Opinion
3:21-cv-1344-JR
09-21-2021
APRIL S. WALDEN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF OREGON PORTLAND DIVISION, Defendant.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
JOLIE A. RUSSO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro se plaintiff, April Walden, brings this action “against the United States District Court, District of Oregon for failing to conduct an Internal (Complete) Investigation into the Abuse and Retaliation I experienced at Providence Health & Services in 2018.” Complaint (ECF 2) at p. 1. Because the Court has no such duty to investigate, the Court construes plaintiff's complaint as alleging a claim for violation of her due process rights related to Walden v. Providence Health and Services, 3:19-cv-1717-AC.
Plaintiff moves to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). A review of plaintiff's application reveals she is unable to afford the costs of litigation, therefore the IFP application (ECF 1) is granted. However, the Clerk of the Court shall not issue process at this time.
Plaintiff's allegations, while generally nonsensical, challenge the dismissal of her complaint in the 19-cv-1717-AC case: Plaintiff alleges:
On July 10th, 2020 I filed a" Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and the Memornandum of Law, and I also Included the Evidence, which I titled DISCOVERY with the document. I placed the evidence in a 8 x 11 envelope, and titled it confidential as it was crucial and sensitive in my case. The photos I disclosed showed pictures of the Object, where it was sitting, what it was attached to, the toxic description of the Information listed on the weapon, and how it was Intentionally placed in a work office to cause harm. After submitting the crucial piece of evidence, I have been patiently waiting (like patients in the doctors office for three years) for the results. But Unfortunately the Court did not Intervene, nor did they take any further action on my behalf.
Complaint (ECF 2) at pp. 1-2.
The court should dismiss, at the earliest practical time, certain IFP actions that fail to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (in assessing whether a complaint fails to plead a claim, the court must accept all factual allegations as true); Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996) (allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff).
A complaint must comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) requires a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” However,
[w]hile a complaint ... does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level....Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Moreover, the Supreme Court has emphasized that, when assessing the sufficiency of any civil complaint, a court must distinguish factual contentions-which allege behavior on the part of the defendant that, if true, would satisfy one or more elements of the claim asserted-and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. In short, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.
On August 24, 2020 in case 3:19-cv-1717-AC, Judge John Acosta recommended granting defendant Providence's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff filed objections on September 10, 2020, and on October 9, 2020, Chief Judge Marco Hernandez adopted the recommendation and dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. On October 26, 2020, plaintiff moved to “add additional evidence”. On October 28, 2020, Judge Acosta interpreted plaintiff's motion as an attempt to cure the deficiencies in her complaint, found the attempt lacking and ordered plaintiff to file an amended complaint by November 30, 2020. The Court warned plaintiff that a failure to file the amended complaint would result in dismissal with prejudice. Plaintiff failed to file anything further and on December 7, 2020, Judge Hernandez dismissed the case with prejudice. Plaintiff did not file an appeal.
Plaintiff challenges the dismissal by judicial officers of this court. The Supreme Court has long held that while sovereign immunity prevents suits against the government as an entity, it does not, in all instances, prevent suits against government officers in their individual capacities. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 686-87 (1949). However, the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be avoided merely by naming officers and employees of the United States as defendants. Id. at 687. When a federal officer is sued in his or her representative capacity, the suit is actually a suit against the United States, and it is barred by sovereign immunity. United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853, 858 (9th Cir.1986). A suit is against the sovereign if the “‘judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be ‘to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'” Id. (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 n. 11 (1984)). However, sovereign immunity clearly will not protect an officer from liability when actions of an officer are ultra vires of his designated authority. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1963). Actions are ultra vires when: (1) the official's act is beyond the limits of his statutorily designated authority, (2) the official is acting pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, or (3) the official himself commits an unconstitutional act or deprives another of a federal right. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 474 (9th Cir. 1992) (concurring opinion); see also Dugan, 372 U.S. at 621-22. Courts generally hold that suits charging individual federal officials with unconstitutional acts are not barred by sovereign immunity. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d at 859. In these ultra vires situations, the officer's actions can act as the basis of a suit for specific relief against the officer as an individual. Id.
Arguably, plaintiff's complaint could be construed as seeking redress from a due process violation against a government official which can be excepted from the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Nonetheless, a suit may fail as one against the sovereign, even if alleged that the officer being sued has acted unconstitutionally or beyond his statutory powers; if the requested relief cannot be granted by merely ordering cessation of the complained conduct but would require affirmative action by the sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign property. Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 n. 11 (1949). While plaintiff appears to be seeking injunctive relief, she also indicates she is seeking reimbursement for $17,834.77. Assuming an extra judicial act and payment of damages directly from the actor's pocket, sovereign immunity may not be implicated.
No federal statute authorizes federal courts to hear suits or give relief against federal officers who violate the Constitution of the United States. However, the Supreme Court has long held that federal officers may be sued for declaratory or injunctive relief to prevent future infringements of federal laws. See, e.g., id.; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). For purposes of a due process claim against a judicial officer at this stage of the proceedings, any appearance of impropriety is sufficient to survive the limited pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Church of Scientology Int'l v. Kolts, 846 F.Supp. 873, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
Nonetheless, plaintiff cannot use this proceeding as a collateral attack on the dismissal of her complaint in case 3:19-cv-1717-AC.
[b]y styling his or her complaint as a Bivens injunctive action, a federal court litigant could circumvent the limitations on direct appeal, including interlocutory appeal, and for extraordinary writs. To allow a district court to grant injunctive relief ... would be to permit, in effect, a ‘horizontal appeal' from one district court to another or even a ‘reverse review' of a ruling of the court of appeals by a district court. Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987).
Regarding money damages, both Judges Acosta and Hernandez are entitled to immunity. Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for their judicial acts. Id. at 1388. In addition, the judicial or quasi-judicial immunity available to federal officers in suits involving claims for damages, extends to actions for declaratory, injunctive, and other equitable relief. Id. at 1394. Such immunity will not be deprived because the action taken was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of authority; rather, liability only attaches when a judge has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, (1978). The act of adjudicating plaintiff's claim is clearly a judicial act no matter the motivation behind the act. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (Judicial immunity from civil liability is not affected by the motives with which the judicial acts are performed, and intent plays no role in the immunity analysis).
The test for determining whether an act by a judge is “judicial” in nature is to determine whether the act “is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. The acts of making rulings, holding hearings, and adjudicating claims are acts well within the purview of functions “normally performed by a judge” in his or her judicial capacity. Accordingly, the judicial officers identified in the complaint are immune from this action.
Where a complaint can be remedied by an amendment, a district court may not dismiss the complaint with prejudice but must permit the amendment. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992). Because the complaint, no matter how construed, runs into the roadblocks of sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, and the prohibition on collateral attacks on a court decision, there is no cure to the deficiencies in the pleading. Accordingly, the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's application for IFP status (ECF 1) is granted, however, the Clerk of the Court shall not issue process. For the reasons stated above, the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice and a judgment should be entered.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment or appealable order. The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the court. Thereafter, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge will be considered as a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to this recommendation.