Opinion
C.A. No. N10C-06-146 CLS.
Date Submitted: May 12, 2011.
Date Decided: August 15, 2011.
On Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. Granted.
Joseph M. Walls, Inmate, SBI # 107, Smyrna, DE, Plaintiff.
Joseph C. Handlon, Esq., Wilmington, DE, Attorney for Defendants.
ORDER
Introduction
Before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and the Plaintiff's response in opposition. The Court has reviewed the parties' submissions. For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
Background
Joseph M. Walls ("Plaintiff") is currently incarcerated at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center ("JTVCC" or the "prison") in Smyrna, Delaware. He has filed this action against Perry Phelps ("Phelps"), the warden of JTVCC, Michael Little ("Little"), the legal services administrator of JTVCC, and unknown John or Jane Does 1-5, employees of JTVCC (collectively "State Defendants"). In June 1998, Plaintiff was transferred from the custody of the Delaware Department of Corrections ("DOC") to the Virginia DOC. Plaintiff received ten boxes of personal property from the Delaware DOC when he was transferred.
In January 2001, Plaintiff was transferred from the custody of the Virginia DOC back to the Delaware DOC. At that time Plaintiff received eight boxes of personal property. He was permitted to maintain the eight boxes of personal property at JTVCC when it was under the control of Warden Thomas Carroll.
In August 2001, Plaintiff was transferred from the custody of the Delaware DOC to the Arizona DOC. He had seven boxes of personal items. On January 17, 2002, Plaintiff received the seven boxes of personal items from the Arizona DOC. In January 2003, Plaintiff was transferred from the custody of the Arizona DOC back to the Delaware DOC. On March 14, 2003, Plaintiff received the nine boxes of personal property he had with him while in the custody of the Arizona DOC. Plaintiff was permitted to maintain the nine boxes of personal items at the JTVCC when Thomas Carroll was the warden.
On April 7, 2008, Correctional Officers confiscated all the boxes Plaintiff had in his cell. All of Plaintiff's personal property was returned to him with the exception of twelve boxes allegedly containing religious, political, legal, and treatment program papers and books. At this time Lieutenant Michael Trader informed Plaintiff the twelve boxes were now under the control of Defendant Little, pursuant to Defendant Phelps' orders. A disciplinary report was filed detailing the items found in Plaintiff's cell. On April 11, 2008, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant Phelps requesting the return of the twelve boxes of personal property.
On April 23, 2008, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Defendant Little requesting the return of his property. On April 28, 2008, he wrote a second another letter to Defendant Little requesting his property. Plaintiff indicated the boxes contained legal paperwork necessary for his case.
On May 2, 2008, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Defendant Phelps requesting the return of his personal property.
On May 21, 2008, Defendant Little returned one box of the personal property to Plaintiff. Plaintiff was informed that the remaining eleven boxes would not be returned. Defendant Little indicated Plaintiff could provide an address for the boxes to be shipped. Plaintiff claims he provided a shipping address for one of the boxes. Allegedly, Plaintiff verbally informed Defendant Little not to mail or destroy the remaining ten boxes. Plaintiff intended to file administrative grievances and seek court intervention for the return of the ten boxes of personal property. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Little agreed to store the ten boxes in his office until Plaintiff exhausted his administrative grievances and court remedies.
On May 21, 2008, Plaintiff signed a "NOTICE" which informed him that he has exceeded the permitted two cardboard boxes, or one metal lockerbox from the commissary, for personal belongings. He had the option of going through the boxes and discarding the excess material on his own or have the excess material shipped to an address he would provide. After two weeks the excess material would be destroyed.
On May 25, 2008, Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance regarding the boxes of his personal belongings. In his grievance he states he was permitted to bring one box of legal paperwork back to his cell, in accord with prison policy. He also states he was forced to discard four boxes of paperwork and six boxes remain in the possession of Defendant Little. Plaintiff claims the remaining boxes contain material essential to his criminal and civil litigations or essential for his religious and treatment programs. The grievance was denied as non-grievable.
On February 5, 2010, Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Little requesting access to the boxes he alleges Defendant Little agreed to store in his office.
