Opinion
A101332.
10-10-2003
STEVEN ERIC WALKER et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant and Respondent.
This litigation was commenced by 63 prisoners serving indeterminate life sentences in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Their complaint alleged several causes of action, the factual nexus of which was the allegedly improper refusal by various defendants to grant them parole dates. The complaint sought monetary damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint without leave to amend and 39 of the plaintiffs filed this appeal.[] We find no basis to reverse the trial courts order.
BACKGROUND
Appellants filed their civil complaint in Solano County on July 7, 2000. As aforesaid, the approximately five dozen plaintiffs, all of them inmates of state prisons serving indeterminate life sentences, alleged six causes of action against the State of California (state), its Governor, and dozens of state officials.
Appellants purported to "perfect" service of process upon all defendants by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the office of the Attorney General. While conceding that this effected service on the state, under Government Code section 955.4, subdivision (a) (further references are to the Government Code unless otherwise specified), respondent points out that there is no evidence of personal service on any other defendant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 415.10.
The state appeared in the action and successfully moved for removal of the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The federal district court dismissed all federal claims against the state and permitted the appellants to move for remand to the state court. Upon remand, the state filed the general demurrer which is the subject of this appeal.
On September 17, 2002, the trial court sustained the states general demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend. The trial courts order concluded that: First, all the "[d]efendants are statutorily immune from liability" under sections 820.2 and 845.8; second, "the proper and appropriate manner" for the plaintiffs to pursue relief is "through writ of habeas corpus" in a criminal proceeding; and finally, it was not practicable to construe the complaint as a petition for writ of habeas corpus because of the number of plaintiffs involved and the lack of "facts specific" to their individual "parole board determinations."
The order also expressly allowed the plaintiffs to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus in order to request the types of equitable and injunctive relief which had been sought by their complaint. The appellants moved for reconsideration, which was also denied by the trial court. The record does not contain any order of dismissal following the sustaining of the demurrer. This courts order of February 5, 2003, which noted that an appeal is not possible from an order sustaining demurrer but nevertheless, deemed the trial courts order to have incorporated an order of dismissal and construed the notice of appeal as applying to that judgment. (See Zieff v. Weinstein (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 243, 245, fn. 1.) Therefore, this appeal is both timely and has been permitted to proceed in the interest of justice.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the trial courts decision on demurrer in order to determine whether the complaint contained sufficient facts to state a cause of action under any legal theory. "Because a demurrer both tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and involves the trial courts discretion, an appellate court employs two separate standards of review on appeal. [Citation.] . . . Appellate courts first review the complaint de novo to determine whether or not the plaintiffs complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory, [citation], or in other words, to determine whether or not the trial court erroneously sustained the demurrer as a matter of law. [Citation.]" (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 879 (Cantu).) "Second, if a trial court sustains a demurrer without leave to amend, appellate courts determine whether or not the plaintiff could amend the complaint to state a cause of action." (Id. at p. 879, fn. 9.)
We have examined the complaint to see if it contains sufficient facts to state a cause of action as a matter or law (Filet Menu, Inc. v. Cheng (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1279-1280) and, presuming the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, determine whether or not there is a possibility of relief under any possible legal theory. (Platt v. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1439, 1444.) We have considered the decision to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend under the abuse of discretion standard. (Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 627, 636; Cantu, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 879, fn. 9.)
DISCUSSION
It must be acknowledged that appellants have exercised remarkable care and considerable skill in crafting their complaint to create the appearance that they are not seeking impermissible relief. However, this attempt failed, because it is apparent on the face of the more than 50 page long complaint that appellants seek relief for the alleged failure of the state, and various public officials, to "properly" implement provisions of the Penal Code pertaining to the parole of prisoners. Among other things, appellants pray for a declaration that the State and its officials have "impermissibly expand[ed] upon the mandate established by the . . . California Penal Code § 3000 et seq. [by failing] to set parole release dates for [appellants]." Appellants also pray for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctive relief requiring the state and its officials to refrain from deviating from the "clear intent of the Legislature as set forth in [Penal Code section 3000 et seq.]." A similar declaration is sought with reference to the calculation of time credits pertaining to eligibility for parole dates. Appellants seek to enjoin the Governor and various state officials from "committing or continuing to commit, any act specified in the herein complaint," with reference to "plaintiffs rights, both statutorily and constitutionally . . . ." Other portions of the complaint seek damages, attorney fees and costs in connection with the complaints general allegations that the state and its officials have either failed to carry out statutory duties or misapplied statutory provisions.
Accordingly, the issue before us is whether, as a matter of law, these appellants can recover legal damages or obtain equitable relief with reference to the manner in which the state, state agencies and state employees make and implement parole decisions. The answer to the first part of this question is straightforward.
The state, state agencies and the states employees are immune from damage suits that complain of improper parole decisions under section 845.8: "Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for: [¶] (a) Any injury resulting from determining whether to parole or release a prisoner or from determining the terms and conditions of his parole or release or from determining whether to revoke his parole or release. . . ." Section 811.2 defines "Public entity" to include the state, and its agencies.
