Summary
rejecting claims based on various alleged promises including "to respect adult students and treat them with respect" and "to not discriminate against adult students"
Summary of this case from Evans v. Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y.Opinion
99 Civ. 8733 (RCC).
September 25, 2000.
Opinion and Order
Plaintiff, Vicki Ward, initiated an action against defendants, New York University (the "University") and the New York University School of Education, Division of Nursing (collectively referred to as the "defendants") for breach of contract, failure to abide by the University's rules and procedures, promissory estoppel and fraudulent misrepresentations. Ward, a former student in the Division of Nursing, contends that defendants terminated her matriculation in breach of an express or implied contract between the parties and in violation of the University's own rules and procedures. Ward also asserts that defendants made false misrepresentations to her regarding the incidents of her schooling, and that she incurred substantial expenses in reliance upon these misrepresentations. Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (c), on the grounds that Ward has failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted and that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. For the following reasons, defendants' motion is granted and Ward's claims are dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
Ward was accepted into the New York University School of Education's Master of Arts Program in Nursing Care: Infants, Children and Adolescents, beginning in the fall of 1994. Ward was assigned to a preceptor named Marianne Roncoli, a Clinical Associate Professor at the University and a Pediatric Nurse Practitioner. (Compl. at ¶ 21; Answer at ¶¶ 20-21.) She alleges that Roncoli "maintained and evinced a noticeable dislike of [her] . . . and abused her incessantly." (Compl. at ¶ 23.) Ward asserts that Roncoli tormented her and even "made misrepresentations about her in [student] Evaluation Summaries." ( Id. at ¶¶ 23(a), (b).) Ward also claims that Roncoli threatened to "interfer[e] with [her] education [and] would amass support for her crusade against [Ward]." ( Id. at ¶ 25.) As a result, Ward alleges that she requested a different preceptor during 1995, but did not receive a response. In the Spring of 1996, Ward's matriculation was terminated. Defendants maintain that Ward's deficient academic performance, including, but not limited to her poor clinical performance, lead to the termination of her enrollment. Ward filed this action on August 9, 1999.
In her first cause of action Ward alleges that defendants made representations to her regarding the educational environment at the University, including the treatment of students, the teaching style and the utilization of"out of area preceptorships." (Compl. at ¶¶ 9(a)-(e).) She asserts that in reliance upon these representations, she entered the program and incurred significant expenses, including student loans, in pursuit of her education. ( Id. at ¶ 11.) Ward argues that the parties entered into an express or implied contractual relationship, whereby defendants would continue her enrollment as long as she completed her studies and earned a GPA of 2.5 or better. ( Id. at 6 10.) She alleges that defendants are in breach of this contract because they terminated her enrollment despite her compliance with all of the terms and conditions of the contract. ( Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.) Ward maintains that defendants "arbitrarily and capriciously terminated [her] enrollment," in view of the fact that she had maintained a "good GPA" and completed 75% of the required credits. ( Id. at ¶ 14).
In her second cause of action, Ward contends that the termination of her enrollment was also in violation of the University's rules and procedures. (Compl. at ¶ 29.) She maintains that defendants, inter alia, failed to properly supervise Roncoli or handle complaints concerning Roncoli. ( Id. at ¶¶ 30-32.) Ward argues that in making the decision to terminate, defendants improperly relied upon Roncoli's "biased and unbalanced opinion" of Ward, in violation of the University's procedures and in contravention of the representations made to her. ( Id. at ¶¶ 28, 34.) Ward asserts that the improper dismissal contributed to her suffering a miscarriage of her pregnancy. ( Id. at ¶ 33.)
The final two causes of action are based on promises and representations that defendants made to Ward, concerning the incidents of her education. In her third cause of action, Ward claims that, in reasonable reliance upon the alleged promises and representations, she was induced into taking out student loans to pay for her schooling. (Compl. at ¶¶ 37-38.) This claim appears to be one sounding in promissory estoppel. The fourth cause of action alleges that defendants deliberately made false misrepresentations to Ward, including: i) fair treatment by the defendants; ii) supervision and teaching by honest and unbiased supervisors; in) the existence of established guidelines for treatment of students; and iv) no arbitrary termination of student enrollment. This claim is framed as one for fraudulent misrepresentations. ( Id. at ¶¶ 42(a)-(e).)
Ward is seeking damages in the amount of $300,000, as well as unspecified monetary damages for emotional distress, lost earnings, injury to reputation and punitive damages. Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), on the grounds that Ward has failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted and that the action is barred by the statute of limitations.