On March 5, 2010, Defendant Little wrote a memo to Plaintiff stating
I did not agree to store any legal papers for you, please refer to NOTICE signed by you on May 21, 2008. You did not comply with the procedures listed and by doing so your signature authorized the Department to destroy the excess belongings that you did not provide an address to where they should be sent. This excludes legal materials that you were authorized to keep. Interesting enough it took you almost four hours to go thru the materials. Finally, you kept one box, which I authorized for legal materials; one box was other inmate's legal materials which I returned to them, you trashed four boxes and six additional boxes by which you refused to give an address to have sent out of the institution. Your memory seems to be incorrect.
On March 9, 2010, Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance requesting compensation for the destruction of his personal property and violating his rights. On March 12, 2010, Plaintiff's administrative grievance was ruled non-grievable.
Plaintiff filed this complaint on June 24, 2010 alleging violations of U.S. Const. amend. I, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, Del. Const. art. I, § 1, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 2000bb-2000cc, and an unnamed section of Chapter 65 of Title 11 of the Delaware Code. Title 11, Chapter 65 relates to the Department of Corrections. Plaintiff is seeking an amount in excess of $2,602,400. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the equal protection claim, and the retaliation claim.
Plaintiff alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981- 1985; however, § 1984 is omitted.
Attached to his complaint, Plaintiff has created an affidavit certifying the fair market value of his destroyed property. He estimates the fair market value of the paper to be $200,000 based on approximately 10,000 pages per box (5,000 pages double sided), multiplied by the number of boxes destroyed, 10, multiplied by the cost of reproduction of each page, $2. Plaintiff estimates the intellectual property value of the paper to be $2,402,400 based on 364 days in the year multiplied by the number of hours in a workday, 6, multiplied by the number of years of work, 22, multiplied by his hourly work rate of $50. The paper value and the intellectual property value of the material amounts to $2,602,400.
Standard of Review
Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to file a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." All the facts pled in the complaint are accepted as true. The motion will be granted "only where it appears with reasonable certainty that the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts that would entitle him to relief."
Highland Capital Management, L.P. v. T.C. Group, LLC, 2006 WL 2128677, *2 (Del. Super. Ct.) ( citing Plant v. Catalytic Constr. Co., 287 A.2d 682, 686 (Del. Super. 1972), aff'd, 297 A.2d 37 (Del. 1972).
Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1034 (Del. 1998) (citing Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 (Del. 1978)).
Discussion
I. Plaintiff Has Not Satisfied the Pleading Requirements for an Alleged Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Even if He Did, the State Defendants Have Qualified Immunity. A. Pleading Requirements for a Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983Plaintiff has not satisfied the pleading requirements to allege a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To withstand a motion to dismiss Plaintiff "must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." A person can be a local official sued in an official capacity. The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." "The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power `possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'" "State employment is generally sufficient to render the defendant a state actor." A state employee "acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law."
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted).
Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
West, 487 U.S. at 49 ( citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
Id. at 49 (citations omitted).
Id. at 50 (citations omitted).
However, "Courts are generally very reluctant to interfere with the administration of prisons." "To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials, [the United States Supreme Court has] determined that prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a `reasonableness' test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights." A prison regulation will be upheld when it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.
State v. Webster, 2001 WL 789657, *1 (Del. Super. Ct.) (citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987)).
O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349.
Id.
The regulation in this case is reasonably related to the legitimate penological interests of security and administration of JTVCC. In his complaint, the Plaintiff asserts he has a constitutional right to maintain the ten excess boxes of his personal property in his prison cell. The prison has a policy of limiting the amount of non-dangerous contraband in an inmate's cell for the security of the prison. Plaintiff had the opportunity to have the prison mail out the excess boxes to an address he was to provide. He exercised that option for only one of the boxes. He then went through the remaining ten boxes and discarded four boxes on his own. He never provided Defendant Little with an address for the remaining six boxes, despite signing a notice stating he had two weeks to provide an address or the material would be destroyed. Limiting the number of non-dangerous contraband boxes to two cardboard boxes per inmate is reasonably related to the legitimate prison interests of safety and administration. B. Qualified Immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In its motion to dismiss, the State incorrectly contends Defendant Phelps was sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on respondeat superior. While the State is correct in its assertion that a person may not be sued based on respondeat superior for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the complaint states Defendant Phelps, along with the other defendants, "unilaterally and secretly destroyed Mr. Plaintiff's' 10 boxes of personal property." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Complaint, ¶ 56. Since the Plaintiff alleges Defendant Phelps was directly involved in the destruction of his property, the Court will not dismiss the claim against Defendant Phelps based on respondeat superior.
