Opinion
F071135
09-12-2017
MARIA WASH, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent, v. JOHN WASH, Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant.
John Wash, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. Daniel L. Harralson Law Office and Daniel L. Harralson for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 09CECG00933)
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Mark Wood Snauffer, Judge. John Wash, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. Daniel L. Harralson Law Office and Daniel L. Harralson for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Appellant challenges a judgment entered after the trial court granted a motion to enforce the parties' settlement agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. We conclude the trial court correctly determined the settlement agreement contained all the terms of settlement that were material to the parties and those material terms were sufficiently definite or certain to be enforceable.
All unlabeled statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
We therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The Parties and the Property
John Wash and Thomas Wash are the sons of Robert Wash, who died in 2005. The sons inherited approximately 100 acres of agricultural located at 3535 and 3473 South Temperance Avenue, Fresno. The 100 acres is described as the family farm and the childhood home of John and Thomas.
Thomas married Maria S. Banda Banales and they had two sons. Thomas died on November 3, 2011, at the age of 59. John asserts the parties knew Thomas had cancer since around 2006, well before this litigation was filed.
In 1998, John, Thomas and Maria entered into a partnership agreement for a general partnership named "Wash and Wash Partnership" (Partnership). The Partnership's primary purpose was the acquisition of farm property, together with the leasing, operating, management and farming of that property. The partnership agreement stated the initial contributions included two 20-acre parcels located on East Central Avenue, which we refer to in this opinion as "the 40 acres."
The 100 acres of agricultural land is one of the subjects of this litigation. Thomas and Maria operated a tree and nursery business on the 100 acres. In addition, the 100 acres contains approximately 77 acres of citrus orchards. Maria's residence is on the 100 acres. John's residence also is on the 100 acres, on the north side of the driveway that serves both residences. Litigation Begins
In March 2009, Thomas and Maria filed a complaint against John. The complaint sought dissolution of the Partnership, an accounting of its affairs, and the partition of the 40 acres into two 20-acre parcels.
In August 2009, John filed an answer and a cross-complaint for partition, partnership dissolution, accounting, and waste. John's partition request related to 100 acres of land located on South Temperance Avenue, in which he held an undivided 50 percent ownership interest and in which Thomas and Maria held an undivided 50 percent ownership interest. John's waste cause of action alleged that since about 2007 Thomas and Maria had failed to farm (i.e., prune, irrigate and harvest) and maintain the 40 acres of land and permanent crops in a commercially reasonable manner consistent with industry standards. The Settlement
To resolve their dispute, the parties retained the services of a mediator, Lee M. Jacobson. On August 24, 2010, the parties, their attorneys and the mediator held a mediation hearing. The mediation resulted in a four-page settlement agreement, which was signed by the parties, the two attorneys and the mediator. The agreement stated John would receive "approximately 20 acres" of the 100 acres, Thomas and Maria would receive "an equal amount of acreage right next to John's," and Thomas and Maria would have the option of purchasing the remaining acres after an appraisal was completed. These and other terms of the settlement agreement are described in more detail in parts II.A and III.A, post.
Later in August 2010, the attorney for Thomas and Maria filed a notice of conditional settlement of the entire case. The notice stated (1) the settlement agreement conditioned dismissal of the lawsuit on the satisfactory completion of specified terms that would not be performed within 45 days and (2) a request for dismissal would be filed within one year.
In February 2012, the trial court conducted a case status review and issued a minute order continuing a dismissal hearing for six months. The minute order stated the case was continued due to pending issues with funding for the escrow and, once those issues were resolved, a dismissal would be filed and the case would come off calendar.
In March 2013, Maria filed a motion to enforce the settlement, appoint a receiver and award attorney fees. John opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion. The court's ruling stated Maria had no power to proceed on behalf of the deceased party, Thomas, without an order substituting her in as his personal representative. In September 2013, the trial court put the case back on active calendar and set the trial date for February 2, 2015.
In March 2014, Maria filed a motion to substitute herself for Thomas. The court denied the motion without prejudice on the ground that the showing was insufficient to establish Maria was Thomas's successor in interest.
In September 2014, Maria filed another motion to substitute herself as Thomas's successor in interest. John again opposed the motion. The trial court granted Maria's motion, allowing her to act in place of Thomas as his successor in interest. Enforcement of Settlement
In January 2015, Maria filed an ex parte application for an order to enforce the settlement. The trial court set the matter for a hearing and directed any opposition be filed five days before the hearing date. John's opposition asserted numerous grounds for denying the motion, including that the agreement was unenforceable, was impossible to perform, was missing material terms, and was uncertain.
On January 27, 2015, the motion was argued and submitted. The trial court granted the motion to enforce the settlement agreement and directed that its tentative ruling would become the order of the court. The court referred to its authority under section 664.6, found the written agreement had been signed by the parties and their attorneys, determined the agreement contained all of the material terms of the parties' agreement, and concluded the agreement was valid and enforceable.
On February 13, 2015, the trial court entered a judgment to implement its order granting the motion to enforce the settlement. The judgment stated Maria shall have judgment against John "pursuant to the terms set out in the written settlement agreement dated August 24, 2010, a copy of which is Attached hereto as Exhibit 'A' and incorporated herein by reference." The judgment awarded Maria attorney fees of $2,460. A week later, John filed a notice of appeal from the judgment and the order granted under section 664.6.
Other disputes among the parties relating to the 100 acres have been brought before this court. In an earlier appeal, we affirmed an order entered under section 527.6 enjoining John from harassing Maria and her two sons. (Maria Banda v. John Wash (Feb. 3, 2016, F069417) [nonpub. opn.].)
DISCUSSION
I. BASIC LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A. Formation of an Enforceable Settlement
1. Motions under Section 664 .6
A strong public policy of California is to encourage the voluntary settlement of litigation. (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1359 (Osumi).) Section 664.6 promotes this public policy by providing an expedited procedure for enforcing a settlement once the parties have agreed to it. (Osumi, supra, at p. 1360.) This expedited procedure permits the entry of a judgment on the settlement without the filing of a new lawsuit. Section 664.6 provides in full:
"If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement."
