Opinion
No. 2-149 / 01-0913.
Filed June 19, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, ARTIS REIS, Judge.
Plaintiff claims the district court erred in refusing to grant her request for a default judgment and by dismissing her petition. AFFIRMED.
Robert Wright, Jr. of Wright Wright, Des Moines, for appellant.
Horace Cheatum, Memphis, Tennessee appellee pro se.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Plaintiff-appellant, Diane Waddy, appeals from the district court's refusal to grant her motion for a default judgment against a Tennessee resident, after he failed to appear and defend against her petition seeking damages in an Iowa court. The district court concluded Waddy's action was an impermissible collateral attack on the final judgment of a Tennessee court and dismissed her petition. We agree with the district court's conclusion and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Diane Waddy claims that Horace Cheatum is the biological father of her son Romaine, born April 23, 1985. On March 1, 1994, a Tennessee court entered an order finding that Cheatum was not the biological father of Waddy's son. Six years later, Waddy filed a claim against Cheatum in Iowa district court. In her petition, filed June 30, 2000, she sought damages from Cheatum resulting from the fraud he allegedly perpetrated on the Tennessee court which adjudicated the paternity of Waddy's child in 1994. Waddy's petition alleges Cheatum fraudulently submitted a urine sample to the Tennessee court.
Cheatum, who continues to live in Tennessee, was served with Waddy's petition on September 9, 2000. On December 7, 2000, Waddy filed a motion for a default judgment against Cheatum because he had failed to make an appearance, or answer her petition. The district court responded by ordering the plaintiff to supplement the record with information that would establish a basis for the court's exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant or the subject matter. Waddy then filed an affidavit espousing her theory that Cheatum committed fraud in the Tennessee paternity action by submitting a blood sample that was not his own in order to avoid the responsibilities of paternity. After examining Waddy's affidavit, the district court informed her it would not re-litigate the paternity action previously adjudicated in Tennessee. The court also expressed its belief that the proper forum for Waddy's claim of fraud appeared to lie with the courts of Tennessee. The court gave Waddy a final opportunity to submit authority establishing the Iowa court had jurisdiction and informed her that if she failed to do so, her petition would be dismissed.
Waddy refers to a urine sample in her petition and to a blood sample in other pleadings filed in the district court.
Waddy responded with a statement of authority, which acknowledged her petition amounted to a collateral attack against the Tennessee judgment. She argued the Iowa court had jurisdiction to consider her collateral attack on the judgment because "extrinsic fraud" had perverted the judicial process in Tennessee. The district court disagreed and dismissed Waddy's petition. Waddy appeals.
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW
The decision whether to grant a default judgment rests in the sound discretion of the district court. Kohorst v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 348 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Iowa 1984). We review the district court's ruling for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is found where the court's ruling is clearly based on untenable or unreasonable grounds. Troendle v. Hanson, 570 N.W.2d 753, 754 (Iowa 1997).
III. ANALYSIS
Upon review of the record, we conclude the district court properly dismissed Waddy's petition. Generally, courts are prohibited from mounting collateral attacks on the judgments of other state courts. An exception applies where a plaintiff alleges the out of state judgment was fraudulently obtained through some act of the opposing party. More specifically, courts have consistently held that such collateral attacks must be based on allegations of "extrinsic fraud" rather than "intrinsic fraud." Mauer v. Rohde, 257 N.W.2d 489, 496 (Iowa 1977).
Our supreme court explored the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud in Mauer v. Rohde, 257 N.W.2d 489, 496 (Iowa 1977) where it explained:
Intrinsic fraud occurs within the framework of the actual conduct of the trial and pertains to and affects the determination of the issue presented therein. It may be accomplished by perjury, or by the use of false or forged instruments, or by concealment or misrepresentation of evidence.
Extrinsic fraud on the other hand, has been described as the fraud which keeps a litigant from presenting the facts of his or her case and prevents an adjudication on the merits. Examples of extrinsic fraud are a bribed judge, dishonest attorney representing the defrauded client, or a false promise or compromise.
Waddy claims Cheatum submitted a blood or urine sample other than his own for testing when the paternity of her child was determined in Tennessee in 1994. She argues her claim in Iowa is based on extrinsic fraud in Tennessee, and therefore, she contends it is proper for her to collaterally attack a matter previously adjudicated in Tennessee in the courts of Iowa. The district court disagreed, finding that Waddy's claim was based on intrinsic rather than extrinsic fraud. We agree with this conclusion.
We conclude the deceptive sample allegedly submitted by the defendant in the Tennessee paternity action is akin to false testimony and fraudulent exhibits which have previously been categorized as intrinsic fraud by Iowa courts. Phipps v. Winneshick County, 593 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Iowa 1999) (stating that false testimony is intrinsic fraud); In re B.J.H., 564 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Iowa 1997) (holding that intrinsic fraud includes false testimony and fraudulent exhibits). If a false sample of blood or urine was submitted for testing by the defendant in the Tennessee paternity action, then the fraud occurred within the framework and conduct of the Tennessee trial, and is therefore intrinsic in nature.
Intrinsic fraud occurs within the framework of the actual trial and pertains to or affects the determination of the issue presented therein. Mauer, 257 N.W.2d at 496. A collateral attack based on fraud cannot be predicated on issues which actually were, or with due diligence could have been, presented and adjudicated in the original proceeding. Gigilos v. Stauropoulos, 204 N.W.2d 619, 621 (Iowa 1973). The affidavit Waddy provided to the district court states in pertinent part: "Mr. Cheatum had told me on several occasions, prior to my pregnancy, stories about how he and his friends would substitute blood samples for paternity tests." Waddy's opportunity to fully investigate this lead and make the truth appear was through the paternity action in the Tennessee court, not by collateral attack on the judgment mounted six years later in another state court.
We conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to grant Waddy's motion for default judgment. We further conclude that Waddy's attack on the 1994 Tennessee judgment is based on intrinsic rather than extrinsic fraud. Therefore, her petition was properly dismissed by the district court.
AFFIRMED.