Opinion
No. 5-699 / 03-1625
Filed December 7, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, George Stigler, Judge.
Keith Walker appeals from the district court's summary disposition of his application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
John J. Bishop, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Robert P. Ewald, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Kim Griffith, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
The applicant-appellant, Keith Walker, appeals from the district court's denial of his application for postconviction relief. He contends the district court erred in dismissing the application because it did not indicate its intention to dismiss nor give the applicant an opportunity to respond, but dismissed the application without a hearing. We affirm.
Prior proceedings.
The applicant was convicted in 1990, following a jury trial, of first-degree murder. His conviction was upheld by this court on direct appeal. State v. Walker, No. 90-1883 (Iowa Ct.App. Feb. 25, 1992). His 1994 application for postconviction relief was dismissed for want of prosecution in January 1996. His December 1996 application for reinstatement was denied as untimely. The denial was affirmed on appeal. Walker v. State, 572 N.W.2d 589, 591 (Iowa 1997). In 1998 the applicant sought to reinstate his postconviction relief proceeding. The district court denied the application and his subsequent appeal was dismissed as frivolous.
Current proceedings.
In October 2001 the applicant filed the application for postconviction relief that is the subject of this appeal. The district court, after an interlocutory appeal, allowed the application to proceed and appointed counsel. In January 2003 the State moved to dismiss the application. On February 13, 2003 the district court filed its "Order on Motion for Post-Conviction Relief" stating "opposing party has resisted" and denying the motion "for the reasons set out in prior Orders denying Petitioner's Motions for Post-Conviction Relief." On February 19 postconviction counsel filed a "Motion for Additional Time to Respond to Motion to Dismiss." The notice of appeal postmarked March 4, 2003 may not have been filed in district court, but was deemed timely filed by supreme court order in June 2004.
Scope of review.
We review postconviction relief proceedings for errors at law. DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Iowa 2002).
Discussion.
The applicant contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his application for postconviction relief. He advances the court did not give notice of its intent to dismiss, as required in the second paragraph of Iowa Code section 822.6 (2003). He further advances the third paragraph does not apply because the court did not rule on the State's motion to dismiss, but only ruled on his application for postconviction relief. See id.
The second unnumbered paragraph provides:
When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to postconviction relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for dismissal. The applicant shall be given an opportunity to reply to the proposed dismissal. In light of the reply, or on default thereof, the court may order the application dismissed or grant leave to file an amended application or direct that the proceedings otherwise continue. Disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if a material issue of fact exists.
Iowa Code § 822.6 (2003).
The third unnumbered paragraph provides:
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the application, when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Id.
The State responds that the applicant's failure to respond to its motion to dismiss resulted in a default of any arguments he may have had in his application for postconviction relief. See Brown v. State, 589 N.W.2d 273, 275 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998) (determining a court may dismiss an application summarily as a matter of default where the applicant has been served properly with the State's motion to dismiss, given adequate time to respond, and failed to respond). The State further argues paragraph two of section 822.6 does not apply because the court did not indicate its intention to dismiss the application on its own initiative, but instead dismissed under paragraph three as a default.
The State advances three other reasons the dismissal of this newest application for postconviction relief was appropriate: (1) the 1996 denial of his application to reinstate his first application for postconviction relief is the law of the case, barring any claims raised in the first postconviction application, see Walker, 572 N.W.2d at 590-91; (2) Iowa Code section 822.8 generally prevents an applicant from raising issues in a postconviction proceeding that were not raised on direct appeal, see Walker, No. 90-1883 (Iowa Ct.App. Feb. 25, 1992); and (3) section 822.3 sets forth four prerequisites to obtaining relief based on newly-discovered evidence that the State asserts the applicant cannot meet, see Jones v. Scurr, 316 N.W.2d 905, 907 (Iowa 1982).
We first address the court's summary dismissal of the applicant's request for relief because our resolution of this contention determines whether or not we need to address what claims, if any, the applicant may raise given the procedural history of this case.
Iowa Code section 822.6 provides two methods for summary disposition of postconviction relief applications. The first method, stated in paragraph two, allows for summary disposition on the court's initiative and the applicant is entitled to notice of the court's intention to dismiss, the reasons for dismissal, and an opportunity to respond prior to a final disposition. Hines v. State, 288 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Iowa 1980). The second method, set forth in paragraph three, allows for summary disposition on a motion from either party. The goal here "is to provide a method of disposition once the case has been fully developed by both sides, but before an actual trial." Id. The summary disposition under paragraph three is "analogous to" a disposition by summary judgment. Summage v. State, 579 N.W.2d 821, 822 (Iowa 1998); Iowa Rs. Civ. P. 1.981-1.983.
The applicant argues the court acted under the second paragraph, but failed to give notice of its intent to dismiss. The State argues the court acted under the third paragraph, based on the State's motion to dismiss the application and the applicant's failure to respond.
The "Order on Motion for Post-Conviction Relief" provides:
On this day, the Court, presented with Petitioner's Application for Post-Conviction Relief, and being duly advised, does find as follows:
Opposing party has resisted.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said Motion is DENIED, for the reasons set out in prior Orders denying Petitioner's Motions for Post-Conviction Relief.
The applicant asserts the express language used by the court demonstrates it was ruling on his application, not on the State's motion to dismiss. He advances the caption, the first paragraph, and the third paragraph all relate expressly to his postconviction pleadings. The State counters that the applicant did not respond to its motion to dismiss, so the court could rule without a hearing as a matter of default judgment and summarily dismiss the postconviction proceeding. Brown v. State, 589 N.W.2d at 275 ("[W]here a motion to dismiss an application for postconviction relief has been filed, proper service has been made on the nonmoving party, and the nonmoving party has been afforded under Rule [1.981(3)] an adequate time to respond and fails to do so, the court may summarily dismiss the application as a matter of default judgment."); see Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3) (requiring a response within fifteen days). The State asserts the "elliptical" sentence, "Opposing party has resisted" refers to its motion to dismiss. It argues the court properly dismissed the application for postconviction relief without a hearing after the applicant failed to respond to the State's motion to dismiss.
In Brown our court discussed prior cases that required a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, noting that changes in the rules of civil procedure no longer prevent a district court "from reviewing the summary judgment motion and response thereto and ruling thereon without affording the parties a hearing." Brown, 589 N.W.2d at 275. We then applied that principle in the context of postconviction relief proceedings. Id. In the matter before us, the State moved to dismiss the application and properly served the applicant. He was given more than the time required by rule to respond, but did not. The applicant had the opportunity to resist envisioned by prior cases. "These criteria having been met, we determine the trial court did not err in dismissing, without a hearing," the application for postconviction relief. Id. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of the application for postconviction relief.
See Watson v. State, 294 N.W.2d 555, 556 (Iowa 1980); Hines v. State, 288 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Iowa 1980).