Before a judgment may be entered under this provision, the trial court must determine in the first instance whether the parties have entered into an enforceable settlement. (Osumi, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1360.) In making this determination, the trial court may consider the parties' declarations and other evidence and, if it chooses, may receive and consider oral testimony. (Ibid.; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1306(b) [presentation of oral testimony at a hearing on a noticed motion].)
2. Elements of an Enforceable Agreement
The elements necessary for an enforceable settlement agreement are established by the legal principles applicable to contracts generally. (Gorman v. Holte (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 984, 988.) The basic requirements for an enforceable contract are (1) parties capable of contracting, (2) the consent of those parties, (3) a lawful object, and (4) adequate consideration. (Civ. Code, § 1550.) The consent of the parties to a contract must be free, mutual, and communicated by each to the other. (Civ. Code, § 1565; see Civ. Code, § 1581 [communication of consent].)
Mutual consent is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties—that is, the reasonable meaning of the words of the settlement agreement, not their unexpressed intentions or understandings. (Iqbal v. Ziadeh (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1, 10 [meaning of "affiliate" in general release contained in a settlement agreement] (Iqbal); see Alexander v. Codemasters Group Limited (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 129, 141 [employment agreement] (Codemasters).) The concept of mutual consent covers a variety of specific issues. The two specific issues involving mutual consent relevant to this appeal are (1) whether the parties consented to all material settlement terms and (2) whether the language used for those terms was sufficiently certain.
3. Mutual Consent: Material Terms
Determining whether an omitted term is material is relevant to the agreement's enforceability. "A settlement is enforceable under section 664.6 only if the parties agreed to all material settlement terms." (Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182; cf. Peterson Development Co. v. Torrey Pines Bank (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 103, 115 [loan commitment letter is not a binding contract unless it contains all material terms of the loan].) Under this principle, if a material term is missing, the trial court may not supply that term to complete the settlement agreement and render it enforceable. (Leeman v. Adams Extract & Spice, LLC (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1374.)
In the context of mutual consent, the words "material" and "essential" mean the same thing. A standard legal dictionary lists "essential" and "significant" as synonyms of "material." (Black's Law Dict. (9th ed. 2009) p. 1066, col. 1.) Thus, the following explanation of when a term is "essential" also defines when a term is "material." "Whether a term is 'essential' depends on its relative importance to the parties and whether its absence would make enforcing the remainder of the contract unfair to either party." (Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1256, fn. 3 (Copeland).)
4. Mutual Consent: Certainty
In addition to the requirement that the parties agree upon (i.e., mutually consent to) all material terms, the formation of an enforceable agreement also requires the agreed-upon terms to be sufficiently definite that the performance promised is reasonably certain. (Codemasters, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 141 [formation of a contract requires certainty]; 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Contracts, § 137 [requirement of certainty].) "[R]easonably certain" means the terms provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an adequate remedy. (Codemasters, supra, at p. 141.) Restated from the opposite perspective, where the terms are so uncertain and indefinite that the intention of the parties as to material particulars cannot be ascertained, the agreement is not enforceable. (Robinson & Wilson, Inc. v. Stone (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 396, 407 [construction contract, as interpreted by the trier of fact, was not enforceable because it was indefinite and uncertain as to scope of the work contemplated in certain portions of the building; no plans for the design of the interior of those portions existed].) By comparison, an agreement definite in its essential elements is enforceable despite uncertainty in some minor, nonessential detail. (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Contracts, § 146.)
The questions of whether an agreement contains all of the material terms and whether the language that constitutes the terms of the agreement is reasonably certain sometimes are intertwined. (See Codemasters, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 141-142.) For instance, a settlement agreement might lack a material term due to uncertainty about that term. (Ronin v. Lerner (Tex.Ct.App. 1999) 7 S.W.3d 883, 888.) Also, a contract that leaves an essential element for future agreement usually is held fatally uncertain and, thus, unenforceable. (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Contracts, § 147.) However, California law recognizes an exception to this principle. When the agreement specifies an objective method for ascertaining the material term left for future determination, such as the purchase price, the contract is not construed as too indefinite to be enforced. (Larwin-Southern California, Inc. v. JGB Investment Co. (1979) 101 Cal.App.3d 626, 643.)
B. Standard of Review
1. General Principles
When a motion brought under section 664.6 has been granted, the trial court's findings of fact are subject to appellate review under the substantial evidence standard and the trial court's resolution of questions of law are subject to independent (i.e., de novo) review. (Burckhard v. Del Monte Corp. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1912, 1916.) When applying the substantial evidence standard of review, appellate courts resolve all evidentiary conflicts and draw all reasonable inferences to support (1) the trial court's finding that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement agreement and (2) the court's order enforcing that agreement. (Osumi, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1360.)
2. Identifying Questions of Fact and Questions of Law
Determining which standard of review to apply requires an appellate court to identify whether a particular issue poses a question of law or a question of fact. Under California law, whether a particular term is material (i.e., essential) depends on its relative importance, which may turn in part on the intention of the parties. (Coleman Engineering Co. v. North American Aviation, Inc. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 396, 405; Copeland, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1256; see Civ. Code, § 1636 [mutual intention of parties at time of contracting].) Mutual intent is a factual question. (Codemasters, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 141.) Therefore, in the context of this case, we conclude the trial court's determination that a particular term is (or is not) a material term of the settlement is a finding of fact and subject to review under the substantial evidence rule.