II. DISCUSSION
The standard for determining a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (c), is the same standard applied in determining a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 816 (1994); Heartland Sec. Corp. v. Gerstenblatt, 2000 WL 303274 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2000). Hence, the Court accepts all well pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of Ward. Leeds v. Metz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the complaint will not be dismissed "'unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief.'" Sheppard, 18 F.3d at 150 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99 (1957)); see Gally v. Columbia Univ., 22 F. Supp.2d 199, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
A . Failure to State Claims Upon which Relief Can Be Granted
In her first two causes of action, Ward alleges that the University arbitrarily and capriciously terminated her enrollment, given the fact that she had maintained a "good GPA" and had completed 75% of the required credits. (Compl. at ¶ 12.) She contends that this constituted a breach of the contract between the parties and was in contravention of the University's rules and procedures. Defendants maintain that the decision to terminate Ward's enrollment was based on her academic deficiencies, including, but not limited to her poor clinical performance. Thus, defendants contend that the Court should defer to their decision to terminate her enrollment.
Educational institutions are afforded considerable deference when making decisions concerning academic standards. See Babiker v. Ross Univ. School of Medicine, 2000 WL 666342 at *6 (S.D.N Y May 19, 2000); Garg v. Albert Einstein College of Medicine of Yeshiva Univ., 747 F. Supp. 231, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Therefore, in reviewing such decisions, the Court is limited to determining whether the defendants "'abided by their own rules, and whether they have acted in good faith or their action was arbitrary or irrational.'" Babiker, 2000 WL 666342 at *6 (quoting Gertler v. Goodgold, 487 N.Y.S.2d 565, 569 (1985)); see Clarke v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 1996 WL 609271 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1996) (quoting same). This deference is rooted in the principle that academic evaluations involve the subjective judgment of professional educators, and therefore, courts should not substitute their judgments for those of the educators. See Ansari v. New York Univ., 1997 WL 257473 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1997) (quoting Paladino v. Adeiphi Univ., 454 N.Y.S.2d 868, 871 (2nd Dep't 1982)); see also Board of Curators of the Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89, 98 S.Ct. 948 (1978) ("[a]cademic evaluations of a student . . ., bear little resemblance to the judicial and administrative fact-finding proceedings"); In re Susan M v. New York Law Sch., 557 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299-300 (1990) (holding that strong policy considerations militate against courts intervening in controversies relating to educational institution's judgment of student's academic performance). Thus, the Court is reluctant to venture into the domain of the University, specifically its academic evaluation of Ward. However, even if the Court were to engage in such review, Ward has failed to state a valid claim for a breach of the contract between the parties.
Courts in this jurisdiction have acknowledged that a student can sue a school for breach of contract. See Babiker, 2000 WL 666342 at *6; Gally, 22 F. Supp.2d at 206; Keles v. New York Univ., 1994 WL 119525 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1994), aff'd, 54 F.3d 766 (1995); Olsson v. Board of Higher Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 408, 413-14 (1980); Paladino, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 873. When a student enrolls at a university, an implied contract arises whereby, if the student complies with the conditions prescribed by the university, he or she will obtain the degree she is pursuing. See Babiker, 2000 WL 666342 at *6; Gally, 22 F. Supp.2d at 206; Keles, 1994 WL 119525 at *5. Consequently, the student must fulfill her obligations by satisfying the academic requirements and complying with the procedures of the university. See Gally, 22 F. Supp.2d at 206. Hence, a viable contract action exists where the school was to "provide for certain specified services, such as for example, a designated number of hours of instruction, and the school failed to meet its obligation." Ansari, 1997 WL 257473 at *3 (quoting Paladino, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 873); see Clarke, 1996 WL 609271 at *5 (quoting same); Gally, 22 F. Supp.2d at 206 (quoting Clarke, 1996 WL 609271 at *5).
In the complaint, Ward points to a number of the University's general policy statements and broad and unspecified procedures and guidelines as the specific services which were promised but not provided. Ward asserts, inter alia, that defendants promised: i) to provide a great learning environment for adult students; ii) to respect adult students and treat them with respect; in) to not discriminate against adult students; iv) to provide supervision and teaching by honest and unbiased instructors; and v) to provide and to follow guidelines for student treatment. (Compl. at ¶¶ 9(a)-(e), 42.) In addition, in her memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to dismiss, Ward asserts that the University also failed to provide numerous other services, as specified in the University's bulletins. (Memo in Opp'n at p. 5.) For purposes of this motion, however, the Court will not consider these additional promised services because it would be error for a district court to rely upon factual allegations presented outside the pleadings, including legal briefs or memoranda. See Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 83-84 (2d Cir. 2000); Fonte v. Board of Managers of Continental Towers Condominium, 848 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir. 1988); Gebhardt v. Allspect, Inc., 96 F. Supp.2d 331, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
The promised services, as Ward categorizes them, actually are more akin to general statements of policy. In analogous cases, the services identified were specifically designated and discrete promises, relating to the incidents of the forthcoming education, such as the provision of a designated number of hours of instruction, Ansari, 1997 WL 257473 at *3 (quoting Paladino, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 873), state of the art facilities, Id. at *1, and supervision by field supervisors, Clarke, 1996 WL 609271 at * 1. Here, virtually all of the promised services that Ward cites, are broad pronouncements of the University's compliance with existing anti-discrimination laws, promising equitable treatment of all students. As such, they cannot form the basis for a breach of contract claim. See Gally, 22 F. Supp.2d at 208; Odunmbaku v. New York Blood Ctr., 1996 WL 514867 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 10, 1996); Blaise-Williams v. Sumitomo Bank, Ltd., 592 N.Y.S.2d 41, 42 (1st Dep't 1993).
