Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-2662-R
November 13, 2003
FINDINGS. CONCLUSIONS. AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On August 19, 2003, under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the District Court referred Sergeant Tom Eberhart's ("Eberhart's") Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 14, 2003, for a recommendation for disposition of the motion. The findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge follow:
Background
Plaintiff, Mark Franklin Walker, filed this civil rights action on December 17, 2001. He alleges Eberhart, a jailer at the Ellis County Jail, violated his civil rights. Plaintiff claims he requested medical care for his serious burns from pepper spray and a fractured hand, but despite the seriousness of his injuries, Eberhart refused him medical care. Eberhart seeks judgment as a matter of law based upon the undisputed facts and upon his claim of qualified immunity. Plaintiff filed a response on September 19, 2003, and Eberhart filed a reply on September 22, 2003.
In his response to Eberhart's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff does not mention the pepper spray. Summary judgment for Eberhart is warranted with respect to that claim. Additionally, Plaintiff complains for the first time in his response that he entered the jail with mental issues of self-harm. His complaint and other pleadings do not raise any mental health issues. Accordingly, such issues are not before the Court.
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and the evidence show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Melton v. Teachers Ins. Annuity Assoc. of Am., 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997). Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). There is a genuine issue of fact if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Society of Fin. Examiners v. Nat'l Ass'n of Certified Fraud Examiners, Inc., 41 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir. 1995). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to preclude a grant of summary judgment. Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1999). According to Rule 56, whenever a motion for summary judgment is made, an adverse party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.Civil Rights Violation
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may bring a suit for damages for violation of his constitutional rights against government agents acting "under color of state law." See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A prison official's deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1972). Nevertheless, constitutionally adequate care does not ensure that an inmate will agree with every treatment decision. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107-08. The appropriate test for deliberate indifference is subjective recklessness, as used in the criminal — law sense. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838-40, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1980, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The legal conclusion of deliberate indifference must rest on facts clearly evincing wanton actions on the part of defendants. Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1237 (5th Cir. 1985). The deliberate indifference standard also applies to claims of inadequate protection and medical care by pre-trial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment. Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 135 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 1998). To demonstrate that a prison official violated a pre-trial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, the inmate must establish that the alleged deprivation was, objectively, sufficiently serious and that the prison official had a sufficiently culpable mental state, that is, that he acted with deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hare, 74 F.3d at 643.
The Eighth Amendment provides that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
Examples of deliberate indifference noted in Estelle include Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974) (prison surgeon discarded the severed portion of inmate's ear in front of him and stitched the stump, explaining to the inmate that he did not need his ear) and Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970) (prison doctor refused to administer prescribed pain killer and rendered inmate's leg surgery unsuccessful by requiring the inmate to stand in violation of contrary instructions from his surgeon). Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105 n. 10.
In Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 39 n. 8, 103 S.C. 1625, 1632 n. 8, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983), the court approved the following definition of wanton:
Wanton means reckless — without regard to the rights of others . . . Want only means causelessly, without restraint, and in reckless disregard of the rights of others. Wantonness is defined as a licentious act of one man towards the person of another, without regard to his rights; it has also been defined as the conscious failure by one charged with a duty to exercise due care and diligence to prevent an injury after the discovery of the peril, or under circumstances where he is charged with a knowledge of such peril, and being conscious of the inevitable or probable results of such failure." 30 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 2-4 (2d ed. 905) (footnotes omitted).
Qualified Immunity
Eberhart has raised the defense of qualified immunity. The Court addresses the question of qualified immunity first, because its resolution determines a defendant's immunity from suit, that is, his ability to avoid a trial altogether, rather than mere immunity from damages. Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 820 (5th Cir. 1993). Government officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Trial courts should first determine whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for a violation of a constitutional right and then, and only then, address whether a plaintiff has pleaded facts that, if proved, would overcome a defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity. Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 276-78 (5th Cir. 1992).
Analysis
The Court has reviewed the summary judgment evidence and arguments in connection with the pleadings and the entire court record. The following material facts with respect to Plaintiffs claim against Eberhart for deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs serious medical needs are undisputed:
1. Plaintiff was arrested on March 28, 2001, and incarcerated in the Ellis County Jail. (Arrest Record, D.'s App. Exh.7.)
2. During the book — in process, jailers asked him various questions that were recorded on a book — in form which Plaintiff signed. (Admission Date — Jail Inmate's Medical Record, D.'s App., Exh.4.)