In comparison, the question of whether the language in a written agreement is reasonably certain requires an examination of both (1) the parties' mutual intention to form an enforceable settlement agreement and (2) the court's ability to determine the existence of a breach of the agreed-upon term and to provide an adequate remedy. (Codemasters, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 141-142.) The first inquiry generally presents a question of fact and the second inquiry is primarily a question of law. (Ibid.) The factual aspects of mutual intention relating to materiality and certainty can be described as a meeting of the minds, though whether the meeting occurred is judged under an objective standard. (See Scott v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 454, 467 [meeting of the minds upon the essential features is a requisite to enforceability].)
C. John's Contentions as to Trial Court Error
John is representing himself in this appeal and his opening brief lists four issues challenging the trial court's decision to enforce the settlement agreement pursuant to section 664.6. Those questions involve the concept of mutual consent, whether particular terms of the agreement were material, and whether the language of the agreement was sufficiently certain. The positions John has taken on these issues may have some internal inconsistencies.
The first issue listed by John is whether the settlement agreement "is void, incomplete and/or unenforceable absent the required 'mutual release' of all known claims and ... a waiver of Civ. Code §1542 of unknown claims." Second, John contends the settlement terms are vague, ambiguous and there was no meeting of the minds on all material terms. Third, John asks "whether the mediator acting as binding arbitrator can determine any statement's language for a mutual release of all claims known and unknown prepared by the former attorneys (Browns and Logoluso) in part, because the parties did not have knowledge of the language of Civ. Code §1542 provisions and their rights under the statute prior to signing in 2010." Fourth, John contends the trial court lacked authority under section 664.6 to issue a judgment that failed to state all the terms of the settlement yet to be performed and the party who was to perform each such term.
We begin our analysis by addressing the points John has raised about the settlement agreement's provision for a mutual release of all claims and for a waiver of the protections relating to unknown claims provided by Civil Code section 1542. II. EXECUTION OF A MUTUAL RELEASE AND WAIVER
A. Provision in the Settlement Agreement
The first paragraph on the third page of the settlement agreement provided for a mutual release of claims by stating:
"All parties further agree to execute a standard mutual release of all claims which will contain a waiver of the provisions of California Civil Code Section 1542 which will be prepared by counsel. The parties through their counsel of record hereby agree that any dispute concerning the content or language of the release of all claims to be signed by the Plaintiff will be resolved by submission of the dispute to the mediator, who shall act as binding arbitrator for said dispute."
B. General Releases and Civil Code Section 1542
We interpret this provision as calling for a general mutual release, not a release limited to specific disputes or injuries. The ordinary meaning of the word "'all'" is "'the whole of,'" "'the greatest quantity'" or "'every member or individual component thereof.'" (City of Ukiah v. Board of Trustees (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 344, 347 [drafter could not have chosen a more inclusive word].) As a result of the settlement agreement's use of the terms "[a]ll parties" and "all claims," the literal meaning of that provision calls for a general release. Also, the language does not attempt to limit the scope of the release in any way. For example, the language does not state only particular disputes, injuries or parties are released.
A general release of claims is used to resolve and bring finality to the parties' dispute by reducing or eliminating the possibility of future disputes and allowing the parties to "buy peace" to reduce litigation expenses. (Anderson, Please Release Me, Let Me Go! Releases of Unknown Claims in the Penumbra of California Civil Code Section 1542 (2008) 9 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 1, 3 (Please Release Me).) The Legislature addressed the possibility that a general release might be broader than the releasing party intended by enacting Civil Code section 1542, which provides in full:
"A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or her must have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor."
The Legislature intended Civil Code section 1542 "to preclude the application of a [general] release to unknown claims in the absence of a showing, apart from the words of the release of an intent to include such claims." (Casey v. Proctor (1963) 59 Cal.2d 97, 109.) This statutory limitation on general releases is not absolute; litigants are permitted to relinquish or waive the protections of Civil Code section 1542 and release unknown claims. (Ibid.; Leaf v. City of San Mateo (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 398, 411 (Leaf).) Stated another way, the freedom of contract in California extends to the release of unknown claims.
The question of whether the releaser actually intended to waive the protection of Civil Code section 1542 and discharge unknown claims ultimately is a question of fact. (Leaf, supra, 104 Cal.App.3d at p. 411.) When parties intend to release unknown claims and waive the protection of Civil Code section 1542, it is a common practice for the release document to quote the statutory text in full and to include an express waiver of its protections. (Please Release Me, supra, 9 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. at p. 17.) The recital of the statutory text is not required, but it may be helpful in establishing the parties' intention. (Ibid.) Conversely, the mere recital that the protection of Civil Code section 1542 is waived, or that the release covers unknown claims, is not controlling. (Leaf, supra, at p. 411.) In short, courts evaluating the scope of a release must look beyond the text of the release provision. Our Supreme Court has established the following principle: "If the evidence, independent of the words of the release, indicates that the parties have consciously contracted in reference to unknown claims, the release is, of course, binding." (Casey v. Proctor, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 110, italics added.)
An example of a waiver of the protection of Civil Code section 1542 is provided by a form settlement agreement contained in a secondary authority:
"9. Each party [to this settlement agreement] assumes the risk of any mistake of fact with regard to any of the facts which are now unknown to him, her or it relating thereto. All rights under California Civil Code § 1542 are expressly waived. Section 1542 reads as follows:
"'A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or expect to exist in his favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him must have materially affected his settlement with the debtor.'" (Croskey et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation (The Rutter Group 2016) Form 15:C, p. 15-249.)
Another example of a release of unknown claims and a waiver of the protection of Civil Code section 1542 is contained in the appendix to Marder v. Lopez (9th Cir. 2006) 450 F.3d 445 at pages 454 through 455. That waiver also recited the text of the statute. Although there are many other examples of waivers in published cases and secondary sources, the author of Please Release Me asserts "[t]here is no such thing as a 'standard' waiver." (Please Release Me, supra, 9 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. at p. 5.)
