Opinion
Case No. 1:06-CV-555.
May 1, 2008
ORDER
This matter came before the Court from January 28, 2008 to February 6, 2008 for a jury trial on Plaintiff Jamahl Ware's claims for disability discrimination against Defendant Veterans Security Patrol Company ("Veterans") filed pursuant to the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Ohio Civil Rights Act. Veterans moved for judgment as a matter of law on all of Plaintiff's claims at the end of his case-in-chief and again at the close of all evidence. Plaintiff moved for judgment as a matter of law on his claims at the close of evidence as well. The Court took each of the motions under submission. Doc. Nos. 52 53.
The jury returned a partial verdict finding that Plaintiff had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Veterans discriminated against him solely because of his disability. Accordingly, the jury entered a verdict in favor of Veterans on Plaintiff's Americans With Disabilities Act claim. Doc. No. 62. With regard to Plaintiff's claim under the Ohio Civil Rights Act, however, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to whether Plaintiff's disability played at least a part in Veterans' decision not to hire him. The Court accepted the partial verdict and advised the parties that it would subsequently issue a ruling on the parties' motions for judgment as a matter of law.
As indicated, the jury was able to reach a verdict on Plaintiff's Americans With Disabilities Act claim. Therefore, the parties' respective motions for judgment as a matter of law as to that claim are MOOT.
Judgment as a matter of law is proper "[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). On state law claims, when a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law is based on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court applies the standard of review used by the courts of the state whose substantive law governs the action. Morales v. American Honda Motor Co., 151 F.3d 500, 506 (6th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, Ohio law applies to the motions concerning Plaintiff's Ohio Civil Rights Act claim. Under Ohio law, "[t]he test for granting a directed verdict or a judgment n.o.v. is whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the evidence is construed most strongly in favor of the nonmovant." Sanek v. Duracote Corp., 539 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (Ohio 1989). Such a motion will be granted only if, after considering the evidence in this light, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper verdict. Constr. Interior Sys., Inc. v. Marriott Family Rest., Inc., 984 F.2d 749, 753 (6th Cir. 1993).
The evidence adduced at trial was substantially the same as the evidence presented at the summary judgment stage of the case. The Court, therefore, will not recapitulate the entirety of the record at this time. Nevertheless, this does lead to the conclusion that both parties' motions on the issue of liability must be denied.
This was a circumstantial evidence case. Construed most favorably to Plaintiff, the evidence established a prima facie case of disability discrimination. The main issue with regard to the prima facie case was whether Plaintiff actually applied for a security guard position. As was the case at summary judgment, however, Plaintiff's application was at least ambiguous as to the position he had applied for and he presented evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Veterans actually understood that he was applying for a security guard position. For instance, there was evidence that Veterans treated Plaintiff like every other security guard applicant at the time he submitted his job application. Veterans also attempted to establish that Plaintiff's physical limitations disqualified him from working as a security guard, but its own witness, Patrick Navin, testified unequivocally that there were jobs that Plaintiff could perform even though he is confined to a wheelchair.
Veterans did articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring Plaintiff — that his application was placed in the stack of other applications and never came to light when Veterans was filling security guard vacancies. Veterans' explanation for not hiring Plaintiff largely established a credibility issue and for that reason, Plaintiff's motion for a judgment of a matter of law on the issue of liability must be denied. In other words, a jury could believe Veterans' explanation and, consequently, it would not be liable for discrimination. Surry v. Cuyahoga Comm. College 778 N.E.2d 91, 96 (Ohio Ct.App. 2002) ("The employee's burden is to prove that the employer's reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason for the discharge.").
Finally, again construing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there was evidence from a which a reasonable juror could conclude that Veterans' reason was false and that discrimination played a part in the decision not to hire Plaintiff. First, Veterans could only speculate that Plaintiff's application was lost in the stack of applicants because the person in charge of screening applications at the relevant times in the case, Shannon Jackson, no longer worked for Veterans and could not be located to provide evidence. Thus, Veterans could not account for the possibility that Jackson may have purposefully skipped over Plaintiff's application when she was screening applications to fill vacancies. There was evidence that she wrote "wheelchair" on Plaintiff's application and Plaintiff's testimony, construed in his favor, showed that Jackson was not truthful with him when he followed up on the status of his application. A juror could also form "a suspicion of mendacity,"Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993), concerning Veterans' explanation of its hiring process. For instance, throughout the trial Veterans rather disingenuously suggested that no work was available unless Plaintiff happened to call at the exact moment when positions were being filled. The record at trial, however, showed that at the relevant times in the case, Veterans was hiring new security guards every week and that an applicant was not actually hired until the weekly orientation session was completed each Thursday. There was also evidence that another applicant, McGill, was hired "on the spot" and apparently was not required to even attend the orientation session. Nevertheless, contrary to Veterans' assertions at trial, the evidence showed that there was continual turnover and that there were open positions to be filled every week. Therefore, a juror could reasonably reject Veterans' explanation for not hiring Plaintiff and could conclude that discrimination played a part in the decision not to hire him. Accordingly, Veterans is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability for disability discrimination.
Veterans also moved for judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages for emotional distress. Although Plaintiff's distress caused by Veterans' alleged discrimination was close to de minimis it is not altogether uncompensable. Rodgers v. Fisher Body Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 739 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1984), cited by Veterans at trial, does not stand for the proposition that testimony such as Plaintiff's will not support any award of compensatory damages. Rather, the Court held only that the plaintiff's slight emotional distress was insufficient to justify the "sizeable" damages awarded by the jury for mental harm. Id. at 1108. Accordingly, Veterans' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of Plaintiff's compensatory damages is not well-taken.
Finally, the Court does find that Veterans' motion for judgment as a matter of law should be granted on the issue of punitive damages. As the Court instructed the jury, in order to recover punitive damages under the Ohio Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff must demonstrate "actual malice" by clear and convincing evidence. "Actual malice" is: (1) that state of mind under which a person's conduct is characterized by hatred, ill will or a spirit of revenge, or (2) a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of causing substantial harm. Plaintiff did not present any evidence of hatred or ill will on the part of Veterans. For instance, there was no evidence that anyone made discriminatory comments toward Plaintiff. Moreover, the record did not demonstrate that Veterans' conduct, even assuming it was discriminatory, showed conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights or a great probability of causing substantial harm. Other than the fact that Veterans may have discriminated against Plaintiff because of his disability, there was no evidence that Veterans was consciously aware that it was doing so. The mere fact of discrimination alone, however is insufficient to find "actual malice." Berge v. Columbus Community Cable Access, 736 N.E.2d 517, 542 (Ohio Ct.App. 1999) ("Plaintiff presented no evidence to show that CCCA acted with any hatred or ill will toward plaintiff or that it acted with a conscious disregard for plaintiff's safety, apart from that inherent in a handicap-discrimination claim."); see also Ward v. Hengle, 706 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ohio Ct.App. 1997) ("Ward failed to present any evidence from which the jury could infer that Father Hengle or any other representative of the church acted with hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge, or with reckless indifference toward Ward's rights. He merely presented evidence that, at best, established that Father Hengle and the church committed one act of religious discrimination and nothing more egregious than that.").
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Veterans is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.
Conclusion
In conclusion, for the reasons stated, both parties' motions for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on Plaintiff's claim for disability discrimination under the Ohio Civil Rights Act are not well-taken and are DENIED. Veterans' motion for judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages is not well-taken and is DENIED. Veterans' motion for judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages is well-taken and is GRANTED.