3. The form asked if he had any current medical problems that needed attention. He responded, "No." (Id.)
4. The form asked if he had any other problems, not listed, which needed attention. He responded, "No." (Id.)
5. The following question was on the form: Is there any evidence of recent physical injury seen on inmate? The following was listed: "Swollen left hand." (Id.)
6. At the time of Plaintiff s arrest, Eberhart was an employee of the Ellis County Sheriffs Department, a governmental entity of the State of Texas. (D.'s App., Exh 3, p. 1,12.)
7. Eberhart worked as a jailer at the Ellis County Jail and was the shift supervisor on the morning of March 29, 2001. (D.'s App., Exh. 3, p. 2, ¶ 15.)
8. Eberhart was not on duty on March 28, 2001, when Plaintiff was arrested and when the book — in process began. (D.'s App., Exh. 3, p. 2,
9. Eberhart's only contact with Plaintiff was on the morning of March 29, 2001. (D.'s App., Exh. 3, p. 2, ¶ 5.)
10. Plaintiff filled out an "Inmate Request Form" dated March 29, 2001, requesting to see a nurse because he believed his hand was fractured. (P.'s Exh. 2.)
11. Plaintiff filled out another form on March 30, 2001, requesting an ice pack and some ibuprofen for his hand. (P's Exh. 4.)
12. On March 30, 2001, A. Womack, who was employed by Ellis County Sheriffs Department as a nurse, examined Plaintiff and noted the following:
Seen very little swelling noted to left hand, contusion to palm of hand full ROM. Due to pain, I'm requesting Tylenol for pain.
(D.'s App. Exh 6.)
13. Plaintiff did not have contact with or ask Eberhart for medical attention after the book — in process had been completed. (P.'s Deposition, p. 36 at lines 23-24, D's App. Exh. 1.)
14. On April 19, 2001, X-rays determined that Plaintiff had a "spiral oblique fracture involving the shaft of the fourth metacarpal with mild offset of the fracture fragments." (P.'s Ex. 6.)
Plaintiff claims that (1) Eberhart participated in the book-in process of Plaintiff for more than a brief period of time, and (2) Eberhart had knowledge of Plaintiff s injuries from the paperwork and from physical interaction with him during the process. Assuming for purposes of Eberhart's Motion for Summary Judgment that these facts are true, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Eberhart's conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law as of March 29, 2001. The book-in form indicated a swollen left hand and also showed that Plaintiff did not complain of any medical problems that needed attention. Eberhart's contact with Plaintiff during the book-in procedure the next day would have revealed, at most, that Plaintiff was complaining of a swollen left hand. Plaintiff admits that he made no requests to Eberhart for medical attention after the book-in was completed on March 29, 2001. Plaintiff first requested medical attention in writing on March 29, 2001, and a nurse examined him on March 30, 2001. Upon examination, Plaintiffs injury to his hand did not appear to be serious, even to a nurse.
Plaintiff has no evidence that a delay in treatment from March 29, 2001, the day he requested medical attention from Eberhart, to March 30, 2001, the day a nurse examined him, adversely affected his health. He does not deny that he received medical treatment; rather, he complains that the treatment he received was inappropriate. He urges that the fracture in his hand should have been discovered sooner. Eberhart was not a nurse or doctor, and the jail provides forms on which inmates may request medical treatment. The undisputed evidence shows that after Plaintiff filled out a written request directed to the medical department, he received medical treatment. Although Plaintiff claims that he needed earlier and better medical treatment, such claims do not prove deliberate indifference and entitle him to judgment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Walker v. Butler, 967 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a medic's decision to make an inmate walk to the hospital was not deliberately indifferent even though a later diagnosis revealed a broken ankle).
Plaintiff's summary judgment evidence falls far short of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Eberhart's violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Assuming Eberhart knew that Plaintiffs left hand was swollen, his failure to assure that Plaintiff received immediate medical attention was not objectively unreasonable. Plaintiff has not shown (1) that Eberhart was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, (2) that Eberhart drew that inference, and (3) that he deliberately failed to provide medical attention appropriate to a serious risk of harm. Swollen hands are not uncommon among inmates. The undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiffs hand-fracture was not obvious. In fact, four medical professionals examined Plaintiffs hand before the fracture was diagnosed. Plaintiff has not shown that Eberhart violated any of his constitutional rights. Eberhart is entitled to summary judgment in his favor.
RECOMMENDATION
The Court recommends that Eberhart's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 14, 2003, be GRANTED.
Signed this day of November, 2003.