C. Trial Court's Decision
The trial court's written decision referred to the principles that (1) a settlement is enforceable under section 664.6 only if the parties agreed to all material terms and (2) a court deciding this and other questions about the enforceability of a settlement agreement may consider the parties' declarations and other evidence. (See Hines v. Lukes, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1182.) The written decision included findings that (1) the settlement was made after the parties attended mediation, where the parties were represented by counsel; (2) the parties and their attorneys signed the settlement agreement; (3) the agreement contained a clause stating it was enforceable under section 664.6; and (4) the agreement contained all of the material terms of the parties' agreement. Based on these findings, the court concluded the settlement agreement was valid and enforceable. The next nine paragraphs of the written decision addressed John's arguments as to why the settlement agreement was not enforceable.
John made the broad contention that the settlement agreement was tentative and lacked material terms necessary to make it full, complete and enforceable. One argument John made to support this contention was that the settlement agreement left certain material issues to be decided at a future date, as demonstrated by the agreement to execute at a later time a mutual release of all claims and a waiver of Civil Code section 1542. The trial court rejected this argument, stating:
"[John] does not point to any evidence that the standard waiver and release contained any important or essential terms that were not already covered by
the rest of the agreement, or that the lack of the release somehow made the rest of the agreement incomplete. Also, the mutual release can still be executed by the parties if necessary. Therefore, [John] has failed to show that the agreement lacks any material terms."
Based on this and other determinations, the trial court concluded the settlement agreement was enforceable under section 664.6. John contends the trial court erred in its determinations regarding the release and the waiver of Civil Code section 1542.
D. Interpreting the Trial Court's Decision
1. Possible Interpretations
The trial court's decision contains some ambiguity. The first sentence quoted above seems to determine that the important matters subject to dispute were "already covered by the rest of the agreement" and, therefore, the release of known claims and the waiver of the statutory protections for unknown claims were not material. However, the second sentence quoted above states the mutual release can still be executed, implying that the mechanism provided in the settlement agreement provided the requisite certainty to allow the enforcement of a material term of the agreement. Rereading the first sentence from this perspective, one interpretation is that everything of importance about the mutual release is already covered by the agreement to execute a standard mutual release in the future and by the mechanism for interpreting that provision if future disputes arise.
Therefore, it is possible to read the trial court's decision to mean the mutual release and the waiver of the protections of Civil Code section 1542 were not material to the parties because all the material disputes were resolved elsewhere in the settlement agreement. A second possible interpretation is that both the mutual release and the waiver relating to unknown claims were material to the extent that they were addressed in the settlement agreement.
A third interpretation falls in between the first two. It concludes the mutual release was a material term to the extent it was addressed in the settlement agreement, but the waiver of the protections for unknown claims provided by Civil Code section 1542 was not material. This third interpretation of the trial court's decision arises because the decision did not treat the mutual release provision exactly the same as the waiver provision. The court's first statement in response to John's argument that certain material issues were left undecided addressed the release and the waiver together: "[John] does not point to any evidence that the standard waiver and release contained any important or essential terms that were not already covered by the rest of the agreement." (Italics added.) The court's second and third statements were limited to the release. The second statement provided that John had not pointed to any evidence "that the lack of the release somehow made the rest of the agreement incomplete." The third statement provided, "Also, the mutual release can still be executed by the parties if necessary." To summarize, the first statement addressed both the mutual release and the waiver, while words used in the second and third statements addressed only the mutual release. This textual difference is the basis for the third interpretation that concludes the waiver was not material, but the mutual release of known claims (which the trial court determined could still be executed) was material.
2. Legal Principles Affecting Our Choice of Interpretations
When an appellate court is reviewing a trial court's decision that can be interpreted in more than one way, the appellate court's choice from among those interpretations is guided by the legal principles of appellate procedure. The most basic rule of appellate procedure is that the trial court's decision is presumed to be correct and the appellant has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Stated another way, the presumption of correctness means appellate courts indulge all intendments and presumptions in support of the trial court's order. (Ibid.) Under the presumption of correctness, if one interpretation of the trial court's decision contains no reversible error and the others contain error, the appellate court is required to presume the trial court meant the interpretation with no error. Thus, we are compelled to reject interpretations that contain error and choose a reasonable interpretation with no error. Consequently, when a trial court's decision is subject to multiple interpretations, an appellant attempting to carry his or her burden of affirmatively demonstrating prejudicial error must show all of the reasonable interpretations are infected by error.
One illustration of an interpretation that is not reasonable arises where the interpretation is based on an implied finding of fact that is not supported by substantial evidence. Such an interpretation is not reasonable under the circumstances and will not be adopted by the appellate court. (E.g., In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133; Madera Oversight Coalition, Inc. v. County of Madera (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 48, 66 [under presumption of correctness, appellate court interprets trial court's decision to include implied findings of fact consistent with its order, provided such findings are supported by substantial evidence].)
3. A Possible Interpretation without Error
As explained below, John has not carried his burden of demonstrating that the third interpretation contains prejudicial error or, alternatively, eliminated that interpretation by showing it is an unreasonable interpretation under the circumstances presented. Accordingly, we reject John's argument that the trial court erred in determining the settlement agreement was complete and should have determined the agreement was incomplete because material terms addressing the mutual release and the waiver of Civil Code section 1542 were left for future agreement.
E. Materiality of the Waiver of Civil Code Section 1542
For purposes of this appeal, we will analyze the mutual general release and the waiver of Civil Code section 1542 as separate terms, starting with the more specific waiver of the statutory protections. The third interpretation described earlier concludes the trial court determined the waiver of the protections of Civil Code section 1542 was not material to the settlement agreement. John disagrees. He argues the third interpretation is wrong because the "waiver of Civil Code Section 1542 is a material term as it goes to the cause of creating and entering the Settlement and/or is the consideration for the agreement."
The first interpretation reaches the same conclusion as to the waiver of the Civil Code section 1542.