Ward does identify one particular point that could be considered a promised service; that defendants "allow and sanction out of area preceptorships." (Compl. at ¶ 9(e).) However, the Court fails to see any connection between the provision of out of area preceptorships and Ward's claims. Whether such preceptorships were or were not permitted has no bearing here, as Ward has not alleged any facts to demonstrate that they were not permitted. Furthermore, even had they not been allowed, the point is moot because Ward's complaint is that one specific preceptor, Roncoli, was biased against her. Therefore, Roncoli could have been replaced by any other preceptor; not necessarily an out of area preceptor.
In further support of the breach of contract claim, as well as in support of the second cause of action for violating the University's rules and procedures, Ward alleges that she was supervised by a preceptor who harbored a bias against her. (Compl. at ¶ 23.) She contends that this was a violation of the University's promise to provide supervision and teaching by an honest and unbiased instructor. Ward asserts that Roncoli abused and tormented her in class, lied about her performance in student evaluations and threatened to, and ultimately did, interfere with her education. ( Id. at ¶¶ 23, 25, 26.) She also maintains that Roncoli had problems with all of her students. ( Id. at ¶ 24.) Therefore, Ward argues that defendants' decision to terminate her enrollment was arbitrary and capricious, because it was based in large part upon Roncoli's biased opinion.
Again, the Court's review of the defendants' decision here, is limited to whether they abided by their own rules, and whether they have acted in good faith or their action was arbitrary or irrational.'" Babiker, 2000 WL 666342 at *6 (quoting Gertler, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 569); see Clarke, 1996 WL 609271 at *6 (quoting same). Although Ward may have found Roncoli's techniques personally offensive, the fact that Roncoli may have utilized intimidating and militaristic teaching methods, and may even have been belittling towards Ward, does not establish a valid cause of action for breach of contract. See Gally, 22 F. Supp.2d at 208. In fact, a claim by a student who found her professor's teaching methods personally offensive, is best "left to the sound handling of school administrators." Id. Accordingly, Roncoli's treatment of Ward cannot form the basis for a claim of breach of contract.
Furthermore, in view of the deference given to defendants' decisions concerning academic standards, Ward cannot maintain a claim for defendants' alleged failure to abide by the University's rules and procedures. First, it was well within the discretion of defendants to accord whatever weight they deemed appropriate to Roncoli's assessment of Ward. See Ansari, 1997 WL 257473 at *2 (quoting Paladino, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 871). The Court will not involve itself in a decision that has historically been left to the subjective judgment of professional educators. Because defendants are in a far better position to assess Ward's academic performance, the Court will not second guess their judgment. See Board of Curators, 435 U.S. at 90 ("determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decision making"). Second, even accepting Ward's factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, bald assertions and conclusory allegations claiming that the University's rules or procedures were not followed, do not state a valid claim. See Tarshis v. The Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2000); Leeds, 85 F.3d at 53 (2d Cir. 1996); see also RCM Exec. Gallery Corp. v. Rols Capital Co., 1997 WL 27059 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1997) (district court not required to accept conclusory allegations even on a motion to dismiss). Ward has failed to allege any facts demonstrating that defendants failed to abide by the University's regulations or procedures in addressing her complaints concerning Roncoli and her request for a different preceptor. She neither points to any specific provision regarding complaints or requests for reassignment nor proffers any evidence of having made such complaints or requests. Moreover, she fails to consider that her clinical performance was but a factor in the ultimate decision to terminate her enrollment, and that an assignment to a different preceptor may not, in the defendants' judgment, have had any impact upon the evaluation of her academic performance. There simply is no evidence to suggest that defendants failed to adhere to their procedures, and that this failure contributed to the termination of her enrollment. Accordingly, the Court will not speculate as to whether this may or may not have affected a decision that defendants are better suited to address. Finally, there is nothing in the record, and plaintiff does not offer any supporting evidence, to suggest that defendants have either acted in bad faith, arbitrarily or irrationally. Therefore, the motion to dismiss also is granted with respect to the second cause of action.