Defendant Phelps and Defendant Little have qualified immunity and may not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conduct occurring in their official capacity. Government officials, such as prison officials, are afforded qualified immunity from liability for civil damages when they are performing discretionary functions "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." "The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official's error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact."
In its motion to dismiss, the State argues the Defendants Phelps and Little have qualified immunity but then cites the law for sovereign immunity. Having found the Defendants may not be sued because they have qualified immunity, the Court does not need to address whether sovereign immunity applies.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, (1982).
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
To determine whether Defendants Phelps and Little have qualified immunity this Court must decide whether the Plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established at the time the Defendants committed the alleged misconduct. A constitutional right is clearly established when a "reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates [the prisoner's constitutional] right." When a policy of the prison, such as permitting a limited number of boxes be kept in a cell, invades an inmate's constitutional rights, it will be held valid as long as it relates to a legitimate penological interest. Even though Defendants Phelps and Little either authorized or physically destroyed Plaintiff's ten boxes, a reasonable official would not have realized he was violating a constitutional right of an inmate because of the need to maintain security in the prison. Therefore, the Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim against Defendants Phelps and Little is granted.
Id. at 232 (citations omitted).
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 604 (1999).
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
Plaintiff contends this case is factually similar to Jacobs v. Beard, 172 Fed.Appx. 452 (3d Cir. 2006). The Court disagrees. In Jacobs, the trial court was reversed for granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Plaintiff alleged that prison officials confiscated his legal documents, refused to return them after learning they were to be used in a lawsuit against them, placed the plaintiff in isolation and threatened another inmate who had a sworn affidavit in support of plaintiff's lawsuit. Here, the papers confiscated did not pertain to a lawsuit filed against prison officials, Plaintiff was not put in isolation or disciplined in any way because he had excess non-dangerous contraband in his cell and there were no threats made by prison officials.
II. Plaintiff Has Failed to State an Equal Protection Violation.
Plaintiff is unable to prove a set of facts entitling him to relief on his equal protection claim. "To the extent that Plaintiff's equal protection claim implicates constitutionally protected rights such as the free exercise of religion, the Court is required to determine (1) whether a constitutional violation has occurred, and (2) whether the challenged prison policies are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Plaintiff alleges the prison policy at issue violated his constitutional rights. As previously stated, a prison policy will be held valid so long as it relates to a legitimate penological interest. In this case, the prison has a legitimate interest in the security of the prison and limits the number of boxes containing non-dangerous contraband in a cell. Plaintiff is unable to prove a set of facts entitling him to relief since legitimate penological reasons exist to limit the amount of boxes contained in a cell. The equal protection claim is dismissed.
Riley v. Snyder, 72 F.Supp.2d 456, 460 (D.Del. 1999) (citation omitted).
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
Plaintiff contends Hall v. McGuigan controls this case. 743 A.2d 1197 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999). The Court disagrees. In Hall, the prison had a policy of confiscating mail that could potentially pose a security threat of violence among the prisoners. The Court recognized there could be some instances where mail could contain a threat of violence. Id. at 1202. The motion for summary judgment was denied because there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether conditions at the DCC at the time justified confiscating the mail. Id. The facts are significantly different to this case. Plaintiff was given the opportunity to mail his remaining boxes to an address outside the prison, which he chose not to do. He also went through the boxes and destroyed some of the material himself. Therefore, Hall is not controlling in this case.
III. Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Retaliation Claim.
Plaintiff is unable to prove a set of facts entitling him to relief on his retaliation claim. "A prisoner alleging retaliation must show (1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) an adverse action by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights, and (3) a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him." Plaintiff alleges the destruction of his ten boxes of personal items, some of which allegedly contained religious and rehabilitation information, was a violation of the First Amendment and in retaliation for "assisting minority prisoners [in exercising] their religious, political, legal or treatment rights." The policy at issue in this case was a non-discriminatory policy aimed at prison security and administration. The action taken by prison officials, destroying the excess non-dangerous contraband after permitting Plaintiff to have it mailed to an address outside the prison, would not deter someone from exercising his or her constitutional right to practice religion. Therefore, the causal connection between Plaintiff exercising his constitutional right to practice religion and the action taken by the State Defendants does not exist. The motion to dismiss the retaliation claim is granted since Plaintiff is unable to prove a set of facts entitling him to relief.
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Complaint, ¶ 68.
See Motion to Dismiss ¶ 21.
Conclusion
Based on the forgoing, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED.