Opinion
2:22-cv-03179-TLW-MGB
12-15-2022
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff James L. Ward (“Plaintiff”), a state detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action against the Greenville County Detention Center (“GCDC”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action on September 19, 2022, challenging certain conditions of confinement and medical treatment at GCDC. (Dkt. No. 1.) The undersigned notes at the outset that because Plaintiff's handwriting is somewhat illegible, it is difficult to ascertain all of the facts underlying his claims. See Kraim v. Columbia Police Dep't, No. 3:18-cv-1335-MGL-PJG, 2019 WL 2058252, at *1 (D.S.C. May 7, 2019) (“Illegible words or allegations need not be considered by the court.”). Based on the undersigned's careful review, however, the crux of this case appears to be purported unsafe sleeping conditions at GCDC that ultimately led to Plaintiff falling out of his bunkbed, and the alleged inadequate medical treatment that followed. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4.)
According to Plaintiff, the first fall from his top bunk occurred on or around June 30, 2022. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff claims that there were no correctional officers in his pod at the time of his fall, such that his cellmate eventually had to text someone outside of the jail and ask him or her to alert GCDC staff of the incident. (Id.) Upon receiving the call, several correctional officers and a nurse went to check on Plaintiff. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff seems to suggest that when the staff arrived in his cell, he overheard at least one of the correctional officers say that he was “faking” his injuries, and one of the correctional officers “kicked” his foot. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that the nurse checked his blood pressure and then called emergency medical services so that Plaintiff could be transported to the hospital, where it was determined that he had fractured his L5 vertebrae. (Id. at 5.)
Although not entirely clear, Plaintiff was apparently placed in “lockdown” for two weeks after returning from the hospital because he was supposedly “a liability to the jail.” (Id. at 5-6.) He was then moved to a “downstairs” cell, which required him to climb up stairs despite his recent injury. (Id. at 5) Plaintiff claims that the nurse provided him with Tylenol for the pain, but only for three days. (Id.) Plaintiff was later moved back to his previous pod, where he fell a second time; despite other inmates allegedly pushing the “emergency button” on the wall, Plaintiff claims that the correctional officers and nurse did not check on him for over an hour after the second alleged fall. (Id.) It appears Plaintiff was once again transported to the hospital, although the outcome of that visit is unclear. Plaintiff requests that GCDC pay his medical bills, “including surgery if needed,” and that the Court award him $200,000 for his “pain and suffering.” (Id. at 6.)
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Upon reviewing the initial Complaint, the undersigned issued a proper form order notifying Plaintiff that his case was subject to summary dismissal because he had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. No. 4.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned gave him twenty-one days to cure the identified pleading deficiencies by filing an amended complaint with the Court.The undersigned warned Plaintiff that if he filed an amended complaint, it would completely replace the original Complaint, and that the amended pleading should therefore contain all of the claims Plaintiff wished to assert; identify all of the defendants against whom those claims are asserted; and include a legible plain short statement of the supporting facts against each defendant. (Id. at 2.)
The undersigned also informed Plaintiff that he would need to file a set of proposed service documents for any defendants named in his amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 4 at 3.)
On November 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 8) and several proposed service documents (Dkt. No. 9) in compliance with the undersigned's instructions. Unfortunately, the service documents are incomplete, and the Amended Complaint does not cure the pleading deficiencies discussed in the undersigned's preceding order. To the contrary, the Amended Complaint is noticeably less detailed than the original pleading and simply restates the same allegations presented therein. Consequently, even if the undersigned liberally considers both pleadings together, this case remains subject to summary dismissal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
Unless noted otherwise, any further references to the “Complaint” herein encompass Plaintiff's original Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) and Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 8), which the undersigned considers together in an abundance of caution.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
In the instant case, Plaintiff brings claims of inadequate medical attention and “cruel and unusual punishment” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.(See Dkt. No. 8 at 4.) A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). Thus, to state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The undersigned notes that such claims generally fall under the Fourteenth Amendment for pretrial detainees like Plaintiff. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977).
As the undersigned previously explained to Plaintiff, inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds are not “persons” and do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. (Dkt. No. 4 at 2.) See Sumpter v. Georgetown Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 0:20-cv-1770-JMC-PJG, 2020 WL 3060395, at *2 (D.S.C. June 8, 2020). Accordingly, GCDC is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983, regardless of whether Plaintiff refers to the “physical building” or the “staff and collection of officials it houses.” Studley v. Watford, No. 3:16-cv-439-JMC-PJG, 2016 WL 2893157, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 15, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 2853546 (D.S.C. May 16, 2016); see also Barnes v. Bakersville Corr. Ctr. Med. Staff, No. 3:07-cv-195, 2008 WL 2564779 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2008) (noting that the plaintiff must name specific staff members to state a claim against a “person” as required under § 1983).
Despite the undersigned's explicit warning, both Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) and Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 8) name GCDC as the only Defendant in this case. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 1; Dkt. No. 8 at 1-2.) The incomplete service documents likewise identify GCDC as the sole Defendant. (Dkt. No. 9 at 1.) Thus, Plaintiff has failed to name a defendant amenable to suit under § 1983, and his claims are therefore subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court summarily DISMISS this case without further leave to amend, as Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Ackbar v. Monaco, No. 4:19-cv-2774-RMG, 2020 WL 1164194, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2020), aff'd, 828 Fed.Appx. 913 (4th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, the Clerk of Court shall not issue the summons or forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process at this time.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).