Opinion
No. 98 C 4293
JUNE 28, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On March 2, 2001, we entered judgment in favor of defendants on its motion for summary judgment with regard to plaintiffs first patent infringement claim (Patent No. 4,894,476) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. (Rule) 54(b). On March 16, 2001, plaintiff filed a timely Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend that judgment. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs motion is granted.
Legal Standard
This Court's orders are not "mere first drafts, subject to revision and reconsideration at a litigant's pleasure." Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., Inc., 123 F.R.D. 282, 288 (N.D. Ill. 1985). Thus, motions to reconsider are rarely appropriate. They should only be presented when the law or facts change significantly after the issue is presented to the Court, the Court has "patently misunderstood a party," has "made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented" to it, or has "made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension." Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990) (quotingAbove The Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannon Roofing Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)). Such motions do not allow "a party to undo its own procedural failures [or] to introduce new evidence or advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to the judgment." Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
Discussion
On October 5, 2000, defendant moved for summary judgment with regard to plaintiffs first patent infringement claim. In response, plaintiff agreed that because plaintiff could not get the discovery necessary to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, entry of summary judgment was appropriate. In reply, defendant requested that we enter judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). We did so on March 2, 2001, stating:
Because plaintiff has not responded to defendants motion for summary judgment with facts sufficient to prevent the entry of summary judgment, and because plaintiff agrees that summary judgment in favor of defendants is appropriate, we grant defendants' motion for summary judgment. Moreover, because there is no just reason for delay or appeal of such order, it is hereby ordered that defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiffs patent infringement claim (Patent No. 4, 894, 476) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). This is a final and appealable order.
Our decision to grant defendants request for a Rule 54(b) certification was premised on the fact that plaintiff agreed that summary judgment was appropriate, plaintiff failed to present any evidence in response to defendants motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff passed up the opportunity to object to defendants request for a Rule 54(b) certification. However, in hindsight, it is clear that we "patently misunderstood the parties" insofar as we believed they both agreed that a Rule 54(b) certification was desired. Bank of Waunakee, 906 F.2d at 1191. Therefore, plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion is appropriate. Upon reconsideration, we vacate our March 2, 2001, Order dismissing plaintiffs first patent infringement claim pursuant to Rule 54(b). A brief explanation of why we chose to alter our earlier judgment follows.
Plaintiff has submitted several arguments in support of its contention that our Rule 54(b) certification was inappropriate. For the most part, plaintiffs positions are untenable. First, plaintiffs assertion that Rule 54(b) certification is reserved for the "infrequent harsh case" results from plaintiffs misinterpretation of the Supreme Court's holding inCurtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979). As defendants point out, Curtiss-Wright, held that "[h]owever accurate it may be as a description of cases qualifying for Rule 54(b) treatment, the phrase "infrequent harsh case" in isolation is neither workable nor entirely reliable. . . ." Id. Second, plaintiffs contention that a delay in final judgment will preserve judicial administrative interests is likewise meritless. Considering the fact that plaintiff cannot in good faith appeal the entry of summary judgment, there is no danger of piecemeal litigation. Finally, and most troublesome, is plaintiffs basis for arguing that the consequences of entering final judgment weigh heavily against entering judgment now. The proffered basis for plaintiffs contention is that Purepac, who is one of the defendants in the New Jersey lawsuit, may lose some of its exclusivity rights if judgment were entered now. Plaintiffs assertion that it has Purepac's best interest at heart is not very convincing. After ball, plaintiff is suing Purepac for patent infringement. It is clear that the catalyst behind plaintiffs desire to prolong the entry of final judgment is so that plaintiff can preserve its monopoly in the marketplace for as long as possible.
Despite our disagreement with plaintiffs arguments, we find that the entry of a Rule 54(b) was inappropriate. At first glance, the language of Rule 54(b) suggests that it would apply to a wide array of cases. In fact, if our inquiry were really only limited to determining whether there was "no just reason for delay," Rule 54(b) would apply to this case. However, the courts have interpreted Rule 54(b) much narrower. For instance, the Seventh Circuit has held that a district judge ordinarily should not enter a Rule 54(b) certification unless the losing party requests it. Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Daniels, 763 F.2d 286, 291 (7th Cir. 1985). In addition, "[t]he only purpose of Rule 54(b) is to render "final" for purposes of appellate review a discrete part of a case that can and should stand on its own immediately." Carver v. Condie, 169 F.3d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 1999). Considering the Seventh Circuit's narrow interpretation of Rule 54(b), it seems as though we must not only make an "express determination that there is no just reason for delay," we must find a reason to enter judgment now, e.g., the losing party desires to appeal immediately, or certification would confine the remaining claims. Entering judgment now would do nothing to advance the remaining patent infringement claim. Therefore, we vacate our March 2, 2001 Order dismissing plaintiffs first patent infringement claim pursuant to Rule 54(b). The first patent infringement claim is dismissed pursuant to Rule 56.