1. Challenging a Materiality Finding
The first step in analyzing whether John has carried his burden of affirmatively demonstrating the trial court committed prejudicial error is to identify the type of issue raised and the corresponding standard of review. John's issue involves the materiality of a particular term in the settlement agreement. Under California law, the trial court's determination that a particular term is (or is not) a material term is treated as a finding of fact and subject to review under the substantial evidence rule. (See pt. I.B.2, ante.) Accordingly, the trial court's finding that the waiver of the protections of Civil Code section 1542 was not a material term of the settlement agreement must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. We note that John's arguments on appeal are not tailored to the substantial evidence standard of review in that he has not attempted to demonstrate the absence of substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the waiver of Civil Code section 1542 was not material.
Having identified the substantial evidence test as the applicable standard of review, the second step in analyzing John's argument is to identify the test for materiality. That test will guide our review of the evidence relating to the materiality of the waiver of Civil Code section 1542. As described in part I.B.2, a finding as to the materiality of a particular term is based on the relative importance of the term to the parties at the time of contracting. (See pt. I.B.2, ante.) Accordingly, we must evaluate the evidence that addresses, either directly or circumstantially, the relative importance of the waiver of the protections of Civil Code section 1542 and determine whether a finding that the waiver was relatively unimportant to the parties lacks sufficient evidentiary support.
2. Evidence Relating to the Waiver
John's argument that the waiver provision was material conflicts in some respects with his argument that there was no meeting of the minds as to waiver. In support of the latter argument, John asserted Maria did not understand the reference to "a waiver of the provisions of California Civil Code section 1542" and, in addition, he had no knowledge of that section. John's supplemental declaration dated January 25, 2015, and submitted in opposition to Maria's motion to enforce the settlement stated:
"I will not sign any release at this point in time, because I did not know that my attorney had intended to waive all unknown and unsuspected claims protected under Civil Code 1542, which include all the accounting fraud and conversion that I've discovered since signing the agreement but before any mutual release was prepared."
During her January 12, 2015, deposition, Maria was asked if she recalled the settlement agreement calling for the parties to execute a standard mutual release and waiver pursuant to Civil Code section 1542. Maria answered, "I'm sorry, I don't understand the question." Next, she was asked if she knew what a mutual release was. She answered, "No." Maria was referred to the provision on page three of the settlement agreement stating all parties agreed to execute a standard mutual release of all claims which would contain a waiver of the Civil Code section and then asked whether she ever executed a standard mutual release. Maria responded: "I'm sorry, but I don't understand. I don't understand that particular - particular stuff." Next, Maria was asked if she understood it when she signed the settlement agreement. She answered "No."
Another factor of some relevance to the importance of the waiver provision is its location near the end of the settlement agreement. Its location supports the inference that the provision was boilerplate. When boilerplate is used in an agreement, the question arises about how well the application of the boilerplate's technical aspects were explained to the parties. Here, there is no evidence in the record that the technical aspects of Civil Code section 1542 were explained to the parties or the distinction between known and unknown claims were explained to the parties.
We conclude the evidence in the record—which includes John's supplemental declaration, the deposition testimony of Maria and the text of the settlement agreement—adequately supports the finding that the waiver of Civil Code section 1542 was not a material term of the settlement agreement. It follows that the absence of a final, executed waiver did not render the settlement incomplete and, thus, unenforceable.
Furthermore, this finding is consistent with the absence of evidence showing the resolution of unknown or unsuspected claims (1) was ever discussed among Thomas, Maria and John before or during the mediation; (2) would eliminate risks that concerned the parties; or (3) otherwise was an essential part of the decision-making process that led them to sign the agreement in August 2010.
The trial court's finding as to the materiality of the waiver fits with our Supreme Court's approach to determining the intent of the parties to waive the statutory protections of Civil Code section 1542—that is, their intent to release unknown claims. The determination of intent relating to waiver and unknown claims is subject to a special rule that precludes a trier of fact from relying solely on the language used in the written document. "[T]he evidence, independent of the words of the release, [must] indicate[] that the parties have consciously contracted in reference to unknown claims" before the release of unknown claims (i.e., the waiver of Civil Code section 1542) is binding. (Casey v. Proctor, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 110.) Here, the trial court considered the evidence independent of the words of the settlement agreement and that evidence showed the parties attached no importance to the resolution of unknown claims.
3. John's Specific Argument Relating to Materiality
In closing our discussion of the materiality of the waiver of Civil Code section 1542, we address the specific argument raised by John on that issue. John contended the waiver goes to the cause of creating and entering the settlement and the waiver was consideration for the settlement agreement. This argument, standing alone, does not affirmatively show the trial court committed prejudicial error. Under the legal principles applicable to our review of the trial court's finding, there must be evidence to show the waiver of Civil Code section 1542 (i.e., the release of unknown claims) was relatively important to the parties. In short, John's argument does not identify a legal error and does not establish the trial court erred in evaluating the evidence relating to materiality.
F. Mutual Release
1. Issue Raised by John's Arguments
The third interpretation of the trial court's decision described in part II.D.2, ante, concludes the mutual release was a material term to the extent it was addressed in the settlement agreement. Stated another way, the trial court determined the provision contained all the important (i.e., material) terms relating to the mutual release and those terms were sufficiently certain to implement their agreement about the mutual release.
John has argued the mutual release was a material term, which is consistent with the third interpretation. In this regard, our adoption of the third interpretation is favorable to John's position as to materiality. Accordingly, we need not address whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding as to the materiality of the mutual release.
We note that if we had adopted the first interpretation, which concludes neither the mutual release nor the waiver were material, the relevant question would be whether substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding of fact that the mutual release of known claims was not material. In that situation, we would be required to address the argument that the mutual release of known claims was redundant to the settlement agreements other provisions, which resolved all of the important (i.e., material) claims.
John's claim of error challenges the aspect of the third interpretation that involves the provisions addressing the future execution of the release and the resolution of disputes about the content and language of the release. In John's view, those provisions are too indefinite or uncertain to be enforceable. Thus, John disagrees with the trial court's statement that "the mutual release can still be executed by the parties if necessary."
