Opinion
Case No. 1:17-cv-129
05-03-2017
LEROY WALTON, Plaintiff, v. GEORGIA DEPT. OF DRIVER SERVICES, et al., Defendants.
Bowman, M.J.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's objections (Docs. 7, 8, 9, 10) to the magistrate judge's March 6, 2017 report (Doc. 4) recommending dismissal of Plaintiff's civil rights complaint. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for purported violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 occurring in December 2012. A summary of Plaintiff's allegations are contained in the R&R, and will not be restated here.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 6, 2017, the magistrate judge sua sponte recommended dismissal of this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and issued a report containing a notice to Plaintiff of his right to "serve and file specific, written objections to [the] Report & Recommendation . . . within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof." (Doc. 4). On March 20, 2017, Plaintiff filed a document titled "BRIEF, DOCUMENTS and AFFIDAVIT" (Doc. 5), which included various documents that appear to have been filed in an earlier case, but no specific objections to the magistrate judge's R&R in the above-captioned matter. The Court struck the objections as non-compliant with Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), but granted Plaintiff an additional fourteen days to file compliant objections. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed multiple sets of documents:
First, on April 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed a document asking the Court to "stop these corrupted defendants in this case." (Doc. 9, PAGEID# 125). He attached many pages from the set of objections that was stricken. (Doc. 5). Certain pages of the filing appear to have been manually cut and pasted together from other documents, with no nexus among many of the paragraphs. See, e.g., Doc. 9, PAGEID# 127.
Second, on April 11, 2017, Plaintiff filed a disjointed set of papers with a cover page asserting that the judges assigned to this case "showed bias and corruption" in disposing of his complaint. (Doc. 7, PAGEID# 110). The remainder of the filing amalgamates pieces of the magistrate judge's R&R, unexplained medical records, and portions of other filings. Again, certain pages of the filing appear to have been manually cut and pasted together from other documents, with no nexus among many of the paragraphs. See, e.g., Doc. 7, PAGEID# 113.
Third, on April 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed a document purporting to be a "complaint against the 6th and 11th Circuit Court[.]" (Doc. 8, PAGEID# 122). Therein, Plaintiff suggests that a judge in another jurisdiction has demonstrated corruption. (Id.)
Fourth, on May 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed a document with a Northern District of Georgia caption, again accusing a judge in another jurisdiction of corruption. (Doc. 10, PAGEID# 141).
While Plaintiff did not offer titles for the above-referenced filings (Docs. 7, 8, 9, 10), this Court construes them as objections to the R&R on the basis that the magistrate judge allegedly showed bias in recommending dismissal of his complaint. This Court has no authority to consider accusations of bias against judges in other jurisdictions. However, as discussed below, Plaintiff's objections that the magistrate judge showed bias in recommending dismissal of the complaint in this case are not well-taken.
Plaintiff's filings (Docs. 7, 8, 9, 10) are plagued with many of the same defects that prompted this Court to strike Plaintiff's first post-R&R filing. (Doc. 5) However, to bring about a resolution to this case focused on merits rather than procedure, the Court will treat the filings (Docs. 7, 8, 9, 10) as properly filed objections. The Court also notes that the April 17, 2017 and May 1, 2017 objections were filed out of time, without leave. However, the Court will consider the objections at this juncture, to the extent that they overlap with the bias/corruption objections filed on April 10 and 11, 2017
II. ANALYSIS
At the outset, the Court observes that Plaintiff has not requested that the magistrate judge or the undersigned recuse themselves from the instant case. Even if Plaintiff had, recusal is only warranted where a "reasonable, objective person, knowing all of the circumstances, would have questioned the judge's impartiality." Brautigam v. Damon, No. 1:11-cv-551, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25028, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2016) (citing Hughes v. United States, 899 F.2d 1495, 1501 (6th Cir. 1990)). Furthermore, "[a] bias sufficient to justify recusal must be a personal bias 'as distinguished from a judicial one,' arising 'out of the judge's background and association' and not from the 'judge's view of the law.'" United States v. Story, 716 F.2d 1088, 1090 (6th Cir. 1983). "Plaintiff's subjective speculation alone is insufficient to support his allegation of judicial bias." Smith v. Caterpillar, Inc., 304 F. App'x 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Hughes, 899 F.2d at 1501).
Here, Plaintiff does not attempt to establish personal bias, and instead focuses on a perceived refusal of federal judges to "follow the law of the United States Constitution[.]" (Doc. 8, PAGEID# 123). However, it is apparent from the R&R that the magistrate judge considered the law - and only the law - in recommending dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint. The magistrate judge correctly observed that Plaintiff's claim was defective because his complaint failed to link any specific state actor to an alleged deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. (Doc. 4, PAGEID# 91). Furthermore, dismissal was warranted for the separate and independent reason that Plaintiff's cause of action, which accrued in December 2012, is time-barred by Ohio's two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims. (Doc. 4, PAGEID# 91) (citing Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989)). Thus, the magistrate judge correctly concluded that the foregoing defects require dismissal.
Plaintiff claims that he was injured at some point while traveling from Michigan to Georgia. (Doc. 3, PAGEID# 48). Plaintiff's Complaint suggests, but does not expressly state, that Plaintiff's injuries occurred in the State of Georgia. (Doc. 3, PAGEID# 78). Even assuming the existence of personal jurisdiction here, the Court must reach the same substantive conclusion when applying Georgia law. Brown v. Univ. of Ky. Comprehensive Assessment & Training Servs., No. 13-5500, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 25049, at *5 (6th Cir. June 19, 2014) ("The statute of limitations applicable to a § 1983 action is the state limitations statute for personal-injury actions filed in the state where the § 1983 claim arises"). Georgia also has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33; Jones v. Taylor, No. 5:15-CV-289-LJA-MSH, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26563, at *4 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 27, 2017). --------
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 4) of the Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff's Objections (Docs. 7, 8, 9, 10) to the R&R (Doc. 4) are OVERRULED, and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. This matter shall be CLOSED and TERMINATED from the docket of this Court.
This Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), that an appeal of this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore denies Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Michael R. Barrett
MICHAEL R. BARRETT, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT