Opinion
No. CV07-4014587S
April 9, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The Plaintiff, Waterbury Police Union Local 1237, AFSCME, AFL-CIO ("the Union") commenced this proceeding seeking to vacate an arbitration award in connection with a collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the defendant, the City of Waterbury ("the City"). The arbitration award rendered by the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration, ("the Board"), by a majority ruling, found that the issue presented was not arbitrable.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. The Union filed a grievance on behalf of former police Sgt. Cashman alleging that the City violated the 1992-1995 collective bargaining agreement between the City and the Union by failing to reimburse 100% of Mr. Cashman's Medicare costs. Mr. Cashman retired from the Police Department in March of 1993. This claim was denied by the Police Chief and thereafter a hearing was held by the Acting Director of Human Resources. The Acting Director issued his decision denying the Union's claim on the basis that Mr. Cashman was not a member of Local 1237 and therefore the Union had no standing to represent him. Thereafter, the Union appealed to the Board. The unrestricted submission presented to the Board was "Is the matter arbitrable?" Following a hearing before the Board, the Board issued a memorandum of decision denying the grievance. The conclusion of the Board was: "The matter is not arbitrable." A majority of the members of the Board concluded that since the relevant collective bargaining agreement was not made part of the record, they could not determine whether, as the Union maintains in its appeal, the Union may in fact bring a grievance on behalf of Mr. Cashman. The Union subsequently filed in this superior court an application to vacate the award pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418(a). In its application, the Union argues that the Board "exceeded [its] powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." The City urges the court to decline to vacate the Board's decision. Both parties briefed their respective positions and oral argument was held on March 4, 2008.
The relevant legal standards governing this court's decision are as follows. "Judicial review of arbitral decisions is narrowly confined . . . When the parties agree to arbitration and establish the authority of the arbitrator through the terms of their submission, the extent of our judicial review of the award is delineated by the scope of the parties' agreement . . . When the scope of the submission is unrestricted, the resulting award is not subject to de novo review even for errors of law so long as the award conforms to the submission . . . Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution . . ." Bridgeport Fire Fighters Local 998 v. Bridgeport, 106 Conn.App. 92 (2008).
The court notes that the significance of a determination that an arbitration submission was unrestricted or restricted is not to determine what the arbitrators are obligated to do, but to determine the scope of judicial review of what they have done. That is, the submission tells the arbitrators what they are obligated to decide. The observation by a court of whether the submission was restricted or unrestricted tells that court what its scope of review is regarding the arbitrator's decision. However, even in the case of an unrestricted submission, courts have recognized three grounds for vacating an award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute (2) the award violates clear public policy and (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald Co., 275 Conn. 72, 80-81, 881 A.2d 139 (2005).
In presenting their positions to this court, both parties agree that the submission at issue was unrestricted; neither the parties' agreement nor any other provision restricted the powers of the Board. See Alderman Alderman v. Pollack, 100 Conn.App. 80, 85, 917 A.2d 60 (2007); Rocky Hill Teachers Ass'n. v. Board of Education, 72 Conn.App. 274, 278 n. 6, 804 A.2d 999, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 907, 810 A.2d 272 (2002). Thus, the first relevant determination is whether, as is the position of the Union, the Board contravened § 52-418(a)(4). "[T]he arbitrator's interpretation of the scope of the issue must be upheld so long as it is rationally derived from the parties' submission . . ." Bridgeport Fire Fighters Local 998 citing Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald Co., supra, 275 Conn. at 99, quoting American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Milwaukee Local v. Runyon, 185 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1999). "[A]n award must be final as to the matters submitted so that the rights and obligations of the parties may be definitely fixed." Local 63, Textile Workers Union v. Cheney Bros., 141 Conn. 606, 617, 109 A.2d 240 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 959, 75 S.Ct. 449, 99 L.Ed. 748 (1955). As noted, the issue submitted by the Union was whether the issue was arbitrable. The Board determined it had insufficient evidence to determine the issue arbitrable. It is the court's decision that the board's interpretation of the issue submitted by the parties was reasonable, and its determination was properly reached. Therefore, the motion to vacate the arbitration award on this ground is denied.
While not in the Union's application, the Union in its memorandum of law raised a second ground for its position that this court should vacate the decision of the Board: "The arbitrators' decision is contrary to the public policy of the state favoring arbitration as a means of dispute resolution." That is, it is the Union's position that the award is contrary to several strong and established public policies. The issue then, for this court, is "whether the award falls within the public policy exception to the general rule of deference to an arbitrator's award . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) South Windsor v. South Windsor Police Union Local 1480, Council 15, 255 Conn. 800, 815, 770 A.2d 14 (2001) "The public policy exception applies only when the award is clearly illegal or clearly violative of a strong public policy. A challenge that an award is in contravention of public policy is premised on the fact that the parties cannot expect an arbitration award approving conduct which is illegal or contrary to public policy to receive judicial endorsement any more than parties can expect a court to enforce such a contract between them . . . When a challenge to the arbitrator's authority is made on public policy grounds, however, the court is not concerned with the correctness of the arbitrator's decision but with the lawfulness of enforcing the award . . . Accordingly, the public policy exception to arbitral authority should be narrowly construed and a court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's interpretation of collective bargaining agreements is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests . . . The party challenging the award bears the burden of proving that illegality or conflict with public policy is clearly demonstrated . . . Therefore, given the narrow scope of the public policy limitation on arbitral authority, the Union can prevail in the present case only if it demonstrates that the arbitrators' award clearly violates an established public policy mandate." Trumbull v. UPSEU, Local 424, Unit 4, No. CV07-4021977 (Jan. 10, 2008), citing Brantley v. City of New Haven, 100 Conn.App. 853, 860, 920 A.2d 331 (2007). After due consideration given to the parties' memoranda and oral arguments on this point, the court finds that the Union has failed to establish that the award is violative of a clear and dominant public policy. Accordingly, on this ground also, the motion to vacate the arbitration award is denied.