Opinion
No. CV 05 5001528
April 27, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #110
The following facts were presented to the court by way of pleadings, and documents accompanying the motion for summary judgment.
On December 12, 2005, the plaintiff, Janette Walker, filed a two-count complaint against the defendants, Joseph Oneto and Chase Manhattan Auto Finance Corporation (Chase). Count one of the complaint, for negligence, is directed against Joseph Oneto and count two of the complaint, for vicarious liability under General Statutes § 14-154a, is directed against Chase. This action arises from the automobile accident.
In her complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. The plaintiff's vehicle and the vehicle operated by Oneto collided on Whitney Avenue in Hamden on July 19, 2004. The collision was caused by the negligence and carelessness of Oneto. At the time of the collision, Oneto operated a vehicle owned by Chase. Oneto was in lawful possession of the vehicle by virtue of a lease in which he was lessee of the vehicle and Chase was a lessor. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff sustained injuries, incurred medical expenses, lost wages, lost capacity to earn income and "suffered the loss of life's pleasures."
On October 25, 2006, Chase filed a motion for summary judgment accompanied by a memorandum of law and a sworn affidavit with the supporting documentation attached. On December 6, 2006, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition. On December 26, 2006, Chase filed a reply memorandum. On January 8, 2007, Chase filed a supplemental reply memorandum. On February 8, 2007, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to Chase's supplemental reply memorandum. The matter was heard on the short calendar on February 26, 2007.
DISCUSSION CT Page 5815
"Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Morris v. Congdon, 277 Conn. 565, 568-69, 893 A.2d 413 (2006). "[I]n seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle[s] him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Socha v. Bordeau, 277 Conn. 579, 585-86, 893 A.2d 422 (2006). "A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if it raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiff's claim and involves no triable issue of fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosato v. Mascardo, 82 Conn.App. 396, 400, 844 A.2d 893 (2004)."[T]he party moving for summary judgment . . . is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including affidavits." Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 796, 653 A.2d 122 (1995). Likewise, "[t]he existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counter affidavits and concrete evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible Tract Society of New York, Inc., 78 Conn.App. 865, 871, 829 A.2d 38, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 931, 837 A.2d 805 (2003). "[O]nly evidence that would be admissible at trial may be used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment, and the applicable provisions of our rules of practice contemplate that supporting [or opposing] documents . . . be made under oath or be otherwise reliable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rockwell v. Quintner, 96 Conn.App. 221, 233-34 n. 10, 899 A.2d 738, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 917, CT Page 5816 908 A.2d 538 (2006). The court may consider not only the facts presented by the parties' affidavits and exhibits, but also the "inferences which could be reasonably and logically drawn from them . . ." United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 381, 260 A.2d 596 (1969).
"As required by Practice Book § 17-46, [s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 97 Conn.App. 527, 538-39, 906 A.2d 14 (2006).
In its supplemental reply memorandum, Chase argues that there is no issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because, as an owner of a vehicle leased for a term of more than one year and insured for bodily injury liability in the amount of $ 100,000 per person and $ 300,000 per accident, it is exempt from liability under General Statutes § 14-154a(b)(1). In support of its motion for summary judgment, Chase submitted a signed and sworn affidavit of its assistant vice president accompanied by a copy of the lease agreement between Chase and the operator of the vehicle. Chase also submitted an unauthenticated copy of the declaration sheet for the insurance policy obtained by the operator of the vehicle.
The plaintiff counters that Chase failed to meet its burden of establishing that it is exempt from vicarious liability under § 14-154a(b)(1) because Chase has not offered any evidence regarding the term of the subject lease and because the evidence offered in support of the sufficiency of insurance coverage is inadequate in that a photocopy of a purported declaration sheet for the insurance policy submitted by Chase is not authenticated. The plaintiff further argues that even if exception applies, under § 14-154a, Chase still would be liable, albeit to a limited extent, i.e., $ 100,000 per person and $ 300,000 per accident, and therefore, must remain in the case.
General Statutes § 14-154a(a) provides in relevant part: "Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner." Nevertheless, General Statutes § 14-154a(b)(1) that became effective on October 1, 2003, carves out the following exception: "The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to . . . [a]ny person, with respect to the person's lease to another of a private passenger motor vehicle, if the total lease term is for one year or more and if, at the time damages are incurred, the leased vehicle is insured for bodily injury liability in amounts of not less than one hundred thousand dollars per person and three hundred thousand dollars per occurrence and the vehicle is not subject to subdivision (2) of this subsection . . ."
"As used in this section, `private passenger motor vehicle' means a: (A) Private passenger type automobile; (B) station-wagon-type automobile; (C) camper-type motor vehicle; (D) truck-type motor vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of less than ten thousand pounds, registered as a passenger motor vehicle, as defined in section 14-1, or as a passenger and commercial motor vehicle, as defined in said section, or used for farming purposes; or (E) a vehicle with a commercial registration, as defined in subdivision (12) of said section. Private passenger motor vehicle does not include a motorcycle or motor vehicle used as a public or livery conveyance." General Statutes § 14-154a(b)(1).