In her third cause of action, for what appears to be promissory estoppel, Ward contends that she is entitled to recover monetary damages because she took out student loans in reasonable reliance upon defendants' "promises and representations." (Compl. at ¶¶ 37-38.) In order to establish a claim for promissory estoppel, Ward must prove that there was: i) a clear and unambiguous promise; ii) a reasonable and foreseeable reliance on her part; and in) an unconscionable injury to her as a result of this reliance. See Readco, Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, Inc., 81 F.3d 295, 301 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1989)); Encyclopedia Brown Prods., Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 1998 WL 734355 at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1998). Further, the unconscionable injury must be "beyond that which flows naturally from the non-performance of the unenforceable agreement." Merex A. G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., 29 F.3d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1994); North American Knitting Mills, Inc. v. International Women's Apparel, Inc., 2000 WL 1290608 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 12, 2000) (quoting Merex A.G., 29 F.3d at 826). Here, Ward cannot clear the first hurdle of identifying a clear and unambiguous promise made by defendants. The Court assumes that she is referring to the general statements of the University's policies, underlying her earlier causes of action. However, relying upon these broad policy pronouncements, without pointing to a single specific promise or representation is insufficient to state a claim. See Tarshis, 211 F.3d at 35; Leeds, 85 F.3d at 53; see also RCM Exec., 1997 WL 27059 at *8 (district court not required to accept conclusory allegations even on motion to dismiss). To hold that such a general allegation states a legally sufficient claim for promissory estoppel, would be tantamount to permitting a cause of action against a university whenever it issues broad policy statements. Furthermore, because the Court has determined that defendants have neither breached the implicit contract between the parties nor violated the University's rules and procedures, a claim for promissory estoppel cannot survive.
The final cause of action, based upon defendants' alleged deliberate and fraudulent misrepresentations, also fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under the particularity requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), the complaint must: i) specify the fraudulent statements; ii) identify the speaker; in) state where and when the statements were made; and iv) explain why the statements were fraudulent. See Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Spoto v. Herkimer County Trust, 2000 WL 533293 at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2000) (quoting Di Vittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus. Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1987)) (to fulfill particularity requirements of Rule 9(b), complaint must specify time, place, speaker and content of alleged misrepresentation). The Court notes, that although defendants contest whether the representations Ward identifies meet this particularity requirement, in liberally construing the complaint, the representations Ward cites give sufficient notice to allow defendants to prepare a defense. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp., 25 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (2d Cir. 1994). Ward also must put forth proof of scienter by at least alleging facts "giv[ing] rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent." Id. at 1128; see Mills, 12 F.3d at 1176; Spoto, 2000 WL 533293 at *5. This can be accomplished by either "alleging facts to show that defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or . . . alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness." Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128 (citation omitted). However, the complaint here, is completely devoid of any facts showing "[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of mind of [the defendants]." Fed.R.Civ.P. 9 (b) (1999). Although Rule 9(b) relaxes the specificity requirement for scienter, this "must not be mistaken for license to base claims of fraud on speculation and conclusory allegations." Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128 (internal quotation marks omitted). Despite construing the complaint liberally and drawing all reasonable inferences in Ward's favor, she has failed to plead fraudulent intent with sufficient particularity; a necessary element of a viable claim for fraudulent misrepresentations. Even under New York law, to prevail on such a claim, Ward is required to make a showing of scienter. See Cofacredit, S.A. v. Windsor Plumbing Supply Co., Inc., 187 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Having failed to do so, the fourth cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentations is dismissed.
B . Statute of Limitations
Finally, defendants contend that Ward's claims should be dismissed because the statute of limitations governing these claims has run. Defendants maintain that the applicable statute of limitations is the four month limitations period for Article 78 proceedings. Ward, however, asserts that the six year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims is applicable here, and the claims are timely filed. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213 (McKinney 1999). Article 78 proceedings are not the proper vehicle for enforcing private contractual rights. See Clarke, 1996 WL 609271 at *2. Here, Ward does not seek to compel or prohibit any action by defendants, but instead seeks to recover monetary damages for injuries allegedly resulting from defendants' breach of the implied contract between the parties. See Gally, 22 F. Supp.2d at 205-06; Clarke, 1996 WL 60927 1 at *2.3. Accordingly, the statute of limitations for Article 78 proceedings is not applicable here and the six year limitations period for breach of contract claims governs. Ward's claims, therefore, are timely filed.
III. CONCLUSION
Because Ward has timely filed the complaint under the six year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims, the motion to dismiss cannot be granted on this basis. However, for the aforementioned reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted and the complaint is dismissed for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted.