Opinion
NO. 2012 CA 0662
12-21-2012
JAMES TIGNER WALKER, BARBARA RIGBY WALKER, ALISON W. MEDINIS, CARYN W. DONNELLY, CLARE1 W. KETTELKAMP AND ANDREW TIGNER WALKER v. J-W OPERATING COMPANY, GRIGSBY PETROLEUM, INC., MATADOR PRODUCTION COMPANY AND THE STATE OF LOUISIANA THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION
Charles G. Tutt Shreveport, Louisiana Attorney for Appellants, James Tigner Walker, Barbara Rigby Walker, Alison W. Medinis, Caryn W. Donnelly, Clair W. Kettelkamp, and Andrew Tigner Walker Wm. Timothy Allen, III Paul M. Adkins Stacey D. Williams Shreveport, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellees, J-W Operating Company, Cohort Energy Co., Noble Energy, Inc., and Thomas J. Adair, LLC #2 Jamie D. Rhymes April L. Rolen-Ogden Attorneys for Appellees, Grigsby Petroleum, Inc., Desert Paul Matthew Jones Lafayette, Louisiana Partners III, LP, J. Kyle Jones and Tara Lee Jones, Ashley Tad Hillin, Jack W. Grigsby, Lakeland Co., LC, Grigsby Land LC, KCS Resources, Inc., Winwell Resources, Inc. and G&G Partnership Glenn L. Langley B. Lee Carr, Jr. Shreveport, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellees Matador Production; J. Howard Hooper, Universal Legatee of the Succession of Annelle Hutchinson Hooper; Colbert Lands, LLC; Colbert-Fournoy, LLC; Elizabeth McClellan Turner; Jay Edward Hooper, Jr. and Leslee Hooper Roche, Sole Heirs of Jay Edward Hooper; John L. McClellan; LHRT Partnership; Margaret Trigg Hooper Smith; Phyllis Jackson; Robert Campbell Hutchinson; Susan H. Magee; Phyllis Jackson, Usufructuary, and William Hutchinson Jackson, Jr., Thomas Harman Jackson and Rebecca Reynolds Jackson Falls, Naked Owners; Clifton Trigg Hutchinson; Dr. Adele Hutchinson Haber; Campbell Hutchinson, as Trustee of Ann Hutchinson Green Family Trust; Robert Campbell Hutchinson; and Hargrove Land & Co. R. Joseph Wilson Jena, Louisiana Attorney for Appellee The State of Louisiana, through the Office of Conservation, Commissioner of Conservation Byron A. Richie Shreveport, Louisiana Attorney for Appellees Succession of James F. Thigpen, Christopher Jacob Thigpen, Sarah Alice Thigpen Lynn, and the James E. Boswell and Athlyn Thigpen Boswell Revocable Living Trust C. Theodore Alpaugh, III New Orleans, Louisiana Attorney for Appellee KDN Corporation
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
W. KETTELKAMP AND ANDREW TIGNER WALKER
On Appeal from the
19th Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 555,247
The Honorable Wilson Fields, Judge Presiding
Charles G. Tutt
Shreveport, Louisiana
Attorney for Appellants,
James Tigner Walker, Barbara Rigby
Walker, Alison W. Medinis, Caryn
W. Donnelly, Clair W. Kettelkamp,
and Andrew Tigner Walker
Wm. Timothy Allen, III
Paul M. Adkins
Stacey D. Williams
Shreveport, Louisiana
Attorneys for Appellees,
J-W Operating Company,
Cohort Energy Co., Noble Energy,
Inc., and Thomas J. Adair, LLC #2
Jamie D. Rhymes
April L. Rolen-Ogden
Attorneys for Appellees,
Grigsby Petroleum, Inc., Desert
Paul Matthew Jones
Lafayette, Louisiana
Partners III, LP, J. Kyle Jones and
Tara Lee Jones, Ashley Tad Hillin,
Jack W. Grigsby, Lakeland Co., LC,
Grigsby Land LC, KCS Resources,
Inc., Winwell Resources, Inc. and
G&G Partnership
Glenn L. Langley
B. Lee Carr, Jr.
Shreveport, Louisiana
Attorneys for Appellees
Matador Production; J. Howard
Hooper, Universal Legatee of the
Succession of Annelle Hutchinson
Hooper; Colbert Lands, LLC;
Colbert-Fournoy, LLC; Elizabeth
McClellan Turner; Jay Edward
Hooper, Jr. and Leslee Hooper Roche,
Sole Heirs of Jay Edward Hooper;
John L. McClellan; LHRT
Partnership; Margaret Trigg Hooper
Smith; Phyllis Jackson; Robert
Campbell Hutchinson; Susan H.
Magee; Phyllis Jackson,
Usufructuary, and William
Hutchinson Jackson, Jr., Thomas
Harman Jackson and Rebecca
Reynolds Jackson Falls, Naked
Owners; Clifton Trigg Hutchinson;
Dr. Adele Hutchinson Haber;
Campbell Hutchinson, as Trustee of
Ann Hutchinson Green Family Trust;
Robert Campbell Hutchinson; and
Hargrove Land & Co.
R. Joseph Wilson
Jena, Louisiana
Attorney for Appellee
The State of Louisiana, through the
Office of Conservation,
Commissioner of Conservation
Byron A. Richie
Shreveport, Louisiana
Attorney for Appellees
Succession of James F. Thigpen,
Christopher Jacob Thigpen, Sarah
Alice Thigpen Lynn, and the James E.
Boswell and Athlyn Thigpen Boswell
Revocable Living Trust
C. Theodore Alpaugh, III
New Orleans, Louisiana
Attorney for Appellee
KDN Corporation
BEFORE: CARTER, C.J., GUIDRY AND GAIDRY, JJ.
CARTER , C.J.
Plaintiffs, James Tigner Walker, Barbara Rigby Walker, Andrew Tigner Walker, Alison Walker Medinis, Caryn W. Donnelly, and Claire Walker Kettelkamp ("plaintiffs") originally filed suit against J-W Operating Company ("J-W"), Grigsby Petroleum, Inc. ("Grigsby"), Matador Production Company ("Matador"), and the State of Louisiana through the Department of Conservation a/k/a the Office of Conservation (the "Office of Conservation"). Plaintiffs' suit requested a declaratory judgment that alternate wells are not authorized by statute, damages for alternate wells already in use, and attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiffs also requested an injunction preventing additional alternate wells from being placed on the surface of their property.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1995, James Tigner Walker and Barbara Rigby Walker acquired a tract of land of approximately 650 acres in sections 17, 18, 19, 20 and 29, Township 15 North, Range 12 West, DeSoto Parish, Louisiana (the "property"). A mineral servitude was reserved with respect to liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons. Therefore, plaintiffs are the surface owners of the property, except for section 29, in which plaintiffs may have owned a portion of the minerals since 2005. In 1996, 1997, and 1998, portions of the property were donated to the remaining four plaintiffs, the children of James and Barbara Walker. The property owned by Plaintiffs lies within the Caspiana Field as defined in the Office of Conservation Order No. 191-A, effective February 15, 1975, and Office of Conservation Order No. 191-B, effective April 15, 1975.
At the time of trial, a controversy existed as to the ownership of the minerals of Section 29.
Following the discovery of natural gas in the Caspiana Field in the early 1970's, the Commissioner of Conservation (the "Commissioner") issued Order No. 191-A and Order No. 191-B in 1975, which created units and established rules and regulations for the development of hydrocarbons from the Cotton Valley Formation and the Hosston Formation in the field. Each unit established by Order No. 191-A and 191-B encompassed approximately 640 acres, based upon the geological and engineering evidence available at that time, which indicated this area could be efficiently and economically drained by one well. The Caspiana Field was divided into twenty-two units. Both Order No. 191-A and Order No. 191-B anticipated the need for future wells within the units as the location of those future wells are fixed at being no closer than 660 feet from a unit boundary and no closer than 2,000 feet from another unit well. Furthermore, Order No. 191-A and Order No. 191-B both indicate that if additional geological or engineering information becomes available, which necessitates a change in the order, a party may petition the Commissioner for a public hearing to consider appropriate changes. Therefore, when it is determined that one well cannot economically and efficiently drain a unit, there should be a hearing to determine the result of that information.
Since 1975, the Caspiana Field has been extensively drilled by numerous wells. There have been substantial improvements in technology that have provided more accurate data than was available in 1975. The Commissioner was able to determine that due to the nature of the geology and the physical characteristics of the reservoir in some units, the gas does not flow over the entirety of the 640 acre unit. As a result of the knowledge as to the nature of the reservoir, beginning in 1994, some of the operators in the Caspiana Field requested permission to drill alternate wells. An alternate well is a well approved by the Commissioner when a unit well is shown not to be actually economically and efficiently draining a unit. Alternate wells are the mechanism used to make sure that the entire unit is properly drained to get maximum production and to prohibit waste.
A public hearing was heard on all of the requests for alternate wells of which plaintiffs complain, and expert testimony was presented by geologists and engineers supporting the need for alternate wells. Between 1996 and 2003, the Commissioner approved six alternate wells on the property. Since 2004, the Commissioner has approved 17 more alternate wells on the property, some of which have never been drilled.
Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that the drilling unit pattern for this field is one well per 640-acre unit. The units correspond to the sections of the field. Plaintiffs allege that only one well may be placed in each unit or section. The Commissioner has approved alternate wells, which have been placed in each unit. Plaintiffs believe too many wells are on their property and attack the authority of the Commissioner to approve the alternate wells rather than establishing new units. Plaintiffs allege that the Commissioner's authority is to allow only one well per unit, and therefore, the Commissioner has violated his statutory authority. The trial court ordered the plaintiffs to amend their petition to include all necessary parties defined as "those people identified by defendants as receiving checks or as mineral lessors, royalty and working interest owners in wells described in Plaintiffs' First Supplemental and Amending Petition ..." Some of these defendants answered, and the plaintiffs obtained default judgments against the ones who did not answer the amended petition.
This matter proceeded to trial. At the end of the presentation of plaintiffs' evidence, all of the defendants moved for judgment in their favor after the plaintiffs completed the presentation of their case. This appeal lies from the granting of an involuntary dismissal by the trial court, which was rendered in open court on June 16, 2011, and signed on October 17, 2011.
At trial, defendants moved for a "directed verdict" but as this matter was before the court as a bench trial, the proper motion was for involuntary dismissal. See Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 1672 and 1810.
Although the trial court stated in open court that it granted a motion for a directed verdict, the actual judgment states that a motion for involuntary dismissal was granted.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Plaintiffs assign numerous errors, but most of them can be summarized as claiming that the trial court erred in finding that the Commissioner has authority to approve alternate wells in an established unit and that the trial court erred in interpreting Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 30:5.1(I) to permit the Commissioner to do so. Plaintiffs alternatively assign as error that any wells approved prior to the effective date of Act 1094 of 1999, enacting Section 30:5.1(I), are not legally approved.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue before this court involves statutory interpretation which is a question of law. Questions of law are reviewed under the de novo standard. See Olde Nawlins Cookery, LLC v. Edwards, 09-1189 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/3/10), 38 So. 3d 1012, 1016.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated Sections 30:1 et seq., the Conservation Act, creates a Commissioner to prevent the waste of the State's oil and gas resources. "Waste" is defined as its "ordinary meaning" as well as:
"physical waste" as that term is generally understood in the oil and gas industry. It includes,La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 30:3(1). The Commissioner has "authority over all persons and property necessary to enforce effectively the provisions of this Chapter and all other laws relating to the conservation of oil or gas." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 30:4(A); Amoco Production Co. v. Thompson, 516 So. 2d 376, 383 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writs denied, 520 So. 2d 118 (La. 1988). Prior to drilling, an operator must obtain a determination from the Commissioner that a proposed well will not waste oil and gas reserves. See Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So.2d 955, 961 (La.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 925, 107 S.Ct. 391, 93 L.Ed.2d 345 (1986) (describing the Commissioner's powers). The Commissioner has specific powers to do the following:
(a) The inefficient, excessive, or improper use or dissipation of reservoir energy; and the location, spacing, drilling, equipping, operating, or producing of an oil or gas well in a manner which results, or tends to result, in reducing the quantity of oil or gas ultimately recoverable from a pool; and ...
make such inquiries as he thinks proper to determine whether or not waste [of oil and gas], ... exists or is imminent ... [and] the authority to collect data; to make investigations and inspections; to examine properties, leases, papers, books, and records; to examine, survey, check, test, and gauge oil and gas wells, tanks, refineries, and modes of transportation; to hold hearings; to provide for the keeping of records and the makings of reports; to require the submission of an emergency phone number by which the operator may be contacted in case of an emergency; and to take any action as reasonably appears to him to be necessary to enforce this Chapter.La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 30:4(B). After notice and hearing, the Commissioner can issue a broad range of orders and regulations aimed at preventing waste. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 30:4(C). Specifically the Commissioner may:
make, after notice and hearings as provided in this Chapter, any-reasonable rules, regulations, and orders that are necessary from timeLa. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 30:4(C).
to time in the proper administration and enforcement of this Chapter, including rules, regulations, or orders for the following purposes:
* * *
(1)(a)(i) To require the drilling, casing, and plugging of wells to be done in such a manner as to prevent the escape of oil or gas out of one stratum to another;
* * *
(13) To regulate the spacing of wells and to establish drilling units, including temporary or tentative spacing rules and drilling units in new fields.
* * *
The above statute gives the Commissioner "authority to make ... any reasonable rules, regulations, and orders that are necessary from time to time in the proper administration and enforcement of this Chapter ..." The statute then lists specific items that are included in this authority. The list is not exclusive but does include the authority to require the spacing of wells and the drilling of wells "to be done in such a manner as to prevent the escape of oil and gas out of one stratum to another." Plaintiffs complain that the authority of the Commissioner does not include the ability to grant permits for alternate wells. However, the legislature's grant to the Commissioner to "make ... reasonable rules, regulations, and orders" would be meaningless if the Commissioner only had the authority to perform the acts listed in Section 30:4(C)(1)-(17). The legislature could have simply said the Commissioner can do the items listed in Section 30:4(C)(1)-(17), but did not do so. The Legislature instead gave the Commissioner the authority to "make ... reasonable rules, regulations, and orders" and "to take any action as reasonably appears to him to be necessary to enforce this Chapter." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 30:4(C) and (B).
The primary duty of the Commissioner is to prevent waste of the state's mineral resources by exercising his authority to promote the full and efficient development of these resources. Hunt Oil Company v. Batchelor, 93-3144 (La. 10/17/94), 644 So. 2d 191, 196-197 (citing Sections 30:2, 30:3, and 30:4). The authority and responsibility for conserving Louisiana's oil and gas resources are virtually entirely vested in the office of the Commissioner of Conservation, Department of Conservation. Id. at 197.
Plaintiffs ignore the broad authority given the Commissioner and focus solely on the lack of words "alternate wells" in the Conservation Act. Plaintiffs argue that until 1999, "alternate wells" were not even mentioned in the Conservation Act, and since that time, only in Section 30:5.1(I). Specifically, plaintiffs assign as error that the trial court incorrectly interpreted Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated Section 30:5.1(I), which reads:
While this Section authorizes the initial creation of a single unit to be served by one or more wells, nothing herein shall be construed as limiting the authority of the commissioner to approve the drilling of alternate unit wells on drilling units established pursuant to R.S. 30:9(B).
Section 30:5.1(I) was added by the legislature in 1999. Section 30:5.1 applies to deep well pools that are not present in the instant case. Plaintiffs argue that since Section 30:9 defines a drilling unit as "the maximum area which may be efficiently and economically drained by one well," the Commissioner never had the authority to put more than one well on a unit. Therefore, Section 30:5.1(I) did not change the Commissioner's authority.
The Commissioner testified that Section 30:5.1 applies to wells drilled deeper than 15,000 feet.
The fundamental issue in this matter is the proper interpretation of the Louisiana Conservation Law. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held, "[w]here two statutes deal with the same subject matter, they should be harmonized if possible, as it is the duty of the courts, in the construction of statutes, to harmonize and reconcile laws." Arabie v. C1TGO Petroleum Corp., 10-2605 (La. 3/13/12), 89 So. 3d 307, 312-313 (quoting McGlothlin v. Christus St. Patrick Hospital, 10-2775 (La. 7/1/11), 65 So. 3d 1218, 1228-29). The well-established rules of statutory interpretation are set forth in the recent Louisiana Supreme Court case of Katie Realty, Ltd. v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, 12-0588 (La. 10/16/12), __ So. 3d __, 2012 WL 4901067:
[T]he interpretation of any statutory provision starts with the language of the statute itself. Oubre v. Louisiana Citizens Fair Plan, 11-0097, p. 11 (La. 12/16/11), 79 So.3d 987, 997. When the provision is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, its language must be given effect, and its provisions must be construed so as to give effect to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language used. La. Civ.Code art. 9; La.Rev.Stat. § 1:4; In re Clegg, 10-0323, p. 20 (La.7/6/10), 41 So.3d 1141, 1154. Unequivocal provisions are not subject to judicial construction and should be applied by giving words their generally understood meaning. La. Civ.Code art. 11; La.Rev.Stat. § 1:3; see also Snowton v. Sewerage and Water Bd., 08-0399, pp. 5-6 (La.3/17/09), 6 So.3d 164, 168.
Words and phrases must be read with their context and construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. La.Rev.Stat. § 1:3. Every word, sentence, or provision in a law is presumed to be intended to serve some useful purpose, that some effect is given to each such provision, and that no unnecessary words or provisions were employed. Colvin v. Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund Oversight Bd., 06-1104, p. 6 (La.1/17/07), 947 So.2d 15, 19; Moss v. State, 05-1963, p. 15 (La.4/4/06), 925 So.2d 1185, 1196. Consequently, courts are bound, if possible, to give effect to all parts of a statute and to construe no sentence, clause, or word as meaningless and surplusage if a construction giving force to and
preserving all words can legitimately be found. Oubre, 11-0097 at 12, 79 So.3d at 997.
Applying the above concepts, this court notes that both Section 30:5.1 and Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated Section 30:9 relate to the authority of the Commissioner to create new units. Section 30:5.1 permits the creation of deep pool units that may be served by one or more wells. Section 30:9 permits the creation of a unit that designates a single well as a unit well. Section 30:9(B) provides:
For the prevention of waste and to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells, the commissioner shall establish a drilling unit or units for each pool, .... A drilling unit, as contemplated herein, means the maximum area which may be efficiently and economically drained by one well. This unit shall constitute a developed area as long as a well is located thereon which is capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities.
The trial court stated that Section 30:5.1(I) expressly authorizes the Commissioner to approve of alternate wells. We disagree and this court's ruling is not based on the rationale of the trial court. Instead, this court finds, according to the rules of statutory interpretation, that Section 30:9(B) must be read in conjunction with Sections 30:2, 30:3, and 30:4, which require the Commissioner to prevent waste, and authorizes him to "make ... reasonable rules, regulations, and orders" and "to take any action as reasonably appears to him to be necessary to enforce this Chapter." Section 30:9(B) mandates that when a unit well is established, it must be in an area that can "be efficiently and economically drained by one well." When, as in the instant case, new technology and findings indicate that a unit cannot be drained by one well, the Commissioner is allowed to hold a hearing and make the necessary "reasonable rules, regulations, and orders" and "to take any action as reasonably appears to him to be necessary to enforce this Chapter." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 30:2, 30:3, and 30:4.
The question then becomes whether the granting of alternate wells is a "reasonable rule, regulation, or order." The first alternate well in Louisiana was approved by an order issued in 1963. Therefore, for almost fifty years, the various Commissioners for the State of Louisiana have approved alternate wells, "A long settled contemporaneous construction by those charged with administering the statute is given substantial and often decisive weight in its interpretation." State v. BP Exploration & Oil, Inc., 96-0716 (La. 1/14/97), 686 So.2d 823, 828.
In further support of the Commissioner's authority to grant alternate wells, the legislature recognized the practice of permitting alternate wells with the passage of Section 30:5.1(I) stating "nothing herein shall be construed as limiting the authority of the commissioner to approve the drilling of alternate unit wells on drilling units established pursuant to Section 30:9(B)." Again, the legislature recognized and acknowledged the authority of the Commissioner in Act 743 of 2012, effective August 1, 2012. Act 743 amended Section 30:5.1 to apply not only to deep pools but to newly defined "deep structure units" as well. The amended statute preserves the Commissioner's existing authority to approve alternate wells and retains the above-quoted language of Section 30:5.1(I).
All of the alternate wells at issue were the subject of a hearing with testimony presented by an expert witness justifying the need for the alternate well to efficiently and economically drain the unit. Each alternate well was found by the Commissioner to be necessary to the nature of the geology, the physical characteristics of the reservoir, or the ability of the oil and gas to flow through a particular formation.
Furthermore, Section 30:9(D) requires the Commissioner to ensure a just and equitable share of oil and gas in the pool to each producer or tract. The Commissioner's authority to issue orders should ensure that the owner of each tract within a unit be given the opportunity to recover or receive his just and equitable share of oil and gas in the pool. Tex/Con Oil and Gas Co. v. Batchelor, 634 So. 2d 902, 910-911 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1993), writ denied, 94-0270 (La. 3/18/94), 635 So. 2d 1102.
The plaintiffs argue that the only method available to the Commissioner is to reconfigure the units and create new boundaries. However, this solution ignores the requirement that the Commissioner afford each producer or tract his just and equitable share of oil and gas in the pool. Reconfiguring units can cause much of the unit to become non-producing. Order No. 191-A and Order No. 191-B require that no wells be placed within 660' of a unit line and no closer than 2000' to any other well. The more a unit is divided, the less space there is to drill, thus creating the waste of the state's natural resources, which the Commissioner is supposed to prohibit and avoid. The record reveals that dividing a unit is inequitable because it does not maintain the equity of the mineral owners. An alternate well provides a reasonable method of insuring the continuation of the just and equitable sharing of production within the unit.