In the present case, it is undisputed that at the time of the accident Oneto was operating a private passenger motor vehicle owned, and leased to him, by Chase. Therefore, the remaining questions are whether the lease agreement between Chase and Oneto was for more than one year, and whether, at the time of the accident, the leased vehicle was insured for bodily injury liability in amounts of not less than $ 100,000 per person and $ 300,000 per occurrence.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Chase has submitted a sworn affidavit by Sue Seegers, the assistant vice president of Chase, with an attached copy of a lease agreement between Chase and Oneto, establishing that the vehicle in question was leased to Oneto for a lease term of forty-eight month (Affidavit, ¶ 2), i.e., more than one year, and that, at all times material to this action, Chase was an additional insured under the USAA insurance company policy with the standard coverage of $ 100,000/$ 300,000 bodily injury liability issued in the name of Oneto. (Affidavit, ¶ 7.) A copy of the lease agreement between Chase and Oneto, attached to the affidavit, further supports the facts to which the affiant attests.
"Trial courts may take judicial notice of facts contained in the court file . . ." In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 402, 852 A.2d 643, appeal dismissed, 270 Conn. 406, 852 A.2d 657 (2004).
Chase also submitted an unauthenticated copy of the declaration sheet for the insurance policy issued to Oneto. "[B]efore a document may be considered by the court in support of a motion for summary judgment, there must be a preliminary showing of [the document's] genuineness, i.e., that the proffered item of evidence is what its proponent claims it to be. The requirement of authentication applies to all types of evidence, including writings . . . Documents in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment may be authenticated in a variety of ways, including, but not limited to, a certified copy of a document or the addition of an affidavit by a person with personal knowledge that the offered evidence is a true and accurate representation of what its proponent claims it to be." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New Haven v. Pantani, 89 Conn.App. 675, 679, 874 A.2d 849 (2005). "The trial court has wide discretion in its rulings on evidence and its rulings will be reversed only if the court has abused its discretion or an injustice appears to have been done." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Drabik v. East Lyme, 234 Conn. 390, 398-99, 662 A.2d 118 (1995).
In the present case, the plaintiff objects to the Chase's submission of an unauthenticated photocopy of the declaration sheet for Oneto's insurance policy. The court sustains the plaintiff's objection. The affidavit with an attached copy of the lease agreement, submitted by Chase in support of its motion for summery judgment, is sufficient to establish that the lease term was for more than one year and that the leased vehicle was insured for bodily injury liability in amounts of not less than $ 100,000 per person and $ 300,000 per occurrence and that, consequently, Chase is exempt from vicarious liability under General Statutes § 14-154a(b)(1).
The plaintiff further contends that, even if exception applies, under § 14-154a, Chase still would be liable, albeit to a limited extent i.e., $ 100,000 per person and $ 300,000 per accident and therefore, must remain in the case. The plaintiff's contention is without merit.
"The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." General Statutes § 1-2z.
"In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language . . ." General Statutes § 1-1(a).
In the present case, the meaning of § 14-154a(b)(1) can be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and the meaning of the text is plain and unambiguous. General Statutes § 14-154a(b)(1) exempts from the vicarious liability any owner of a leased vehicle with the term of lease of one year or more if, at the time of accident, the vehicle has been insured for bodily injury liability in the amounts of not less than $ 100,000 per person and $ 300,000 per occurrence Because the court finds that the vehicle in question was leased to Oneto with the term of more than one year and, at the time of accident, it was insured for bodily injury liability in the amounts of not less than $ 100,000 per person and $ 300,000 per occurrence, the exception in § 14-154a(b)(1) applies. Therefore, Chase is exempt from vicarious liability as the owner of the leased vehicle. Moreover, the plaintiff failed to submit any counter affidavits or other evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. "Once the moving party has met its burden . . . the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . It is not enough . . . for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Socha v. Bordeau, supra, 277 Conn. 586.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff failed to meet its burden of establishing the existence of any issue of material fact. Chase is entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to on the ground that, under General Statutes § 14-154a(b)(1), Chase, as a lessor, is exempt from vicarious liability for the damages to the plaintiff allegedly caused by Oneto's operation of the leased vehicle.
The motion for summary judgment is granted.
As an alternative ground, Chase asserts that, as the owner of the leased vehicle who is in business of renting or leasing vehicles, it is exempt from vicarious liability based on the federal Transportation Equity Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 30106, enacted on August 10, 2005, which preempts General Statutes § 14-154a. The plaintiff counters that 49 U.S.C.A. § 30106 is unconstitutional as an intrusion on the powers reserved to the states by the tenth amendment and as an unlawful exercise of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. In light of the court's decision this alternative ground will not be addressed.