Opinion
12-29-2016
In the Matter of Helen WASHINGTON, Petitioner, v. Thomas P. DiNAPOLI, as State Comptroller, Respondent.
Law Office of Dennis Gaughan, Hamburg (Eric P. Doherty of counsel), for petitioner. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (William E. Storrs of counsel), for respondent.
Law Office of Dennis Gaughan, Hamburg (Eric P. Doherty of counsel), for petitioner.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (William E. Storrs of counsel), for respondent.
Before: PETERS, P.J., GARRY, DEVINE, MULVEY and AARONS, JJ.
DEVINE, J.Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent denying petitioner's application for accidental disability retirement benefits.
Petitioner, a nurse at a correctional facility, suffered injuries when she tripped over an open cabinet drawer. Her subsequent application for accidental disability retirement benefits was denied on the ground that the incident did not constitute an accident within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law, and she requested a hearing and redetermination. Following the hearing, the Hearing Officer determined that the incident constituted an accident entitling petitioner to the benefits. Respondent disagreed upon administrative review and denied petitioner's application. This CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued.
Petitioner bore the burden of showing her entitlement to accidental disability retirement benefits and respondent's determination will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Scofield v. DiNapoli, 125 A.D.3d 1086, 1086, 3 N.Y.S.3d 452 [2015] ; Matter of Bennett v. DiNapoli, 119 A.D.3d 1310, 1310, 991 N.Y.S.2d 167 [2014] ). It is well settled that in order for an incident to constitute an accident within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law, it must be "a sudden, fortuitous mischance, unexpected, out of the ordinary, and injurious in impact" (Matter of Lichtenstein v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund of Police Dept. of City of N.Y., Art. II, 57 N.Y.2d 1010, 1012, 457 N.Y.S.2d 472, 443 N.E.2d 946 [1982] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Matter of Kenny v. DiNapoli, 11 N.Y.3d 873, 874, 874 N.Y.S.2d 399, 902 N.E.2d 952 [2008] ).
Petitioner testified that, on the day of the incident, she was in the medication room along with another nurse. The other nurse retrieved an item from a cabinet drawer and left the room and, when petitioner turned to wash her hands, she tripped and fell over the open drawer. Petitioner described the room as "very small" and well lit, and she knew that the other nurse had opened the drawer. Respondent accordingly concluded that the subsequent trip and fall was not an accident because it stemmed from a condition that was "readily observable and could be reasonably anticipated," rendering petitioner's "own misstep or inattention" the cause of her injuries (Matter of Lamb v. DiNapoli, 139 A.D.3d 1312, 1313, 33 N.Y.S.3d 482 [2016] ; see Matter of Holden v. DiNapoli, 122 A.D.3d 1105, 1106–1107, 996 N.Y.S.2d 783 [2014] ).What respondent's analysis overlooked was that, under the circumstances present in this case, petitioner had every reason to believe that the drawer would be closed when she turned. Petitioner testified that the drawer contained sharp items that would be dangerous in the hands of inmates and, as such, protocol demanded that it be secured when not in use. Petitioner assumed that this protocol had been followed and, indeed, she had never before seen a nurse fail to close and secure the drawer before leaving the room in the seven years that she had worked at the facility. The Hearing Officer credited that testimony-an assessment that respondent did not disturb-and it "establishes the unusual and unexpected nature of the [other nurse]'s action as the precipitating cause of the injury, and that the risk of such action was not an inherent risk in the ordinary performance of petitioner's regular duties" (Matter of Echols v. Regan, 161 A.D.2d 1024, 1025, 557 N.Y.S.2d 596 [1990] ; compare Matter of McCambridge v. McGuire, 62 N.Y.2d 563, 567–568, 479 N.Y.S.2d 171, 468 N.E.2d 9 [1984], with Matter of Tomita v. DiNapoli, 66 A.D.3d 1071, 1072, 886 N.Y.S.2d 250 [2009] ). Substantial evidence therefore fails to support respondent's determination, and it must be annulled (see Matter of Leuenberger v. McCall, 235 A.D.2d 906, 907, 652 N.Y.S.2d 671 [1997] ; Matter of Echols v. Regan, 161 A.D.2d at 1025, 557 N.Y.S.2d 596 ). Petitioner's remaining contentions are academic.
ADJUDGED that the determination is annulled, without costs, petition granted, and matter remitted to respondent for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.
PETERS, P.J., GARRY, MULVEY and AARONS, JJ., concur.