Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:02-CV-1035-Y
May 22, 2003
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND NOTICE AND ORDER
This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:
I. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
B. PARTIES
At the time he filed his petition, Petitioner Carl Lee Waters, TDCJ-ID #920951, was in custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
On March 25, 2003, Waters notified this court that he is now incarcerated at the Elayn Hunt Correctional Center in St. Gabriel, Louisiana.
Respondent Janie Cockrell is the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Waters was indicted for burglary of a building. (1 State Habeas R. at 13.) A jury found him guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to 12 years' confinement. ( Id. at 14.) Waters appealed. The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused Waters's petition for discretionary review. Waters v. State, No. 2-00-153-CR (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Aug. 9, 2001, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication). Waters filed a state application for writ of habeas corpus, which the Court of Criminal Appeals denied without written order. Ex parte Waters, No. 54,022-01 (Tex.Crim.App. Nov. 6, 2002) (not designated for publication). Waters filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division, on December 17, 2002.
Although Waters initially filed his federal petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, the petition was transferred to this division. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (d).
D. ISSUES
Waters raises two issues:1. The search and seizure was unconstitutional.
2. The evidence was legally insufficient to show that Anwer Reza owned the building, as alleged in the indictment.
E. RULE 5 STATEMENT
Cockrell believes Waters has sufficiently exhausted available state remedies on all issues presented and, thus, does not move for dismissal on this ground.F. DISCUSSION 1. Legal Standard for Granting Habeas Corpus Relief
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d), a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody under a state court judgment shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless he shows that the prior adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d). A decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the United States Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000); see also Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1039 (2001). A state court decision will be an unreasonable application of clearly established precedent if it correctly identifies the applicable rule but applies it objectively unreasonably to the facts of the case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08; see also Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 236, 244-46 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 963 (2003).
Section 2254(e)(1) provides that a determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant has the burden of rebutting this presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. Hill, 210 F.3d at 485. When the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denies relief in a state habeas corpus application without written order, it is an adjudication on the merits, which is entitled to this presumption. Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997).
2. Unconstitutional Search and Seizure
Waters argues that his conviction was unconstitutional because the evidence against him was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Federal courts have no authority to review a state court's application of Fourth-Amendment principles in habeas corpus proceedings unless the petitioner was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim in state court. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). Waters raised this claim in the trial court before trial and in his state habeas corpus application. (Clerk R. at 13; State Habeas R. at 7.) Because Waters was provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth-Amendment claim in state court, it is barred from federal habeas corpus review. E.g., Janecka v. Cockrell, 301 F.3d 316, 320-21 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 1264 (2003).
3. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Waters argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction because the State's proof did not support the allegations in the indictment. Specifically, Waters contends that there was no evidence to prove that Anwer Reza owned the building. To review the legal sufficiency of the evidence, a federal court must consider whether, viewing all the evidence "in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the existence of facts necessary to establish the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). All credibility choices and conflicting inferences are to be resolved in favor of the fact-finder. United States v. Cyprian, 197 F.3d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 822 (2000). This court must determine if the evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support the conviction, i.e., whether the evidence satisfied the "substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law." Brown v. Collins, 937 F.2d 175, 181 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n. 16). Whether a state appellate court views the evidence as sufficient is irrelevant. Santellan v. Cockrell, 271 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 982 (2002).
Although Waters entitled his claim "Invalid and Defective Indictment," it is actually a legal-sufficiency claim. (Federal Pet. at 7.) I his claim is, indeed, a defective-indictment claim, it is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. McKay v. Collins, 12 F.3d 66, 68 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 854 (1994).
To prove burglary of a building as charged in the indictment, the State was required to show that Waters entered a building not then open to the public with intent to commit theft without the effective consent of the owner. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a) (Vernon 2003). (State Habeas R. at 13.) An owner is defined as a person who "has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor." Id. § 1.07(a)(35)(A). Possession means "actual care, custody, control, or management." Id. § 1.07(a)(39). Anyone with a greater right to the actual care, custody, or control of the building than the defendant may be alleged as the owner. Alexander v. State, 753 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988).
Waters broke into a video arcade. (3 Rep. R. at 12-13.) Reza testified that he was the manager of the arcade, which required him "to take care of the business, to get in the supplies, to look into the accounts, to . . . get them the money, the transactions." ( Id. at 12.) He stated he had a greater right to possession of the arcade than Waters, whom he had never met before and had not given permission to enter the business. (Id. at 17-18.) With a corporate owner, a manager can qualify as a statutory owner as long has he had a greater right to possession than the defendant. Id. at 392 n. 1. Thus, the evidence is legally sufficient to prove Reza was the "owner" of the arcade. Cf., e.g., Taylor v. State, 630 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1982, no pet.) (holding director of city-owned community center was owner under burglary statute).
4. Summary
In sum, Waters is lawfully restrained because he has failed to prove that he has been denied a constitutionally protected interest. Accordingly, the state courts' determination that Waters was not entitled to relief is not contrary to or does not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state Court proceedings.
II. RECOMMENDATION
Waters's petition for writ of habeas corpus should be denied.
III. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten (10) days after the party has been served with a copy of this document. The court is extending the deadline within which to file specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation until June 12, 2003. The United States District Judge need only make a de novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). Failure to file by the date stated above a specific written objection to a proposed factual finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual finding or legal conclusion accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Carter v. Collins, 918 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1990).
IV. ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is ORDERED that each party is granted until June 12, 2003 to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed and the opposing party chooses to file a response, the response shall be filed within seven (7) days of the filing date of the objections.
It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.