limited to, risk factors revealed by any risk assessment of the inmate; comments of the victim and the victim's family including in person comments, contemporaneous comments and prerecorded comments made by any technological means; comments of the public; official comments; any recommendation by the staff of the facility where the inmate is incarcerated; proportionality of the time the inmate has served to the sentence a person would receive under the Kansas sentencing guidelines for the conduct that resulted in the inmate's incarceration; and capacity of state correctional institutions. K.S .A.2014 Supp. 22–3717(h)(2).
Watkins contends the Board's decision denying him parole was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to state that a proportionality review was conducted or otherwise discuss the proportionality of his sentence. But Watkins' suggestion that the Board failed to consider proportionality in reaching its decision is contrary to the record. The Board's decision denying Watkins' parole specifically stated that it considered “all statutory factors.” Additionally, in response to Watkins' request for reconsideration based on his proportionality argument, the Board responded that it declined to change its decision after “carefully” reviewing his letter and file. And although the Board is required to notify an inmate in writing of its reasons for not granting parole, there is no statutory requirement that the Board provide the inmate with written reasons explaining the decision reached as to each factor or why certain factors might have weighed against its decision. See K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–3717(j) ; Torrence, 21 Kan.App.2d at 458–59. Moreover, a reviewing court cannot reweigh the evidence and issue an independent determination of the appropriateness of parole eligibility. See Brown v. Kansas Parole Board, 262 Kan. 903, 910–11, 943 P.2d 1240 (1997).
Notably, Watkins does not challenge the reasons given by the Board for denying him parole or otherwise argue that the reasons given lacked a factual basis. And he presents no substantive allegations that the Board failed to comply with the applicable statutes or that it exercised its discretion in a manner that was arbitrary and capricious. As a result, the district Court properly dismissed Watkins' petition for failing to state facts entitling him to relief.
Affirmed.