Opinion
C. A. 6:23-cv-03544-HMH-KFM
08-25-2023
Saria Walker, Plaintiff, v. Greenville County Clerk of Court, Thirteenth Circuit Solicitor's Office, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a civil action filed by a pro se and in forma pauperis non-prisoner plaintiff. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on July 21,2023 (doc. 1). Upon review of the plaintiff's complaint, the undersigned recommends it be dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
Of note, it appears that this action arises out of the plaintiff's dissatisfaction with proceedings in the Greenville County General Sessions Court involving herself and an individual named Elijah Wilson. See Greenville County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter Elijah Wilson and 2013A2320601176) (last visited August 11,2023); see also Greenville County Public Index (enter the plaintiff's name and 2022A2330206521,2022A2330206522, 2022A2330206523, 2022A2330206524, 2022A2330206525, 2022A2330206556) (last visited August 11,2023).
The plaintiff alleges federal question jurisdiction based upon various federal laws and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (doc. 1 at 3). She contends that the defendants are violating her rights because they are harassing her, threatening her, and failing to uphold the law in pending lawsuits (id. at 5). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages (id.).
The plaintiff further contends that her rights have been violated because Assistant Solicitor Jeff Weston will not reopen a conviction or grant postconviction relief for Elijah Wilson based on the plaintiff's statements (doc. 1-1 at 1-2). She contends that Asst. Sol. Weston's failure to utilize her statement about events occurring in 2013 violates Brady because he is required to move for a new trial based on her evidence (id. at 3, 5). She also contends that Elijah Wilson should not have been found guilty by association (id. at 6-8). She further contends that on July 21, 2023, she was harassed when trying to file the witness statement with the Greenville County Clerk's Office (id. at 29).
The plaintiff supplemented her complaint on July 26, 2023 (doc. 9). In the supplement, she alleges that the federal court is required to protect her civil rights and that the federal court has violated its oath of office by failing to grant her relief (id. at 1-2).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a Defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
ANALYSIS
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action seeking damages and injunctive relief from the defendants. However, as set forth in more detail below, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Elijah Wilson Claims
As an initial matter, to the extent the plaintiff's complaint seeks relief related to Elijah Wilson's assault and battery by mob conviction, she may not do so in this action because a pro se party may not file or maintain a lawsuit on behalf of others. See Myers v. Loudon Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that although an individual has the right to represent himself/herself by statute - 28 U.S.C. § 1654 - that right does not “create a coordinate right to litigate for others”). The same applies to the plaintiff's claim that Elijah Wilson should be entitled to postconviction relief based upon her exculpatory statement provided ten years after the charges were filed and five years after the conviction was finalized. As such, claims raised by the plaintiff on Elijah Wilson's behalf are subject to summary dismissal.
Younger Abstention
To the extent the plaintiff's allegations can be construed as seeking federal court involvement with her pending state criminal charges, the plaintiff is requesting that this court interfere with or enjoin pending state criminal prosecution against her (see generally docs. 1; 1-1; 9). As noted above, the plaintiff has six pending charges in the Greenville General Sessions Court. See Greenville County Public Index (enter the plaintiff's name and 2022A2330206521, 2022A2330206522, 2022A2330206523, 2022A2330206524, 2022A330206525, 2022A2330206556) (last visited August 11, 2023). Because a federal court may not award injunctive relief that would affect pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this court should abstain from interfering with them. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Younger noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate). From Younger and its progeny, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
Here, the first criterion is met, as the plaintiff is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings. As for the second criterion, the Supreme Court has stated that the “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Court also addressed the third criterion in noting “‘that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.'” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). Here, the plaintiff has the opportunity to argue that her charges should be dismissed in the Greenville County General Sessions proceedings. Indeed, the plaintiff's vague and nonsensical allegations fail to make a showing of “extraordinary circumstances” justifying federal interference with the state proceedings. See Robinson v. Thomas, 855 F.3d 278, 286 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A federal court may disregard Younger's mandate to abstain from interfering with ongoing state proceedings only where ‘extraordinary circumstances' exist that present the possibility of irreparable harm.”). Therefore, to the extent the plaintiff seeks an order from this court enjoining her pending criminal prosecutions in the Greenville County General Sessions Court, this court should abstain from hearing this action.
18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 1512, 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.443, 11.448
To the extent the plaintiff purports to bring claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 1512 or 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.443, 11.448, her claims are subject to summary dismissal. These are federal criminal statutes and Bureau of Indian Affairs/Department of the Interior criminal regulations that do not create a private right of action. See Pinckney v. U.S. Government, C/A No. 2:19-cv-00939-BHH-BM, 2019 WL 4171117, at *2 (D.S.C. June 20, 2019), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 4168753 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2019). The plaintiff, as a private citizen, may not enforce federal criminal laws. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). As such, any claims purported brought pursuant to these statutes and regulations are subject to summary dismissal.
Fair Housing Act Claim
The plaintiff also purports to bring a retaliation claim under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3617, although her complaint contains no allegations regarding retaliation by the defendants with relation to the FHA (doc. 1 at 3). To demonstrate a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “that (1) she was engaged in protected activity; (2) [the defendant] was aware of that activity; (3) [the defendant] took adverse action against her; and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the asserted adverse action.” Hall v. Greystar Mgmt. Servs., L.P., 637 Fed.Appx. 93, 97-98 (4th Cir. 2016) (unpublished). The plaintiff's complaint involves dissatisfaction with court proceedings - and contains no allegations that she was discriminated with respect to housing (see doc. 1). As such, to the extent the plaintiff purports to bring a retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3617, it should be dismissed.
Section 1985 and Section 1986 Claims
The plaintiff's claims asserting a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 or 1986 are also subject to summary dismissal. First, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has “specifically rejected section 1985 claims whenever the purported conspiracy is alleged in a merely conclusory manner,” absent concrete supporting facts. See Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1377 (4th Cir. 1995). Further, the plaintiff's complaint does not allege under which subsection of § 1985 she seeks relief; however, her complaint fails to state a claim under all of the subsections. For example, § 1985(1) governs conspiracies to prevent a federal officer from performing his or her duties, but the plaintiff has not alleged any facts about a federal officer despite asserting that the federal court has violated its duties by not granting the plaintiff relief (see doc. 9). Section 1985(2) involves conspiracies to interfere with court proceedings, but the plaintiff has not alleged a conspiracy by the defendants to intimidate a witness or juror in court proceedings. Although the plaintiff alleges a conspiracy because Asst. Sol. Weston will not move to vacate Elijah Wilson's conviction based on the plaintiff's newly provided statement, her claim fails because she has only alleged one party to the purported conspiracy - Asst. Sol. Weston - and she has not alleged that she tried to participate in Elijah Wilson's court proceedings when they were pending. Indeed, she concedes that she has provided the alleged exculpatory statement five years after Elijah Wilson pled guilty and ten years after he was charged with assault and battery by mob. Moreover, the plaintiff has not alleged “class-based” animus as required to raise a claim under the portion of § 1985(2) applicable to state court proceedings. See Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 726 (1983) (noting that the second part of § 1985(2), which applies to state court proceedings, requires an allegation of class-based animus). As such, the plaintiff has also not stated a claim under § 1985(2). Section 1985(3) applies to conspiracies to engage in “class-based” discrimination to “deprive the plaintiff of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law.” A Soc'y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011).
The plaintiff, however, has not alleged membership to a class contemplated by the statute - indeed, her conspiracy allegations appear to allege a personal animus by the defendants, not a class-based one. See Batiste v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, C/A No. 5:13-cv-13565, 2013 WL 6589878, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 16, 2013) (noting that a plaintiff in a § 1985 action must allege that the conspiracy to discriminate is based upon race, gender, or national origin). As such, the plaintiff has failed to allege a claim under § 1985. Moreover, because a § 1986 claim is derivative of a § 1985 claim, the plaintiff's § 1986 claim is likewise subject to summary dismissal. See King v. PEM Props., C/A No. 2:16-cv-09876, 2019 WL 6210937, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 17, 2019), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 6194639 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 20, 2019).
Section 1983 Claims
The plaintiff's § 1983 claims are likewise subject to summary dismissal. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albrightv. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Not a Person
The defendants in this action - Greenville County Clerk of Court and the Thirteenth Circuit Solicitor's Office - are subject to summary dismissal because they are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law; thus, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” Inanimate objects or groups of people, such as departments, buildings, facilities, and grounds cannot act under color of state law. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that “neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.”); Rhodes v. Seventh Circuit Solicitors Ofc., C/A No. 9:09-cv-1863-JFA-BM, 2009 WL 2588487, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2009) (county public defender office and county solicitor office not persons subject to suit under § 1983). Here, the defendants are buildings, departments, inanimate objects, or facilities. Thus, they are not persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, they are entitled to summary dismissal.
Oath of Office Claims
Even presuming the plaintiff had named a defendant amenable to suit under § 1983, to the extent she purports to bring any independent claims for violations of oath of office by the defendants, these are not cognizable independent claims under state or federal law. See Alford v. Mecklenburg Cnty. Clerk of Superior Ct., C/A No. 3:19-cv-00156-MOC-DSC, 2019 WL 2881556, at *6 (W.D. N.C. July 2, 2019). The plaintiff's reliance on 5 U.S.C. § 3331 also fails to provide a basis for relief because that statute applies to federal authorities - none of which have been named in this action. See 5 U.S.C. § 3331. As such, the plaintiff's oath of office claims are subject to summary dismissal.
Clerk of Court Claims
To the extent the plaintiff's complaint can be construed as seeking relief against a specific clerk at the Greenville County courthouse, her claims would still be subject to summary dismissal. Here, it appears that the plaintiff is dissatisfied with the Greenville County Clerk because documents she submitted for filing in the Elijah Wilson case were not accepted or docketed (see docs. 1 at 3; 1-1 at 29). However, court clerks enjoy derivative absolute judicial immunity when they act in obedience to a judicial order or under the court's direction. See McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 5 (4th Cir. 1972). The plaintiff's allegations against the Greenville County Clerk involve the clerk's role as the clerk of court under the direction of judicial officers; thus, the Greenville County Clerk has immunity and should be dismissed. See Holcomb v. Greenville Cnty. Clerk of Court, C/A No. 6:17-cv-02001-MGL-SVH, 2017 WL 4023128 (D.S.C. Aug. 23, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 4012389 (D.S.C. Sept. 12, 2017) (noting that immunity was extended to court support personnel because “disappointed litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from suing the judge directly, will vent their wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). As such, the plaintiff's claims against the Greenville County Clerk are also subject to dismissal.
Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim
Even presuming the plaintiff had named Asst. Sol. Weston as a defendant (and not just the Solicitor's Office) in this action, her claims that he committed prosecutorial misconduct are subject to summary dismissal because Asst. Sol. Weston is entitled to prosecutorial immunity. As noted, the crux of the plaintiff's claims against Asst. Sol. Weston is that he refused to seek to reopen a conviction for Elijah Wilson from 2018 based on the plaintiff's proffered witness statement (docs. 1 at 3; 1-1 at 1-2, 3, 5). As an initial matter, the claims regarding prosecutorial misconduct by the plaintiff in this action involve the criminal prosecution of Elijah Wilson - and private citizens (such as the plaintiff) do not have a “judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” See Linda R., 410 U.S. at 619. As such, the plaintiff cannot bring a claim alleging prosecutorial misconduct because of actions taken in Elijah Wilson's criminal proceeding. Additionally, prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings such as criminal trials, bond hearings, bail hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pretrial motions hearings. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 267-71 (1993); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff's bare allegations alone are insufficient to overcome the immunity afforded to Asst. Sol. Weston, so any claims construed as being raised against Asst. Sol. Weston are also subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending her complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 2022 WL 3590436 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2022) (mem.) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.