2. Provision Implementing the Mutual Release
One reason John views the provisions for implementing the mutual release as incomplete and uncertain involves the text of the settlement agreement referring to the content or language of the release to be signed by "Plaintiff." John interprets this text to mean that he was not required to sign the mutual release. John appears to argue the absence of a requirement that he sign the mutual release would render that collateral document (1) incomplete and (2) a document to which he did not consent. We disagree with John's interpretation of the text addressing the execution of a mutual release.
First, the initial sentence of the relevant paragraph clearly states all parties agree to execute a standard mutual release of all claims. The reference to all parties includes John. Therefore, John has agreed to "execute a standard mutual release of all claims."
Second, the inclusion of the prepositional phrases "to be signed by the Plaintiff" in the second sentence of the provision does not undo the agreement that all parties would execute a standard mutual release of all claims. The release to be signed by "the Plaintiff" is the same release that would be signed by John. Interpreting the reference to a release "to be signed by the Plaintiff" to mean the release to be signed by all parties does not create an irreconcilable conflict in the text. (See Civ. Code, §§ 1643, 1652.) The conflict would have been irreconcilable if the text referred to a release "to be signed by the Plaintiff only."
Third, the phrase "a standard mutual release" clearly refers to a single document with a mutual release. To be mutual, that document must provide for both sides giving up something, which necessarily implies the document will be signed by both sides (i.e., all parties). Consequently, we reject John's interpretation about who is required to sign the mutual release.
Another reason John views the provisions for implementing the mutual release as unenforceable is his interpretation of the language of the settlement agreement to deny him the right to dispute any proposed language addressing (1) what he was to release and (2) the rights under Civil Code section 1542 he was to waive. First, this interpretation is based in part on John's view that he would not be a signatory to the release, a view which we have rejected. Second, we interpret the language of the release and waiver provision to allow "any dispute concerning the content or language of the release" raised by John to be presented and resolved by the mediator. The provision's text plainly refers to "any dispute" concerning the content or language of the release. The word "any" is expansive. (Zabrucky v. McAdams (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 618, 628 [the word "any" means "of whatever kind" or "without restriction"].) Therefore, the plain meaning of the phrase "any dispute" includes disputes raised by any party to the release and, thus, includes disputes raised by John. In summary, a proper interpretation of the paragraph addressing the mutual release of claims does not deprive John of the ability to dispute the contents of the release.
John's arguments might imply that, in the event of a dispute, the mechanism for implementing the mutual release is too uncertain or indefinite to be enforceable. Under California law, when the agreement specifies an objective method for ascertaining the material term left for future determination, the contract is not construed as too indefinite to be enforced. (Larwin-Southern California, Inc. v. JGB Investment Co., supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 643.) We conclude the agreement has specified an objective method for resolving disputes about the contents of a future mutual release. Authorizing the mediator to act as a binding arbitrator to resolve any dispute concerning the content or language of the mutual release provides a sufficiently certain mechanism for resolving disputes. Therefore, it is enforceable.
G. Outline or Final Agreement
John contends he understood the settlement agreement was just an outline of terms and not a final agreement. We reject this argument because the trial court's finding that the agreement was intended to be final is supported by substantial evidence.
The settlement agreement contains provisions that are relevant to whether the parties intended that document to be (1) a preliminary outline or (2) a final document. The second paragraph of the agreement states: "The parties, having reached an agreement to settle their claims at the mediation hearing now wish to have the terms of said settlements memorialized in this document." The second to last paragraph of the agreement begins: "All parties and their counsel of record hereby agree that the terms of this settlement are enforceable under the provisions of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6." The last paragraph of the agreement states: "If either party is required to commence any proceeding or legal action [to] enforce or interpret any term, covenant or condition of this Settlement Agreement, the prevailing party in such proceeding or action shall be entitled to recover from the other party its reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses."
Under California law, the mutual consent or intention of the parties to a contract generally is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties. (Codemasters, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 141; see Civ. Code, §§ 1565, 1581 [communication of consent].) The provisions of the settlement agreement quoted in the previous paragraph were communicated among the parties and, considered from an objective point of view, demonstrate the settlement agreement was a final agreement, not a preliminary outline.
As to John's statement about his personal understanding, his declaration does not show his understanding was communicated to the other side before the settlement agreement was signed by them. This understanding plainly contradicts the express terms of the agreement. Under California law, the undisclosed subjective intent or expectation of a party to the contract is irrelevant to determining the meaning of the language communicated in the document signed by the parties. (Iqbal, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 8 [words of the contract are evidence of the objective intent]; Codemasters, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 141.) Therefore, we conclude the trial court's finding that the settlement agreement was a final agreement and not a preliminary outline is supported by substantial evidence and John's declaration is insufficient to compel a contrary finding. III. PARTITION AND PARCEL SIZE
A. Provision in the Settlement Agreement
The settlement agreement addresses the division of the 100 acres as follows:
"Regarding the 100 acres, John is to receive approximately 20 acres described as commencing at Temperance and the North side of the existing driveway straight down going West to the canal in the back of the property (on John's side of the driveway). The parties agree to a recorded easement to the use of the existing driveway for both parcels. Thomas and Maria will maintain the easement/driveway at current levels or improve at their sole cost. If Thomas and Maria gate the driveway near their palm tree operation, John will be provided a key and access to the gate and driveway.
"The balance of the remaining acreage is to be divided as follows: Thomas and Maria shall receive an equal amount of acreage right next to John's. Regarding the remaining approximate 60 acres, the parties agree to each retain the services of [a] licensed appraiser who will then select a third licensed appraiser to render a value. Thomas and Maria have the first right of refusal to buy out John's one-half interest in the remaining realty within 60 days of the issuance of the appraisal. The appraiser will be paid for by Thomas and Maria. Parties agree to secure the services of the appraisers within 60 days of this agreement."