The issue before the court is not the establishment of a unit well. In the present case, the Commissioner did establish a unit well for each unit of the Caspiana Field in Order No. 191-A and Order No. 191-B. The issue is the Commissioner's orders permitting the drilling of alternate wells on existing units established pursuant to Section 30:9. Nothing in Section 30:9 prohibits the permitting of alternate wells on a unit previously established pursuant to Section 30:9. The legislature recognized the authority to approve the drilling of alternate wells on drilling units that had been previously established pursuant to Section 30:9 when it passed Section 30:5.1(I).
Plaintiffs rely heavily on Eads Operating Co., Inc. v. Thompson, 93-2155 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/7/94), 646 So. 2d 948, writ denied, 95-0226 (La. 4/7/95), 652 So. 2d 1345 for the proposition that the Commissioner only has the authority expressly given him. Plaintiffs argue that the authority of the Commissioner to approve alternate wells is not expressed in the Conservation Act. Eads does not involve alternate wells but pertains to the Commissioner's authority to create poolwide units to provide for secondary recovery under the law as it existed prior to an amendment in 1960. Id., 646 So. 2d at 951. Prior to Act 441 of 1960, the Commissioner did not have the authority to establish poolwide units. Id. at 954. Eads involved a Commissioner's order issued in 1948. Id. at 952. The orders issued in this matter do not involve poolwide units and were issued after 1960.
Other cases of this circuit have held that all of the authority of the Commissioner need not be expressly provided in the Conservation Law. This court finds that the holding of EnerQuest Oil and Gas, LLC v. Asprodites, 02-0822 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/2/03), 843 So. 2d 535, is more relevant to the facts of the present case than Eads. An argument similar to the one made by plaintiffs was set forth in EnerQuest. EnerQuest argued that the Commissioner did not have statutory authority to "rework" an existing well since the language "rework" is not contained in Sections 30:4, 30:9 and 30:10. The court found the argument misplaced, and that the Commissioner's authority derived from Section 30:4. Since the Commissioner is charged with the duty of preventing waste, the court found that the Commissioner's finding that reworking of the existing wells to be necessary was within the authority of the Commissioner. Id. at 540. The court also noted that in order to prevent waste, the authority and responsibility of the Commissioner "logically and necessarily must extend to the not uncommon practice of reworking of existing wells, if the Commissioner is to effectively fulfill his primary duty to prevent waste of our state's mineral resources." EnerQuest, 843 So. 2d at 542.
The Commissioner has the authority to make any reasonable rule, regulation and/or order that is necessary to properly administer and enforce the Conservation Law. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 30:4(C). See also Exxon Corp. v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 387 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 568 So. 2d 1054 (La. 1990) (upholding the Commissioner's authority to order retroactive unitization despite having no express authority to do so); Amoco Production Co., 516 So. 2d at 393 (finding that the power of the Commissioner to partition gas from a compulsory unit and require an accounting is implicit from the Commissioner's "authority over all persons and property necessary to effectively enforce the provisions of the Conservation Law and all other laws relating to the conservation of oil or gas and the authority to make any reasonable rule, regulation, or order necessary for the proper administration and enforcement of the Conversation Law.") (Emphasis in original).
This court finds that the Commissioner has authority to issue permits for alternate wells pursuant to its grant of authority to prevent waste and its authority to "make ... reasonable rules, regulations, and orders" to effect that goal. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 30:2, 30:3, and 30:4. 30:5.1(I) simply recognizes the intent of the legislature that alternate wells are within the authority of the Commissioner.
The trial court also took into consideration that the plaintiffs actually granted one of the defendants, Matador Production Company, the right to place alternate wells on a portion of section 29, as plaintiffs own some of the mineral rights in this section, pursuant to a surface use agreement. The trial court found the plaintiffs' position in the current matter to be contradictory to its own actions.
Plaintiffs also assert that since Section 30:5.1(I) was not enacted until 1999, it cannot apply to the alternate wells approved prior to that time. Similar to EnerQuest, this court finds that the authority of the Commissioner is derived from Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated Sections 30:2, 30:3, and 30:4.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed for the reasons set forth above. Costs of the appeal are assessed to appellants, James Tigner Walker, Barbara Rigby Walker, Alison W. Medinis, Caryn W. Donelly, Clair W. Kettelkamp, and Andrew Tigner Walker.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.