An additional ground for immunity applies to the exercise of discretion by public officials. Section 820.2 provides as follows: "Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his [or her] act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him [or her], whether or not such discretion be abused." Section 815, subdivision (b) makes it clear that this discretionary act immunity applies, as well, to state agencies.
The United States Supreme Court has described the inherent discretionary aspect of the parole-release decision as follows: "`The parole-release decision, however, is more subtle and depends on an amalgam of elements, some of which are factual but many of which are purely subjective appraisals by the Board members based upon their experience with the difficult and sensitive task of evaluating the advisability of parole release. Unlike the revocation decision, there is no set of facts which, if shown, mandate a decision favorable to the individual. The parole determination, like a prisoner-transfer decision, may be made, "for a variety of reasons and often involve[s] no more than informed predictions as to what would best serve [correctional purposes] or the safety and welfare of the inmate." [Citation.] The decision turns on a "discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what a man is and what he may become rather than simply what he has done." [Citation.]" (Leyva v. Nielsen (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1067.)
The public policy underlying this grant of immunity is apparent; public officials must undertake their assessment of the multiplicity of imponderables inherent in a parole decision without fear that their decisions may result in liability. (Leyva v. Nielsen, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 1061; Cal. Law Com. com., reprinted at 32 West Annotated Gov. Code (1995 ed.) at p. 461 & (2003 supp.) § 845.8, p. 67.) There is no limitation on the application of the immunity. Accordingly, these appellants are not permitted to recover damages for any act or omission relating to parole decisions made by the state, state agencies or state employees.
Appellants argue on appeal that they are, nevertheless, entitled to equitable relief because they have not challenged the denials of parole in their cases. As we have noted, the appellants have attempted to frame their complaint in terms of the "failure to exercise" the obligation to "set parole dates and provide for uniform terms" by the Board of Prison Terms (BPT). It is clear from the allegations of the complaint, however, that the allegedly wrongful denial of parole is the engine driving the complaint. Paragraphs 110 through 115 of the complaint, complain that the Governor has "summarily rejected" the recommendations of the BPT to grant parole release dates. Paragraphs 120 through 150 allege that various state officials have "intentionally, maliciously, and with intent to oppress plaintiffs," disregarded and distorted matters coming before the BPT to justify refusal to set parole release dates. Pages 49 through 53 of the complaint, which includes its prayers for relief, clearly seeks to enjoin the various defendants in the suit from continuing to act in the manner "specified in the herein complaint" which can only refer to the continued failure to set parole release dates. We discern no meaningful distinction between the decision to grant or not grant parole and any alleged requirement that "parole release dates be set." Whatever the label, the gravaman of the complaint is the exercise of discretion to grant or deny parole. As respondent points out, a decision not to grant parole, or the failure to set a parole-release date, are both necessarily the same as a decision to deny parole.
Of course, this does not mean that appellants may be without any remedy to challenge denial of parole in their cases. Respondent concedes that the superior court had the discretion to consider a civil complaint of this sort as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (See People v. Ray (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 64, 67.) The fact that a trial court might, under some circumstances, choose to thus proceed does not make it obligatory. Despite its length, this complaint provides no specific facts with reference to the individual appellants circumstances or the matters which might have been discussed at their parole hearings. Such facts would be required for the trial court to determine whether or not there had been any abuse of discretion with reference to any specific denial of parole. (In re Morrall (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 280, 298-299.) It is well settled that the facts of the parole hearing must be examined in order to determine whether the "`some evidence" standard indicated there was an abuse of discretion in an individual case. (Id. at pp. 298-299.) Moreover, it is apparent that even if such facts had been alleged in this complaint, the difficulty in deciding in a single case whether or not 63 separate parole decisions after 63 separate parole hearings were improper would have been impracticable. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in deciding not to treat the complaint as a package of petitions for writs of habeas corpus.
There is no dispute that a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the traditional, and better, way to obtain release from custody. (SeeIn re Powell (1988) 45 Cal.3d 894, 903.) Equitable remedies of the sort sought by these appellants would be available, if at all, only if there was no adequate remedy at law, which in this case is provided by the availability of proceedings by petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1564.)
We discern no abuse of discretion in the refusal to permit appellants to amend their complaint. Such abuse of discretion could be found only if there was some reasonable possibility that the pleading could be cured by amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The law is so plain in this area that we cannot conclude that the appellants could ever amend their complaint to state any cognizable cause of action either at law or in equity. (See Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Kline, P. J., Ruvolo, J. --------------- Notes: The notice of appeal names 41 appellants (including a hand-printed notation for one prisoner ("Jones, 23H5L") but the notice was actually signed by only 39 appellants. Appellants opening brief contains the names of 40 appellants, but only 37 signed the opening brief. Appellants reply brief names 41 appellants of which 40 appellants signed. As will be seen, there is no issue pertaining to the number or identity of the appellants raised by this appeal.