The settlement agreement also contains terms about John providing financing if the option to purchase the remaining acreage was exercised. In addition, it recognizes Thomas and Maria as the owners of palm trees situated on land to be allocated to John. The agreement provides Thomas and Maria with the right to lease the two to three acres of John's land containing the palm trees so that they could remove and sell the trees as part of their nursery business.
B. Contentions of the Parties
John contends the trial court erred in determining his intended parcel could be significantly larger than the 20 acres stated in the settlement agreement. John argues the surveyor determined it was impossible to partition the 100 acres as proposed because of where the driveway is. If the boundary is drawn down the driveway, the proposed parcel would be 28.5 acres, which John contends is substantially larger than the 20 acres intended. Conversely, if the 20-acre size is implemented, the resulting lot line would cut off John's yard area and interfere with his irrigation systems. In either situation, John contends he would be prejudiced. In his view, receiving more land in the initial parcel would harm his interest by providing him less remaining acreage (or less money from the sale of the remaining acreage). John also contends the trial court committed an additional error because the word "approximately" in the phrase "approximately 20 acres" lacks the required certainty to be enforceable.
Maria's appellate brief does not respond directly to John's contentions about the impossibility of partitioning the 100 acres as agreed. Instead, she makes the general argument that the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence.
C. Mutual Intention Regarding John's Parcel
We conclude the trial court did not err in determining the settlement agreement was enforceable as to the partition of the 100 acres and the agreement was sufficiently certain as to the boundaries of the parcel each side was to receive.
1. Meaning of "Approximately"
We address John's argument about the uncertainty in the phrase "approximately 20 acres" first because the resolution of that argument affects our analysis of John's other contentions. John has argued that the agreed-upon terms are impossible to perform and has suggested that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the provisions defining the size of John's parcel such that the mutual intent of the parties cannot be determined and implemented.
John relies on a dictionary definition stating "approximate" means nearly exact or nearly identical. He asserts the trial court did not even attempt to establish what "approximately" meant to John. As John's uncommunicated subjective intention or understanding is not relevant to an analysis of the meaning of a contract, we interpret this argument as referring to the mutual intention of the parties determined by applying an objective standard to the language of the agreement. (Iqbal, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 8; see Civ. Code, §§ 1565, 1581 [communication of consent].)
The California Supreme Court has recognized the following principles relating to the use of dictionary definitions. "Courts frequently consult dictionaries to determine the usual meaning of words." (In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, 16.) "When attempting to ascertain the ordinary, usual meaning of a word, courts appropriately refer to the dictionary definition of that word." (Wasatch Property Management v. Degrate (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1111, 1121-1122.) However, the interpretation of contracts and statutes involves more than simply stitching together dictionary definitions. (Kopp v. Fair Pol. Practices Com. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 607, 673.)
The word "approximately" ordinarily is defined as "'very nearly, but not absolutely'" and is synonymous with "'about.'" (See Ross v. Keaton Tire & Rubber Co. (1922) 57 Cal.App. 50, 52.) It is used in the sense of an estimate meaning about or near the amount specified. (Ibid.) The word "approximately" is not commonly understood as identifying a mathematically precise range of amounts. For instance, it does not mean within 10 percent of the amount specified. Based on the ordinary definition of "approximately," we conclude the phrase "approximately 20 acres" means very nearly or about 20 acres and note this meaning provides flexibility, not precision.
Restating the meaning of "approximately" using different words is not particularly difficult because we did not have to choose among a variety of definitions with different meanings. Rather, the difficulty arises in applying that definition of "approximately" to the facts of this case. For example, the issue raised by the application of the phrase "approximately 20 acres" to the facts presented could be conceptualized as drawing a line between the amounts of land that are "about" 20 acres and larger amounts of land that are not "about" 20 acres. The exact amount defining such a line is not clear and, therefore, the phrase "approximately 20 acres," standing alone, could be regarded as ambiguous in the context of the facts presented. Mere ambiguity, however, does not automatically mean the contract is uncertain or indefinite to the extent that the contract is rendered unenforceable. Contractual ambiguities may be resolved by the court—sometimes in its capacity as the decider of questions of law and sometimes in the capacity of trier of fact—and the contract enforced. (E.g, Scheenstra, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at pp. 389-396.)
In comparison, restating the meaning of the term "good faith" is less straightforward because it can be defined in three different ways. The California Supreme Court has recognized the term can refer to (1) a subjective state of mind equated with honesty and sincerity, (2) an objective standard requiring a reasonable basis, or (3) a standard that requires both a subjective and an objective component to be met. (Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1113, 1120.)
Sometimes it is useful to break contractual interpretation into two steps: (1) the determination of the meaning of the particular term, which involves restating the term using other words, and (2) the application of that meaning to the fact pattern presented. (See Scheenstra v. California Dairies, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 370, 390-391 (Scheenstra).)
2. Resolving the Ambiguity Involving John's Parcel
The next question is whether the application of the provision defining the parcel John was to receive from the 100 acres is fraught with so much uncertainty that the settlement agreement is rendered unenforceable. Under applicable law, the settlement agreement is enforceable if the difficulty in applying the provision can be resolved in a way that implements the objectively reasonable expectations of the parties. (See Codemasters, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 141 [objective standard]; Merced County Sheriff's Employee's Assn. v. County of Merced (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 662, 670 [under California contract law, a party is responsible for the objectively reasonable expectations created by the words and actions communicated to the other party].)
Our application of the contractual language addressing the size of John's parcel is guided by the general principles of contract interpretation. Among other things, those principles favor interpretations that render contract provisions valid and operative rather than meaningless and unenforceable. (Civ. Code, § 1643) Also, courts are directed to interpret the instrument as a whole, rather than determining the meaning of language in isolation. (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1265; Iqbal, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 10.) Accordingly, we will not determine how to apply the phrase "approximately 20 acres" in isolation, but will take account of (1) the provision stating John was to receive a parcel "commencing at Temperance and the North side of the existing driveway straight down going West to the canal in the back of the property (on John's side of the driveway)" and (2) the other language of the settlement agreement. The quoted text sets forth a method for determining the boundaries of John's parcel, which parcel would contain all of the land on the north side of the existing driveway between Temperance Avenue (the eastern boundary) and the canal (the western boundary) - land that amounts to about 28.5 acres.
