Opinion
CV186078543
11-27-2018
Charles WALDER v. Laquashia WHITAKER et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OZALIS, J.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff, Charles Walder (Walder), alleges the following facts against the defendants, Laquashia Whitaker (Whitaker) and Samuel Thompson (Thompson), in his complaint filed on March 6, 2018. The plaintiff alleges that on or about April 15, 2016, he was operating a motor vehicle northbound on Fitch Street in New Haven, Connecticut. At the same time and place, Thompson was operating a motor vehicle directly behind the plaintiff’s vehicle, and Whitaker was operating a motor vehicle directly behind Thompson’s vehicle. The plaintiff alleges that Whitaker’s vehicle struck the rear of Thompson’s vehicle, pushing his vehicle into the plaintiff’s vehicle, resulting in a three-car collision. The plaintiff alleges that he has suffered losses and injuries from such collision. The plaintiff asserts a claim for negligence against each of the defendants and seeks compensatory damages for his losses and injuries.
Thompson filed a Motion to Dismiss Count Two of the Complaint which alleged a claim of negligence against him on August 21, 2018. The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion on August 27, 2018, to which Thompson filed a reply memorandum on October 9, 2018. Arguments on this motion to dismiss were heard on October 29, 2018.
II.
DISCUSSION
"[A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks. omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). "Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). "In general, a motion to dismiss is the proper procedural vehicle to raise a claim that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action." Bellman v. West Hartford, 96 Conn.App. 387, 392, 900 A.2d 82 (2006).
"[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011). "Claims involving the doctrines of ... statutory immunity, pursuant to [General Statutes] § 4-165, implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelly v. Albertsen, 114 Conn.App. 600, 605, 970 A.2d 787 (2009). Accordingly, a "motion to dismiss is the appropriate procedural vehicle to raise a claim that sovereign immunity [or statutory immunity] bars the action." Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn.App. 103, 116, 891 A.2d 106 (2006), aff’d, 102 Conn.App. 315, 926 A.2d 38 (2007).
Defendant Thompson filed a motion to dismiss Count Two of the Complaint sounding in negligence on the ground that he is statutorily immune from suit in accordance with General Statutes § 4-165. Section 4-165 states in relevant part: "No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment. Any person having a complaint for such damage or injury shall present it as a claim against the state under the provisions of this chapter." Defendant Thompson argues that as a result of § 4-165, he is afforded statutory immunity from suit and this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Count Two of the complaint. In his objection to this motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argues that the court does have subject matter jurisdiction because § 4-165 is inapplicable to the circumstances before the court, and therefore, defendant Thompson is not entitled to statutory immunity.
In support of his motion to dismiss, defendant Thompson attached an affidavit of a State of Connecticut Human Resources Specialist stating that at the time of the accident, Thompson was employed by the State of Connecticut as a courier. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Ex. A. The affidavit also states that Thompson was authorized to drive state owned vehicles. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Ex. A. Additionally, an amended affidavit of the same Human Resources Specialist states that at the time of the accident in question, Thompson was operating a state owned vehicle. Def.’s Reply. Mem. Ex. A. See Pl.’s Mot. Dismiss Ex. A. p. 3. The plaintiff did not present any evidence to counter the evidence offered by the defendant or evidence that reflected any wanton, reckless, or malicious conduct on behalf of defendant Thompson.
This court finds that Thompson was acting within the scope of his state employment and was driving a state vehicle at the time of the accident in question.
As Thompson was acting within the scope of his state employment while driving a vehicle to which the evidence submitted reflects was owned by the state at the time of the accident, and the state has waived sovereign immunity as to this area of fault, the only cause of action that exists is against the state, and not against Thompson personally. See, e.g., Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 319, 828 A.2d 549 (2003) ("[i]n other words, state employees may not be held personally liable for their negligent actions performed within the scope of their employment ..."). Thus, defendant Thompson is afforded statutory immunity from suit pursuant to § 4-165 and defendant Thompson’s Motion to Dismiss Count Two of the Complaint is granted.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant Thompson’s motion to dismiss Count Two of the Complaint on the ground that he is statutorily immune from suit pursuant to § 4-165 is granted. Our Supreme Court has not "definitively determined the meaning of wanton, reckless or malicious as used in § 4-165." Martin v. Brady, supra, 261 Conn. 379, 802 A.2d 814 (2002). "In the common-law context, however, [the Connecticut Supreme Court has] stated: In order to establish that the defendants’ conduct was wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious, the plaintiff must prove, on the part of the defendants, the existence of a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one’s acts ... [I]n order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.