Opinion
4:24-CV-4-M
03-05-2024
ANITA WASHINGTON AND MW, Plaintiffs, v. MICHAEL COWARD, et al., Defendants.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Rober B. Jones, Jr. United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the court on the pro se Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis and for frivolity review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). [DE-1 to -3], Plaintiff has demonstrated appropriate evidence of inability to pay the required court costs, and the application to proceed in forma pauperis is allowed. However, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court shall dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii); see Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72,74 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining Congress enacted predecessor statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) “to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none of the ordinary financial disincentives to filing meritless claims”). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are ‘so nutty,' ‘delusional,' or ‘wholly fanciful' as to be simply ‘unbelievable.'”). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28.
In determining whether a complaint is frivolous, “a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the Plaintiff's allegations.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Rather, the court may find a complaint factually frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Id. “The word ‘frivolous' is inherently elastic and not susceptible to categorical definition.... The term's capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis, in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all factors bearing upon the frivolity of a claim.” Nagy v. Fed. Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2004) (some internal quotation marks omitted). In making its frivolity determination, the court may “apply common sense.” Nasim v. Warden., Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1995).
In order to state a claim on which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Id.
In the present case, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. See id.; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits; the district courts are not required “to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff, Anita Washington, a resident of Virginia, filed a complaint against Defendants Michael Coward, Elizabeth Heath, Lynn Nethkin, and Christopher Rogerson, all residents of North Carolina, regarding a child custody dispute over her minor child M.W. Plaintiff alleges a litany of violations, among them paternity fraud, kidnapping, illegal interference with child custody, and child abuse and neglect. Plaintiff claims M.W. was wrongfully and forcefully taken from her home, pursuant to an ex parte order from Elizabeth Heath, and was placed with Michael Coward, who committed paternity fraud in order to take M.W. Plaintiff further alleges that M.W. is suffering abuse and neglect. Plaintiff asks the court to restore her parental rights and award her full custody of M.W, to hold all individuals accountable, and to award $3.6 million in punitive damages for past and future psychological trauma. Compl. [DE-1] at 1-3.
In support of the complaint, Plaintiff filed numerous documents from a North Carolina state court custody matter between Plaintiff and Coward. Among these documents are an order for paternity testing signed by Lenoir County District Court Judge Beth Heath, Plaintiff's motion to modify custody alleging paternity fraud, an order dismissing Plaintiff's motion to modify custody signed by Lenoir County District Court Judge Christopher Rogerson, Plaintiff's motion to modify custody based on allegations of abuse and neglect and a notice of hearing on the motion, several photographs of the outside of a home, a warrant directing law enforcement to take custody of M.W. after Plaintiff removed him from North Carolina, paternity test results with Lynn Nethkin listed as the specimen collector, a letter from Lenoir County Social Services to Plaintiff regarding her report of suspected child abuse or neglect, a custody/paternity order finding Coward is the biological father of M.W. and awarding joint custody to Plaintiff and Coward, DNA test results, and pictures of M.W. [DE-1-1 to -2-8]. Having reviewed and liberally construed the allegations of the complaint, this matter should be dismissed.
Elizabeth Heath and Christopher Rogerson are state court judges. Plaintiff alleges Judge Heath did not provide her with notice prior to awarding Coward custody, and there are no factual allegations against Judge Rogerson, but he did sign some of the state court custody orders attached to the complaint. The complained-of conduct by these judges relates to the performance of judicial acts in the child custody proceeding for which they are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See Dove v. Pate, No. 5:15-CT-3132-BO, 2016 WL 7655777, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 12, 2016) (“judges performing judicial acts within their jurisdiction are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability claims”) (collecting cases), aff'd, 651 Fed.Appx. 188 (4th Cir. 2016). “Judges are subject to civil liability for judicial acts only where they act in ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.'” Fullard v. Horne, No. 5:17-CT-3159-FL, 2018 WL 3302732, at *3 (E.D. N.C. July 5, 2018) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978)), aff'd, No. 18-6896, 2019 WL 117113 (4th Cir. Jan. 7, 2019); see also Dean v. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that because there was not “a clear absence of subject-matter jurisdiction,” the judge was “clothed with judicial immunity”). Even accusations of malice or corruption are insufficient to overcome judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (“judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (“immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly”). Plaintiff has not alleged that Judges Heath or Rogerson acted without subject matter jurisdiction over the child custody matter. Accordingly, absolute judicial immunity bars Plaintiff's claims against those defendants.
As for Nethkin, who collected the paternity test specimen, Plaintiff generally alleges that the paternity test was fraudulent but makes no specific allegations regarding any conduct by Nethkin. A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This is necessary “in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]”' Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47 (1957)). A complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Id. Plaintiff's conclusory allegations fail to meet the basic pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) and Iqbal and Twombly, and the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to “nudge[] [Plaintiff's] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 547.
Likewise, Plaintiff's allegations against Coward are conclusory and insufficient to state a claim. The documents Plaintiff filed do not support her bald claims that M.W. was wrongfully removed from her home; rather, they indicate that he was removed pursuant to a warrant directing law enforcement to take custody of M.W. after Plaintiff wrongfully removed him from North Carolina. [DE-2] at 2. Finally, the court lacks jurisdiction to reverse the custody decision of the state court. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (per curiam); see Rooker v. Fid. Tr Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Jurisdiction to review such decisions lies with superior state courts and, ultimately, the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). Plaintiff's supporting documents make clear that this is a child custody dispute, and the court lacks jurisdiction over such matters. See Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1088 (4th Cir. 1980) (explaining that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over cases that are “genuinely divorce, alimony, or child custody and support cases”). Accordingly, this matter should be dismissed for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is allowed, and it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on Plaintiff. You shall have until March 19, 2024 to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D. N.C.
If you do not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, you will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, your failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar you from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).
So ordered, this the 5th day of March, 2024.