The application of (1) the estimate of approximately 20 acres and (2) the method for physically locating the parcel's boundaries presents the following question. Can the two clauses be harmonized or, alternatively, do they create a conflict showing the parties never achieved a meeting of the minds about the size or extent of John's parcel? One way to harmonize the 20-acre estimate with the boundary method is to treat one as dominant (i.e., controlling) and the other as subordinate. In this case, conflicting inferences about dominance can be drawn from the language used in the agreement and the circumstances that surround the making of the agreement. (Cf. Iqbal, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 12 [specific provisions of settlement agreement control over inconsistent general terms]; § 1859.)
Regardless of whether the choice among the conflicting inferences is classified as a question of fact or a question of law, we conclude the trial court correctly decided controlling weight should be given to the method for dividing the property and not the estimate of the size of John's parcel. Giving precedence to the method is objectively reasonable in the circumstances because it fulfills the practical considerations of providing John with all of his yard and the irrigations systems. In addition, the method is not inherently flexible, while the phrase "approximately 20 acres" allows flexibility in the size of the parcel John ultimately would receive. Consequently, the trial court reasonably could determine the method for determining the boundaries of John's parcel was more important than the 20-acre estimate in defining the intentions of the parties and, therefore, that provision was to take precedence over the 20-acre estimate. Stated another way, the method can be used to identify how much flexibility the parties intended by their use of the phrase "approximately 20 acres."
In summary, the application of the method for determining the boundaries of John's parcel creates a parcel of 28.5 acres, which is "approximately 20-acres" in the context of this case. Therefore, the provisions are not in conflict and they are sufficiently definite to be enforceable.
Furthermore, John's assertions about his subjective understanding, even if treated as credible, do not provide relevant evidence contradicting this interpretation and application of the provisions describing the parcel John was to receive. Uncommunicated subjective intentions are irrelevant when interpreting a contract. (Iqbal, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 8.)
As to John's argument that this interpretation and application of the settlement agreement results in prejudice to him, we conclude the trial court's rejection of this argument is supported by substantial evidence. Whether or not John's initial parcel is 20 acres or 28.5 acres, he will receive a combination of half the land and half the proceeds generated by any sale of the portion not allocated to him and Maria. Thus, the reduction in the sale proceeds is offset by the value of the larger initial parcel received by John.
D. Justness of Order and Public Policy
John contends the trial court lacked the authority to issue an order enforcing the settlement agreement under section 664.6 and the related judgment because the order and judgment were unjust and against public policy. He argues the order and judgment denied his right to be bound only by settlement terms that were mutually consented to, agreed upon and capable of being carried out. We reject this contention because the trial court did not create new terms of settlement. Rather, it correctly interpreted the settlement agreement in an objectively reasonable manner and determined that interpretation was enforceable.
John also contends the trial court was required (1) to ask the parties what they intended and (2) to accept the offered surveyor's proposed parcel map because of ambiguity in the terms of the settlement agreement and the parties' dispute about the meaning of the agreement's terms. Maria argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it chose to resolve the motion based on the declarations and exhibits presented and not hear oral testimony. California Rules of Court, rule 3.1306 addresses the presentation of evidence at a hearing on a noticed motion. Subdivision (a) of the rule provides: "Evidence received at a law and motion hearing must be by declaration or request for judicial notice without testimony or cross-examination, unless the court orders otherwise for good cause shown." Subdivision (b) of the rule sets forth the procedure to be followed by a party seeking permission to introduce oral evidence, which includes the filing of a written statement describing "the nature and extent of the evidence proposed to be introduced and a reasonable time estimate for the hearing." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1306(b).) Here, John has not shown he complied with the rule and, therefore, has not shown the trial court abused its discretionary authority regarding the presentation of oral testimony at a motion hearing. IV. SCOPE OF THE JUDGMENT
A. Contentions
John contends the trial court's judgment was erroneous because it failed to identify (1) all the settlement terms yet to be performed and (2) the party that was to perform those terms. In addition, John asserts the parties did not ask the trial court to retain jurisdiction under section 664.6 to make further determinations and enforce the judgment, and "that cannot happen now because it is reserved only if requested before judgment."
B. Enforceable Agreement
The trial court gave Maria a judgment against John "pursuant to the terms set out in the written settlement agreement dated August 24, 2010, a copy of which is Attached hereto as Exhibit 'A' and incorporated herein by reference." This portion of the judgment comports with section 664.6, which provides that the court "may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement." The statute does not require the judgment to do more—such as identify particular provisions that have yet to be performed and direct the obligated party to perform those provisions. Consequently, insofar as it goes, the judgment complies with section 664.6.
The enforcement of particular provisions of a settlement agreement is addressed in the last sentence of section 664.6, which provides: "If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement." Here, we disagree with John's assertion that the parties made no such request. The settlement agreement itself, which was incorporated into the judgment, contained a provision describing the enforcement of the settlement agreement and the award of attorney fees to the party who prevails in any proceeding to enforce any term. Although the judgment and attached settlement agreement do not use the phrase "retain jurisdiction," we interpret the judgment and its attachment to mean the parties have requested the court to retain jurisdiction over them for purposes of enforcing the settlement agreement until its terms have been performed in full. It follows that, if a party refuses to perform an obligation under the settlement agreement after the judgment has become final, then the other party may come before the superior court and obtain an order enforcing that obligation. Consequently, we conclude John's arguments about purported deficiencies in the judgment do not identify reversible error. The trial court has the authority to enforce the terms of the agreement in subsequent proceedings.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.
/s/_________
FRANSON, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
HILL, P.J. /s/_________
LEVY, J.